Secure architectures for pairing based public key cryptography by Pan, Weibo
Title Secure architectures for pairing based public key cryptography
Author(s) Pan, Weibo
Publication date 2013
Original citation Pan, W. 2013. Secure architectures for pairing based public key
cryptography. PhD Thesis, University College Cork.
Type of publication Doctoral thesis
Rights © 2013. Weibo Pan
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
Embargo information No embargo required
Item downloaded
from
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/1336
Downloaded on 2017-02-12T08:14:46Z
Secure Architectures for Pairing
Based Public Key Cryptography
Weibo Pan
September 2013
A Thesis Submitted to the
National University of Ireland
in Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Supervisor: Dr. Liam Marnane
Head of Department: Prof. Nabeel A. Riza
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,
University College, Cork
ABSTRACT
Along with the growing demand for cryptosystems in systems ranging from large
servers to mobile devices, suitable cryptogrophic protocols for use under certain
constraints are becoming more and more important. Constraints such as calculation
time, area, efficiency and security, must be considered by the designer.
Elliptic curves, since their introduction to public key cryptography in 1985 have
challenged established public key and signature generation schemes such as RSA,
offering more security per bit. Amongst Elliptic curve based systems, pairing based
cryptographies are thoroughly researched and can be used in many public key pro-
tocols such as identity based schemes. For hardware implementions of pairing based
protocols, all components which calculate operations over Elliptic curves can be
considered. Designers of the pairing algorithms must choose calculation blocks and
arrange the basic operations carefully so that the implementation can meet the con-
straints of time and hardware resource area. This thesis deals with different hardware
architectures to accelerate the pairing based cryptosystems in the field of character-
istic two. Using different top-level architectures the hardware efficiency of operations
that run at different times is first considered in this thesis.
Security is another important aspect of pairing based cryptography to be con-
sidered in practically Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks. The naively imple-
mented hardware accelerators for pairing based cryptographies can be vulnerable
when taking the physical analysis attacks into consideration. This thesis considered
the weaknesses in pairing based public key cryptography and addresses the particular
calculations in the systems that are insecure.
In this case, countermeasures should be applied to protect the weak link of the
implementation to improve and perfect the pairing based algorithms. Some impor-
tant rules that the designers must obey to improve the security of the cryptosystems
are proposed. According to these rules, three countermeasures that protect the pair-
ing based cryptosystems against SCA attacks are applied. The implementations of
the countermeasures are presented and their performances are investigated.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Throughout the development of human civilization, people all over the world have
developed their own methods to protect their information in communications. In
modern society, cryptosystems use secret keys to transform plaintext into ciphertext
[1]. Both the encryptor and the decryptor need these secret key system to communi-
cate. However, once the key is exposed, this system can be solved easily. The study
of trying to break an encryption system without previously knowing the secret key
is called cryptanalysis. The idea of cryptanalysis has existed since cryptography was
first developed. Throughout history, cryptanalysis and cryptography have spurred
on the development of the other. It always happens that in a war or a commercial
war, breaking encrypted information of an opponent can lead to decisive events or
even victory. Advanced cryptanalysis technology forces people to develop newer and
stronger methods for securely encrypting and transmitting information.
Cryptography was initially used to protect secret information by governments
and the military. With the development of the modern society, the demand for
information security comes from many fields, such as commerces, client information
protection, or personal e-mails. Since secure cryptographic systems are required in
many applications, this thesis analyses and implements a highly effecient and secure
public-key cryptographic scheme.
In the 1970s, cryptography became a widespread tool for securing communica-
tions. The security of modern public key cryptography relies on some mathematical
problems. These problems include integer factorization [2] and the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP) [3]. Among modern cryptosystems, Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
[4, 5] and Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) [6] based on pairings [4] are popular
public key schemes.
Pairing based IBE and ABE systems can be implemented on hardware accelera-
tors on FPGAs. Different implementations of the cryptosystem can meet the demand
for information security in many devices ranging from large servers, to mobile de-
1.2. Aim of thesis
vices, to smart cards. Flexible platforms provide a variety of solutions for different
constraints for certain demands. For example, a large server will use more hardware
in exchange for a faster operation speed, while a smart card can use less hardware
and a restricted operation speed. In most previous pairing based algorithm imple-
mentations, timing efficiency were considered as the first priority [7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
However, such designs do not satisfy the various demands of different applications.
Thus, this work not only focuses on the the calculation speed, but also considers
the hardware efficiency of the designs. In this work, different schedules of arranging
the calculation modules are used, similar to those investigated in [12]. In addition,
examing the calculation loop in the pairing based algorithm allows the differences
between operations that happen only once and those that iterate many times to be
considered for the first time. Thus in this work, different top-level architectures are
implemented and their effeciency is investigated.
However, people who take such cryptosystem as a method to protect their infor-
mation would always ask: “Are these schemes secure?” Thus in this work the security
aspect of the chosen cryptographic algorithm implementation will be examined and
perfected.
“The greatest enemy is the greatest teacher.” The improvement and perfection
of a cryptogarphic algorithm will not happen without the input of cryptanalysis.
To examine the security aspect from point of view of an attacker helps a designer
overcome the defects existing in the original cryptosystem. Side channel information
leaked from the operating hardware is often related to the secret information [13, 14,
15]. A cryptosystem designer should consider all the assumptions under which the
attackers may find weaknesses in the proposed cryptosystem.
If there is any weakness identified in the cryptosystem, a designer should try to
overcome such defects by applying countermeasures accordingly. Countermeasures
must be carefully applied so that the including hard mathematical problem still exists
while the weakness is perfectly masked. Although introducing countermeasures to
the original algorithm can lead to the lowering of the efficiency of the design by
increasing the operation time and hardware used, it still is necessary.
1.2 Aim of thesis
The primary aim of this work is to investigate and improve the secure implementation
of a public key cryptographic processor. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [3, 19]
was introduced by Miller and Koblitz in 1985 [20, 21]. It is based on a mathematical
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entity known as an elliptic curve [22] and provides a good security level making use of
only small hardware resources [23]. Pairing based cryptography (PBC) is used in new
forms of public key cryptography known as IBE and ABE. Among PBCs, the Tate
Pairings is proved to be the most efficient one [24, 25]. In this work, the performance
and security aspects of the Tate pairing, more specifically the ηT algorithm [26] for
calculating the Tate pairing, will be investigated.
There are two main options for implementing the Tate pairing: software on a gen-
eral purpose processor and dedicated hardware. The general purpose processors are
in general electronic devices whose functions are based on the software programmes
implemented, such as computers, PDAs and cell phones. However, as these proces-
sors are not optimized for implementing cryptography, a software implementation on
a general purpose processor may lead to low performance [27, 28, 29, 30], and more-
over, security aspects of the secret information in the general purpose processors is
not guaranteed. A dedicated hardware processor for the cryptosystems can provide
much better performance, not only accelerating the operation time, but also promis-
ing better security and can be tamper proof to prevent attackers compromising the
cryptosystem. Thus, dedicated hardware accelerators are widely used in implement-
ing practical cryptosystems. In this work, the algorithms are implemented on Field
Programmable Gate Arrays.
There are several parameters to show the efficiency of a hardware processor.
Since dedicated hardware processors are initially developed to accelerate the op-
eration speed of the cryptography, operation time is considered as an important
parameter. Area efficiency is another factor that has been considered. This is be-
cause in hardware implementations, taking more silicon resource leads to more cost.
Thus, in this thesis, both time and area are taken as performance parameters.
By scheduling the architecture and the operations of the cryptographic algo-
rithms, the flexibility of the algorithms is also considered in this thesis. In the
architecture for the Tate pairing, there are arithmetic units over GF (24m) such as
additions, squarings, multiplications and divisions. These units can be implemented
as operations over GF (2m). In practical implementation of the Tate pairing algo-
rithm, the architectures can be reconfigured for different design constraints, such as
the number of multipliers used in the design and the size of multipliers. This results
in trade-offs between calculation time and area. In this thesis, the architectures for
the Tate pairing algorithm are described using VHDL, and then synthesized for a
particular FPGA technology. A software program is used to automatically generate
the VHDL implementation of the architectures for different constraints. This soft-
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ware along with the use of FPGAs, allows the implementation of different designs to
be quickly analyzed.
Apart from cost and efficiency, security is another important aspect of a cryp-
tosystem. A new class of attack on cryptography known as side channel analysis
(SCA) attacks [14], which monitors the side channel information (electromagnetic
radiation, timing, power [13, 14, 15]) of a cryptosystem, has been developed to reveal
the knowledge of the secret key. In this thesis, the security of the Tate pairing is
considered. Several different attacks are applied on the Tate pairing designs to test
their resistance against SCA attacks. For different kinds of protocols, the security is
discussed. Against SCA attacks, several countermeasures are studied, including uti-
lizing the bilinear property of the Tate pairing [16, 17], randomizing Miller variables
in the algorithm [17], and using projective coordinates to mask the operations [18].
The proposed countermeasures are implemented in this work and the operation time
and area costs of their implementations are evaluated, along with the consideration
of the security aspects of the countermeasures.
1.3 Thesis outline
In this thesis, ηT algorithm, a fast approach to calculate the Tate pairing is studied.
Considering the constraints of time and area, the scheduling methods of implement-
ing the ηT pairing algorithm will be discussed. For security aspect of the ηT pairing
algorithm, the important applications, the pairing based IBE system [5, 4] and ABE
system [6] will be considered in this work. In the IBE or ABE cryptosystem, how
the ηT pairing algorithm can be attacked under certain conditions is discussed. With
all these possible attacks available to an opponent, countermeasures must be consid-
ered by the cryptosystem designer. Three countermeasures are studied and applied
to protect the ηT pairing algorithm.
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical material behind private and public key cryp-
tography. In particular, the pairing based cryptosystems and the elliptic curve on
which pairings are based and their underlying fields arithmetic are covered. The
details of some applications of the pairing based cryptography, for example the IBE
and ABE schemes are introduced. Cryptanalysis is the ever present force finding
weaknesses and spurring the development of cryptography. To improve and perfect
the cryptosystem, this thesis applies correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks on
the hardware implemented pairing based cryptosystems. Introduction of the mathe-
matical theory of CPA and the FPGA platform on which the proposed cryptosystem
10
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is implemented is also given in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, the size of the Galois Field where the Elliptic curve lies on is deter-
mined. All calculations in the pairing based algorithms are operated over the chosen
Elliptic curve. The basic operation blocks of Addition and Squaring are introduced.
Two popular methods of implementing field Multiplication, the digit-serial multipli-
cation and the Karatsuba Multiplier are discussed. For the implementation of field
Division/Inversion, an Itoh-Tsujii algorithm which makes use of the squaring and the
multiplication to implement an inversion operation over GF (2m), and a dedicated
algorithm for Division over GF (2m), the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) are
introduced. These operations form the basic calculation units of a pairing based
algorithm.
Chapter 4 introduces the structure and design flow of the ηT pairing over select
Elliptic curve. As the operation field of the ηT pairing is raised to an extended field
GF (24m), the operations for addition, squaring, multiplication and division are in-
troduced. The top level architectures of the implementation of the ηT pairing are
presented. Since there are 7 multiplications in the main loop in the ηT pairing cal-
culation, when using the digit-serial multiplier, these multiplications dominate the
calculation time. Different schedules for arranging these 7 multiplications are ap-
plied. The implementation results of ηT pairing using both the digit-serial multiplier
and the Karatsuba multiplier are shown in this chapter.
In Chapter 5 the detailed calculation steps of CPA attacks are introduced. To
examine the security aspect of the ηT pairing algorithm in a more practical and
more general way, the important applications, the pairing based IBE scheme and
ABE scheme, are chosen as the targets of the CPA attack. The weaknesses of the ηT
pairing algorithm in the IBE system are discussed in this chapter. The CPA attacks
are applied against every weakness of the algorithm, including the adder and the two
multipliers. With the power traces of these operations collected using an oscilloscope,
this chapter presents how an attacker tries to attack such components making use of
the side channel information leaked during the operations. The target components of
each proposed attack, the operation steps, and the mathematical calculation results
of the attacks applied are described.
Chapter 6 introduces the precautions that must be used to implement a pairing
based IBE system according to the weaknesses exposed by the attacks proposed in
chapter 5. These precautions can be applied through carefully arranging the inter-
mediate variables and the operation blocks by the hardware designers. However,
applying such precautions does not provide perfect security to the Tate pairing algo-
11
1.3. Thesis outline
rithm. Some defects of the pairing based IBE and ABE cryptosystems must be fixed
through additional operations. For this reason, several countermeasures to protect
the pairing algorithm from CPA attacks are introduced and applied to the original
ηT pairing. The implementation results of such countermeasures using the same
top-level architectures are shown.
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2. BACKGROUND THEORY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the mathematical background and some of the theories related
to the topics covered in this thesis. Section 2.2 briefly introduces cryptography. Sec-
tion 2.3 explains the difference between private and public key cryptography. Some
popular public key schemes, the IBE scheme and the ABE scheme, are introduced
in this section.
In section 2.4, the basic mathematical concepts of groups, finite fields, elliptic
curves and point operations over elliptic curves are introduced. In section 2.5, the
basic theory of Tate pairing and an example of pairing based IBE and ABE schemes,
are presented. Discrete logarithm problems (DLPs), serving as the main security
challenge in each case, are discussed.
Section 2.6 introduces some popular cryptanalysis measures of attacking public
key cryptography. Mathematical analysis methods and their complexity are consid-
ered in this section. As a popular method to attack hardware implemented cryp-
tosystems, side channel analysis attacks are introduced. The security of pairing
based IBE and ABE schemes, as examples of pairing based public key schemes, is
discussed in this section.
Section 2.7 introduces some dedicated hardware accelerators used to implement
the pairing based cryptographic algorithms and the reason why they are used. Two
different types of FPGA platforms used in the thesis are introduced in this section.
The method of evaluating the power consumption of a hardware accelerator is also
explained.
2.2 Cryptography
Cryptography protects information and information systems from unauthorized ac-
cess or from being modified [1]. Thousands of years ago people realized that it was
necessary to protect the confidentiality of important information. Secrets should
2.2. Cryptography
always be kept secure from being accessed and tampered with by unintended recip-
ients. Julius Caesar, the Roman Emperor [34] was credited with the invention of
the Caesar cipher in approximately 50 B.C., which was created for the protection of
the secret and important messages being transmitted between Caesar and his mili-
tary. This Caeser Cipher encrypts a message by substituting letters in the message
with letters a fixed number of positions down the alphabet. The number of places
the letters were shifted along the alphabet is called the secret key. Over the years,
novel ciphers were invented and used in cryptography to make cryptosystems more
and more secure. World War II resulted in significant improvements in information
security and marked the beginning of the professional field of modern cryptography.
As modern electronics develops, the development of the internet and personal
computers calls for cryptographic protocols that are suitable for daily communica-
tions. In many applications, keeping the information transferred between public
communication platforms secret can be critical to politics, business and personal
interests. Digital cryptography has developed in order to meet these security needs
[35].
Cryptography, as a system of protecting information, is of course not just about
keeping private information from being read by an unintended recipient. As a safe-
guard of the modern communication via electronic media, modern cryptography
encompasses Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability. Other principles, such as
Authenticity and Non-Repudiation, are also considered to be very important [36].
• Confidentiality: A message should not be disclosed to unauthorized individuals
or systems.
• Integrity: It is always possible to check the message has not been altered while
in transit.
• Availability: A cryptosystem must remain available at all times.
• Authenticity: The identities of the sender and recipient, and the data being
transmitted, are genuine.
• Non-Repudiation: The sender cannot deny having sent a particular message.
The recipient cannot deny having received a particular message.
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2.3 Private and Public Key Cryptography
To provide the properties mentioned above in section 2.2, different protocols have
been developed. There are two different types of cryptography nowadays: private
key cryptography and public key cryptography.
Private key cryptography, also called symmetric key cryptography, uses a single
secret key k which is shared by both the sender and the receiver. This key is used
both to encrypt and decrypt the information. Both sender and receiver need the key
and the key must be kept secret from anyone else. The security of the transmission
depends on how well the key is protected.
Public key cryptography uses two different keys to encrypt and decrypt: a public
and a private key, respectively. Each user has its own key set and while the private
key must be kept secret the public key is publicly available to everyone. Both keys
are mathematically related.
2.3.1 Private Key Cryptography
A communication between Alice and Bob using the private key cryptosystem is
illustrated in Fig. 2.1. In the transmission, Alice first encrypts the plaintext m
using the encryption function E and the secret key k. The encrypted text is called
the ciphertext c. Then Alice sends c to Bob through the insecure channel. The cipher
text c is of no use to anyone except Bob because Bob holds the same shared secret key
k and can recover the message from ciphertext c to plaintext m using a decryption
function D. For security reasons, the primary requirement of this cryptosystem is
that it must be constructed so as to prevent an eavesdropper from simply trying
every possible key (known as brute force attack [37]).
Private key cryptosystems are considered very fast and, thus, are suitable for the
transmissions of a large throughput of data. However, there are two problems to
consider: the key distribution problem and the key management problem. The key
distribution problem is how Alice and Bob agree the value of their shared secret key.
A third party key generator over some secure channel is necessary to distribute the
key. The key management problem is that for each pair of users in the communication
network, there must be a unique key. Therefore, for a network of n users, at least
n(n−1)
2
unique keys are required [38]. For a large network, the number of unique keys
becomes difficult to manage.
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Fig. 2.1: Private key scheme communication
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Fig. 2.2: Public key scheme communication
2.3.2 Public Key Cryptography
Consider the communication between Alice and Bob again, as shown in Fig. 2.2. In
a Public key cryptosystem, Alice has a public and private key pair: (PAlice, KAlice),
respectively. Similarly, Bob has (PBob,KBob). If Alice wants to send Bob a message
m, she firstly encrypts the message with Bob’s public key, PBob. The encrypted
message is then sent to Bob and can only be decrypted using Bob’s private key,
KBob. Similarly, anyone who knows Alice’s public key can send her a message by
encrypting it with her public key PAlice. Alice will then decrypt the message with
her private key KAlice.
In this scheme, the key distribution problem is solved because the public key
is available to everyone. Alice and Bob do not need to agree a shared secret key.
Similarly, anyone who wants to communicate with Bob can encrypt their message
with the same public key PBob. Thus, key management is no longer a problem.
The British government claimed that James H. Ellis, Clifford Cocks and Malcolm
Williamson, members of the British Government Communicationis Headquarters
(GCHQ), first developed the public key algorithms in 1973. The reader may refer to
[39] for the story. However, the most famous public key scheme is RSA which was
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developed in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in the US [40].
The disadvantage of public key cryptography is that it is much more computa-
tionally complex than private key cryptography. Although public key cryptography
eliminates the key distribution and key management problems, it brings some prob-
lems of its own. The main problem is the confirmation of the authenticity of the
public key. In the communication model, Alice has to consider whether the public
key of Bob, received from an insecure channel, is the real one or a value sent by an
attacker.
In a public key cryptosystem, since Alice cannot confirm whether the public key
is authentic or not, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be introduced [41]. The
PKI includes a trusted third party that provides the service of a Certificate Authority
(CA) [42]. CA certifies Bob’s public key as belonging to him. Before Alice sends
Bob a message, she has to validate the public key of Bob by contacting the CA.
This adds an additional step in the communication between Alice and Bob. It is
very important that the CA is trustworthy, otherwise Alice may receive false keys
disguised by some attackers and any message Alice encrypted using the false keys
may be easily decrypted by the attacker.
2.3.3 Identity Based Encryption
In 1984 Shamir [5] proposed a public key scheme in which the public key can be an
arbitrary string. This scheme is called IBE. The first practical IBE implementation
was applied by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [4]. IBE was originally developed to
simplify the certification process. It eliminates the need for the CA. Thus, a PKI
is no longer necessary in the scheme. Instead, a trusted third party Public Key
Generator (PKG) is introduced which is used to distribute the private key of a
receiver.
The structure of an IBE scheme is shown in Fig. 2.3. In the figure, PBob and KBob
represent the keys to encrypt and to decrypt respectively. An encrypted message ‘m’
can be readily decrypted by the intended recepient Bob only.
In an IBE system, each user is identified by a unique identity string, for example
a user name or an e-mail address. The identity of Bob in Fig. 2.3 is IDBob . The
IBE system can be described in 4 steps: setup, key generation, encryption and de-
cryption.
Setup A trusted third party, the PKG, publishes the algorithm E for encryption
and D for decryption, a random generator g and some related rules such as how the
user’s public key can be generated. All elements used in this cryptosystem are a
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Fig. 2.3: Identity-Based Encryption scheme structure
multiple of the generator g.
Key generation The PKG randomly picks a master key M.KBob for Bob. With
this master key, the PKG generates a pair of keys, a public key PBob and a private
key KBob, for user Bob and publishes the public key PBob of IDBob to the insecure
channel.
Encryption Sender Alice in this IBE scheme can get the public key PBob according
to the information published by the PKG (without certificates). Alice then picks
a random number rAlice and generates an identity number gAlice using generator g:
gAlice = g ∗ rAlice. This gAlice helps Bob recognize the sender of the received message.
The rules published by the PKG must ensure that the decryptor can remove rAlice
using gAlice. With the elements above, Alice can encrypt a message ‘m’ by calcula-
tion c = E(m,PBob, rAlice). Alice sends Bob the message pair {c, gAlice}.
Decryption The PKG is responsible for delivering the private key KBob to the au-
thorised recipient Bob according to his ID. When Bob wants to decrypt the message,
he has to contact the PKG and ask for his corresponding private key. On confirma-
tion of IDBob, the PKG sends Bob his private key KBob through some secure channel.
With the received message pair {c, gAlice} and the private key KBob, Bob is able to
decrypt the message by calculation: m = D(c,KBob, gAlice).
In this scheme, it is no longer necessary that the message sender contact a third
party to validate the public key of a receiver. It is easier to send a message as the
onus is on the receiver to contact the PKG and verify his identity to obtain the
private key. This scheme also allows the PKG to control the validity of a customer’s
identity. If the PKG finds that the identity of Bob is no longer valid, it can change
the master key and thus, the private key that Bob received before no longer works.
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2.3.4 Attribute Based Encryption
ABE [6] is a new kind of public key encryption which is based on IBE [5]. In contrast
to the IBE schemes, ABE is a scheme in which each user is identified by a set of
attributes, for example age, gender, college, etc. Some function of those attributes
is used to determine decryption ability for each ciphertext.
Sahai and Waters introduced a single authority attribute encryption scheme in
[6] and named this scheme a ‘Fuzzy identity-based encryption’. In this scheme, a
trusted third party is needed to monitor all the attributes of the users. This authority
is in charge of delivering the secret keys corresponding to each of the attributes to
the intended recepients.
There are two kinds of ABE systems, Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-
Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE [6, 43], every ciphertext is associated with a
set of attributes and the secret key of every user is associated with a threshold
access structure based on attributes. Decryption is enabled if and only if the cipher-
text attribute set satisfies the access structure of the user secret key. In CP-ABE,
[44, 45, 46, 47, 48], the situation is reversed: each ciphertext is associated with an
access structure.
2.3.5 ABE structure
The structure of a basic ABE scheme is shown in Fig. 2.4. In the figure, Ai represents
different attribute parameters. In this scheme, a sender can designate the recepient to
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be a set of elements holding the same specific attributes. For example, a boys’ soccer
team recruiting e-mail may be sent to all boys between 19 - 20 years old. In an ABE
system, all members with attributes age = 19 or 20 and attribute gender = male
will be qualified to decrypt such an e-mail. In this case, Bob and Bill, respectively
19 and 20 years of age, are able to read such an e-mail whilst the girl Eva does not
get access to such information.
Similar to IBE systems, an ABE system can be described using the following
steps: setup, encryption, key generation and decryption [43]. Suppose there are 5
attributes in the ABE system shown in Fig. 2.4, i.e. Ai, where i ∈ Z5. Taking Bob
as an example, the operations in the ABE scheme are described as follows:
Setup This is a randomized algorithm that takes no input other than the implicit
security parameter. In the ABE scheme shown in Fig. 2.4, the Key Generator
publishes the attribute set γtotal={Ai} and a public key set PK={Ti}. It keeps
the master key MK which was used to generate the public key and will be used to
generate the secret key SK.
Encryption This is a randomized algorithm that takes as input a message m, a
set of attributes γe with ne attributes and the public parameters PK. It outputs
the ciphertext c and a number d. In Fig. 2.4, Sender Alice picks 3 attributes
γe = {A1, A3, A4} out of the 5 attributes and uses the corresponding public key
{T1, T3, T4} to encrypt the message m, into ciphertext c and defines a number d = 2
which means that any decryptor should hold at least 2 of the attributes in γe to
decrypt the message.
Key Generation This is a randomized algorithm that takes as input an access
structure γ1, the master key MK and the public parameters PK. It outputs a de-
cryption key SK={Di}. In Fig. 2.4, this step shows the communications between
Bob and the Key Generation algorithm. On trying to get the access to the message,
Bob has to contact the Key Generator with the attributes, γBob={A1, A3}, he holds
and ask for the corresponding secret key. The Key Generator generates a secret
key set SKBob = {DBob1 , DBob3 } according to the master key and the attribute set
input by Bob and sends SKBob back to the decryptor. In SKBob = {DBob1 , DBob3 }
the superscript ‘Bob’ implies that the secret key set is randomly generated for Bob.
Decryption This algorithm takes as input the ciphertext c that was encrypted under
the set γe of attributes, the decryption key SK={Di} for access control structure γBob
and the public parameters PK. It outputs the correct message m if |γe ∩ γBob|≥ d,
where ‘||’ represents the number of elements. In Fig. 2.4, on receiving the secret key
set SKBob = {DBob1 , DBob3 }, Bob is able to compute the plain text of the message.
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No matter how many attributes Bob holds, provided at least 2 of the attributes in
γBob match with those in γe, the message will be correctly decrypted. Otherwise,
Bob will not have the access to the plain text.
For Bill, the same steps are performed and Bill will get a secret key set SKBill =
{DBill1 , DBill4 } for decryption. Thus, this system enables an encryptor to send a mes-
sage to a group of recepients who match the requirements he sets up. Note that
the secret key sets, SKBob and SKBill, are randomly generated for specific decryp-
tors. Although Decryptor1 and Decryptor2 hold 3 attributes in total ({A1, A3, A4}),
merging the information from Decryptor1 and Decryptor2 generates the secret key
set {DBob1 , DBob3 , DBill1 , DBill4 } rather than {DBob1 , DBob3 , DBob4 } or {DBill1 , DBill3 , DBill4 }.
This means that unqualified decryptors cannot forge secret keys, even by colluding.
2.4 Mathematical Background
In this section the necessary mathematical background is introduced. The concepts
of groups, fields and elliptic curves are necessary for building the cryptosystem pre-
sented in this thesis.
2.4.1 Groups
In mathematics, a group is an algebraic structure which consists of a set of elements
and an operation [49]. Such an operation is called the group operation. The group
operation operates on any two of its elements to form a third element. For example,
the set of integers is a group and addition and multiplications are both group oper-
ations of the integer group. A group must satisfy the following properties under the
‘+’ operation:
• Closure: the result of the operation is still in the group, c = a+ b, if a, b ∈ G,
then c ∈ G,
• Associativity: the group operation order does not affect the operation result,
(a+ b) + c = a+ (b+ c) for any a, b, c ∈ G.
• Identity element: There exists an identity element e ∈ G, such that for every
element a ∈ G, the equation e+ a = a+ e = a holds.
• Inverse element: For each a ∈ G, there exists an element b ∈ G such that
a+ b = b+ a = e.
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A group G is said to be Abelian or commutative if a+ b = b+ a, a, b ∈ G. A group
G is said to be finite if there is a finite number of elements in the group. The order
of this group is defined as the number of elements in the group, denoted #G. For
example, the integer Z with addition as its group operation, is an infinite group, its
order is infinity. A group made up of integers modulo p is a finite group, denoted
Zp, where p is the order of this group.
A group G is said to be cyclic if there exists an element g such that for any
element a ∈ G, there exists integer k such that [k]g = a. Here the operation [k]g = a
is the k times addition chain of g, as shown in equation 2.1.
a = [k]g = g + g + ...+ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
‘+′ k−1 times
(2.1)
Here the element g is called the generator of this cyclic group G. The cyclic group
generated by g is denoted < g >. The smallest integer n that satisfies [n]g = e is
the order of this group.
2.4.2 Finite Fields
Mathematically, a field is a cyclic group of elements in which nonzero elements form
a group under multiplication [50]. In a field, notions of addition, subtraction, mul-
tiplication and division satisfy certain axioms. A field F must satisfy the following
properties:
• Closure: c = a+ b, d = a ∗ b, if a, b ∈ G, then c, d ∈ F .
• Associativity: (a+b)+c = a+(b+c) and (a∗b)∗c = a∗(b∗c) for all a, b, c ∈ F .
• Commutative: a+ b = b+ a and a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a and b ∈ F .
• Distributive: a ∗ (b+ c) = a ∗ b+ a ∗ c for all a, b, c ∈ G.
• Inverse: for all a ∈ F , there always exists an element a−1 ∈ F such that
a ∗ a−1 = 1.
The most commonly used fields are the field of real numbers and the field of complex
numbers which are infinite.
The Galois Field is a finite field named after E`variste Galois. The order of a
Galois Field must be equal to the positive integer power of a prime p. E`variste
Galois showed that for any prime p and positive integer m, there exists a finite field
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Fig. 2.5: Example of Elliptic Curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b
with q = pm elements [52]. The prime p is known as the characteristic of the field
GF (pm) = GF (q). In cryptographic applications the characteristics of p = 2, p = 3
and p some large prime are often used. Fields with characteristic two show better
performance in area, runtime, power and energy than prime fields [53]. Page showed
that finite fields of characteristic two and three result in similar performance [54]. In
this work, fields of characteristic 2 with power m ≥ 163 are used, denoted GF (2m).
2.4.3 Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields
An elliptic curve E(GF (q)) over GF (q) can be represented in equation 2.2 [51].
E(GF (q)) : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6, (2.2)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ GF (q). Any point P over this curve consists of two co-
ordinates x and y, which satisfy equation 2.2 as a pair, i.e. P (x, y) ∈ E(GF (q)),
x, y ∈ GF (q). An example of an elliptic curve over the field of real numbers is shown
in Fig. 2.5. The two curves in Fig. 2.5 are described by equation 2.3. For simplicity,
let a and b represent a4 and a6 in equation 2.2, respectively.
E(GF (q)) : y2 = x3 + ax+ b, (2.3)
Restricting the elliptic curve over some special finite fields, for example GF (2m),
simplifies the curve equation 2.2. Equation 2.4 describes an elliptic curve over
GF (2m).
E(GF (2m)) : y2 + xy = x3 + ax+ b, (2.4)
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The number of points on the curve, denoted #E(GF (2m)), is the order of the curve.
In Hasse’s Theorem [52], the number of points can be calculated as #E(GF (2m)) =
2m + 1 − Tr where Tr is called the Trace of Frobenius. Hasse pointed out that
Tr ≤ 2
√
2m. The calculation of Tr is introduced in [55]. For elliptic curves used
in cryptographic schemes, 2m is usually very large. Thus, 2
√
2m is relatively small
compare to 2m and the order of the curve can be represented by #E(GF (2m)) ≈
2m. In Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), the order of the curve represents the
number of possible values that can be used in the cryptosystem. If 2m is divisible
by Tr, the curve is supersingular. Otherwise, it is non-supersingular or ordinary.
Supersingular and non-supersingular elliptic curves behave fundamentally differently
in many aspects. For some certain supersingular elliptic curves, the operations can
be optimized. Consequently, the calculation time of the cryptographic algorithms
based on such curves can be reduced.
2.4.4 Point Operations over Elliptic Curves
There is a specified point O which represents the point at infinite. This point is also
the identity element of this elliptic curve. The point at infinity, O, together with the
curve itself, form a group which provides some useful properties for cryptography.
The group operation of Elliptic Curve is point addition, given by P2 = P0 + P1
for Pi ∈ GF (2m). It operates on two input points P0 and P1 and forms a third
point P2. For the point at infinity O there exists P + O = O + P = P , where P ∈
GF (2m). The geometrical explanation of this point addition operation is given by Ian
Blake in [51]. Let P0 and P1 be two distinct rational points on curve E(GF (2m)).
The E(GF (2m)) is a cubic curve, thus, the straight line d(x, y) joining P0 and
P1 must intersect the curve at a third point, called P2′ which is a rational point
on E(GF (2m)). Reflecting P2′ with the x-axis, one obtains another rational point
P2 = P0 + P1. Fig. 2.6(a) shows a visualization of the point addition over elliptic
curve E(GF (2m)) : y2 = x3 − x+ 1.
In point addition, the special case P0 = P1, i.e. P2 = P0 + P0 = [2]P0, is
called point doubling. In this case, the tangent to the curve at point P0, d(x, y),
must intersect the curve at exactly one other point P2′, as E(GF (2m)) is a cubic
curve. Again, reflecting P2′ about the x-axis, one obtains another rational point
P2 = P0 +P0 = [2]P0. Fig. 2.6(b) shows a visualization of point doubling over the
reals.
For an elliptic curve E(GF (2m)) defined by equation 2.4, let P0(x0, y0) and
P1(x1, y1) be the points on the curve given in affine coordinates. Assume P0, P1 6= O
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Fig. 2.6: Point Addition and Point Doubling over Elliptic curves
and P0 6= −P1. The arithmetic operations for point addition P2 = P0 + P1 and
point doubling P2 = P0 + P0 over the field GF (2m) are given as follows.
P2 = P0 + P1
λ = y0+y1
x0+x1
x2 = λ
2 + λ+ x0 + x1 + a
y2 = (x0 + x2)λ+ x2 + y0
Cost = 2M + 1I + 1S + 8A
(2.5)
P2 = P0 + P0 = [2]P0
λ = y0
x0
+ x0
x2 = λ
2 + λ+ a
y2 = (x0 + x2)λ+ x2 + y0
Cost = 2M + 1I + 1S + 6A
(2.6)
In equations 2.5 and 2.6, λ represents the slope of the straight line d(x, y) used
in the chord and tangent illustrated in Fig. 2.6(a) and 2.6(b), respectively. M, I, S
and A represent the operations of multiplication, inversion, squaring and addition
over field GF (2m), respectively. For an elliptic curve over a finite field GF (2m), the
group of points E(GF (2m)) is always either a cyclic group or the product of two
cyclic groups [56]. Based on point addition and point doubling, and recalling the
successive additions for cyclic groups in equation 2.1, a Point Scalar Multiplication
is defined as per equation 2.7:
Q = [k]P = P + P + ...+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
‘+′ k−1 times
(2.7)
where P and Q are points on curve E(GF (2m)) and k is an integer. Let ` be the
order of point P and k can be an arbitrary integer in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ `. Equation
2.7 can be simply carried out by repeated point additions. But, for large k, this
can be slow in practice. A simple method to speed up Point Scalar Multiplication
25
2.4. Mathematical Background
Algorithm 2.1 Binary Method for Point Scalar Multiplication
Input: P ∈ E(GF (2m)), n-bit integer k =
n−1∑
j=0
kj2
j, kj ∈ {0, 1}
Output: Q = [k]P ∈ E(GF (2m)))
1: Q← O
2: for j = n− 1 downto 0
3: Q← [2]Q
4: if kj = 1
5: Q← Q+ P
6: end if
7: end for
8: return Q
is to make use of both point addition and point doubling operations. The binary
method used to calculate equation 2.7 relies on the binary expansion of k, as given
in Algorithm 2.1.
This algorithm takes point P over the elliptic curve and an arbitrary integer k,
consisting of n bits, as inputs. It iterates through the n bits of k. For each bit of k,
a point doubling operation is performed. If the present bit of k equals ‘1’, a point
addition operation is also performed. Let W represent the number of bits that equal
to ‘1’ in the binary expansion of k, i.e. W =
∑n−1
j=0 kj, kj ∈ {0, 1} . The Point Scalar
Multiplication requires n− 1 point doublings and W − 1 point additions.
2.4.5 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
In a cyclic group G with a generator g and a multiplicative group operation ‘×’,
exponentiation is defined as
h = gx mod n (2.8)
where the generated element h is an element in group G, n is the order of the group
and x is some positive integer. The discrete logarithm of h is x, i.e. logg h = x. The
problem of determining the smallest positive integer x that satisfies equation 2.8 for
given elements h and g in group G, is defined as a Discrete Logarithm Problem
(DLP). In public key schemes, the group G should be sufficiently large so that
the computation of gx can be efficiently performed. However, solving the DLP is
generally intractable in such a group. If there is a fast way to solve the DLP in
group G, then this group G is insecure for a public key cryptography.
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The operations over an elliptic curve offer a property suitable for DLP. i.e., over
an elliptic curve E(GF (q)), it takes polynomial time to calculate a point scalar
multiplication Q = [k]P given k an integer and P a point over E(GF (q)). However,
it takes exponential time to find out the smallest k such that Q = [k]P , given P and
Q. The problem of solving for k under this circumstance is called the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol for sending messages was applied over
elliptic curves by ElGamal [57]. With the operation over elliptic curves, when Alice
wants to send a message m to Bob, the communication changed as follows:
• Public Key Generator posts a generator: point P ∈ E(GF (q)).
• Alice generates a random integer kA ∈ 1 ∼ ` and sends Bob:[kA]P .
• Bob generates a random integer kB ∈ 1 ∼ ` and sends Alice:[kB]P .
• Alice can compute [kAkB]P = [kA]([kB]P )
• Bob can compute [kAkB]P = [kB]([kA]P )
In this communication, generator P is posted by the Public Key Generator, which
must be a trusted third party. NIST presented some of the recommended elliptic
curves and their generators P [58]. A mathematical theorem promises that in ECC,
if a curve is of a prime order #E, then each of its elements, other than the identity,
is of order #E and, therefore, a generator of such curve [59].
In the communications between Alice and Bob above, the information exposed
to an eavesdropper is the chosen elliptic curve E(GF (2m)), a point over this curve
P and the multiples, [kA]P and [kB]P , of the point. The underlying operation in
the Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves is point scalar multiplication. An
attacker can try to solve for kA or kB, namely ECDLP. Other attackers may try
to solve [kAkB]P , namely elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problem (ECDHP). These
two problems are considered to be of the same computational complexity [60]. The
efficiency of the protocol depends on the implementation efficiency of the point scalar
multiplication. The security of the protocol depends on how strong the ECDLP is.
2.5 Pairing Based cryptography
Pairing based cryptography is a relatively new type of public key cryptographic
scheme based on Elliptic Curves. It was first used to attack elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems. Menezes et al. [61] proposed the MOV attack, also known as the Weil Descent
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attacks, which uses Weil pairing to reduce the ECDLP on the elliptic curve over
finite field GF (ql). In this attack the integer l must be carefully selected [62, 61] so
that the ECDLP on E(GF (q)) can be mapped to a DLP in GF (ql). A Similar attack
was proposed by Frey and Ruck [63] using a Tate pairing. In these pairing attacks,
an ECDLP in < P > can be mapped to the DLP over GF (qk) (see Extension field in
section 2.5.1), which can be solved using one of the known sub-exponential methods
[51].
As an efficient public key cryptographic scheme, pairings have been applied in
IBE and ABE schemes [4, 6]. A pairing operates on two points in an additive group
and maps them to a point in a multiplicative group. Let G1 be an Abelian group
with point addition as a group operation and 0 as its identity element. let G2 be a
cyclic group with multiplication as a group operation and 1 as its identity element.
The pairing is described as:
el : e(G1;G1) = G1 ×G1 → G2 (2.9)
Pairings have properties such as bilinearity and non-degeneracy which are of in-
terest for many applications [64, 25, 65, 26]. All pairings considered in cryptosystems
have the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀P, P ′ ∈ G1 and ∀Q,Q′ ∈ G2, there exists e(P + P ′;Q) =
e(P ;Q)e(P ′;Q) and e(P ;Q+Q′) = e(P ;Q)e(P ;Q′), consequently e([k]P ;Q) =
e(P ; [k]Q) = e(P ;Q)k.
• Non-degeneracy: ∀P ∈ G1, with P 6= 0, there is some Q ∈ G2 such that
e(P ;Q) 6= 1. ∀Q ∈ G2, with Q 6= 0, there is some P ∈ G1 such that e(P ;Q) 6=
1.
• Computability: ∀P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2, e(P ;Q) can be computed efficiently.
There are several pairing based algorithms, such as the Weil pairing, the modified
Weil and the Tate pairing [66, 63, 67]. Among them, the Tate pairing has proved to
be the most efficient in all fields for frequently used key sizes. For a security level
from 80 to 256 bits, the Tate pairing requires less calculations than the Weil pairing
[25]. The Tate pairing on supersingular elliptic curves described by Kwon [68] is the
focus of this work.
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2.5.1 Tate pairing over supersingular curves
Now some basic definitions used in the pairings are presented. Suppose E is an
elliptic curve defined over GF (q) and n is a positive integer which is coprime to the
characteristic of field GF (q), i.e. coprime to q. Suppose n divides #E(GF (q)).
• Embedding degree kdeg: The embedding degree of an elliptic curve E is the
smallest positive integer kdeg such that n divides (q
kdeg − 1).
• Extension field: The field GF (qkext) is a kext extension of GF (q). Conversely,
GF (q) is a subfield of GF (qkext).
• Distortion map φ: The rule that maps a point P over GF (q) to another point
P ′ over the kext extension field GF (qkext) is a Distortion map φ [69], denoted
P ′ = φ(P ).
• l-torsion: All the points of order l on E(GF (q)) form an l-torsion subgroup,
denoted (GF (q))[l] = {P ∈ E(GF (q)) : [l]P = O}.
From the definitions above, it can be seen that by picking the same degree k, i.e.
k = kdeg = kext, an elliptic curve E(GF (q)) can be mapped to its extension field
E(GF (qk)) through some distortion map.
As the point operations over supersingular elliptic curves are simpler than the
common curves over finite fields [68, 70], designers generally like to pick suitable
supersingular elliptic curves for implementing the pairing algorithms. Let Ess be a
supersingular elliptic curve over GF (q), the mathematical calculation of Tate pairing
is a map of two points over supersingular curves:
el : e(P ;Q) = ψ(P,Q)
ζ , (2.10)
where ζ = q
k−1
l
. This mathematical expression shows a non-degenerate bilinear
pairing. That is, for any P 6= O ∈ E(GF (q))[l], there exists a point Q ∈ E(GF (q))[l]
such that e(P,Q) 6= 1. Also, there exist e(P1 + P2, Q) = e(P1, Q)e(P2, Q) and
e(P,Q1 + Q2) = e(P,Q1)e(P,Q2). In equation 2.10, ψ(P,Q) is a rational function
with two input points P and Q ∈ GF (q).
In 1986, Miller described the calculation of a pairing in his algorithm [64], pro-
viding an efficient way of finding ψ given points P and Q. This algorithm, known as
Miller’s algorithm, makes use of point addition and point doubling to calculate ψ.
This algorithm was improved by many researchers since pairing based cryptosystems
have been proposed [25, 65, 66].
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The elliptic curve E(GF (q)) has point addition as its group operation. The
elliptic curve E(GF (qk))∗ indicates the multiplicative group of GF (qk), with point
scalar multiplication as its group operation and 1 as its identity element. Consider
the definition of pairing introduced in equation 2.9. Choose the l-torsion subgroup of
E(GF (q)), denoted E(GF (q))[l], to be G1, the degree k extension field E(GF (q
k))∗
to be G2. The pairing described in equation 2.9 is refined here to equation 2.11. This
pairing takes as input two elliptic curve points of order l and gives a third point over
the degree k extension field, namely the l-th order Tate pairing.
el : E(GF (q))[l]× E(GF (q))[l]→ E(GF (qk))∗ (2.11)
In 2002, Barreto, Kim, Lynn and Scott [65] showed that for some specific curves,
there exists a fast way of calculating the Tate pairing. They proposed an algorithm
called the BKLS algorithm for the Tate pairing over supersingular curves with em-
bedding degree k = 2, 4, 6. Menezes [70] pointed out that the embedding degree
k = 6 is attained for GF (3m) and the embedding degree k = 4 is attained for
GF (2m). For cryptographic purpose, elliptic curves over finite fields of characteristic
2, i.e. over GF (2m) where m is odd or more strongly a prime, are considered. The
recommended values of the binary field size m are listed in [58].
Duursma and Lee [26] proposed a closed formula for the Tate pairing which is
a faster algorithm, called the ηT pairing algorithm and Kwon [68] further improved
upon it. The ηT pairing algorithm simplifies the main loop and the final exponen-
tiation of the BKLS algorithm. This algorithm omits the denominators in Miller’s
algorithm. This greatly simplifies Miller’s algorithm because the costly division is
no longer necessary. It chooses the specific elliptic curve Eb described in equation
2.12.
Eb : y
2 + y = x3 + x+ b, (2.12)
where b=0,1. Curves Eb have embedding degree k = 4. In [68] Kwon proved that
on supersingular elliptic curve Eb over binary fields, the Tate pairing and the ηT
pairing calculate the same result, i.e. e(P ;Q) = ηT (P ;Q). The ηT pairing algorithm
is a fast calculation of Tate pairing, and so this work continues to use the notation
el : e(P ;Q) to represent an ηT pairing calculation. The Tate pairing calculation over
Eb can be described as:
el : Eb(GF (2
m))× Eb(GF (2m))→ E(GF (24m)) (2.13)
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Algorithm 2.2 ηT Algorithm for computing Tate pairing
Input: P = (α, β), Q = (x, y)
Output: C = η(P ;Q)
1: C(t)← 1
2: u← x2 + y2 + g + m−1
2
, v ← x2 + 1, α← α4, β ← β4, γ ← αv
3: for i = 0 to m− 1
4: A(t)← γ + u+ β + (α + v)t+ (α + v + 1)t2
5: C(t)← C(t)2 × A(t)
6: u← u+ v, v ← v + 1, α← α4, β ← β4, γ ← αv
7: endfor
8: C(t)← C(t)22m−1
9: return C(t)
This indicates that the Tate pairing maps two points over the same supersingular
curve over GF (2m) to an element over GF (24m).
2.5.2 Implementing the Pairings
The ηT algorithm [68] for calculating the Tate pairing is shown in Algorithm 2.2.
This algorithm takes as inputs two points P (α, β) and Q(x, y) over E(GF (2m)) and
results in an element C(t) in the extension field GF (24m).
In Algorithm 2.2, the coordinates of input points P (α, β) and Q(x, y) are pro-
cessed in step 2 to generate intermediate variables u, v, α, β and γ which are used
to calculate A(t) in every iteration of the ‘for’ loop in step 3, m times. A(t) is re-
generated in each iteration in step 4 by the basic operations over GF (2m) between
the intermediate variables, namely the Miller variables. It should be noted that A3
always equals 0. In step 5, symbols ‘×’ and ‘2’ here represent a multiplication and
a squaring over GF (24m) [77] which can be decomposed into operations in GF (2m)
and will be discussed in Chapter 4. This step updates C(t) in every iteration of the
‘for’ loop. After the ‘for’ loop, a final exponentiation operation of C(t) over GF (24m)
is applied in step 8. This is because the value of C(t) returned at the end of the ‘for’
loop is in the l-th roots of unity. The final exponentiation to the power of (22m − 1)
provides a unique value. This algorithm returns the Tate pairing result C(t).
2.5.3 Bilinear Pairings applied in IBE
Pairing based cryptography can be used in many public key protocols, for example
key distribution protocols [78, 79] and IBE [4]. Interested readers are referred to the
survey in [80]. In this section the IBE scheme of Fig. 2.3 is described using pairings
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Fig. 2.7: Pairing based IBE scheme
and is illustrated in Fig. 2.7.
The main steps in the IBE scheme considered here can be summarized as follows:
Setup In this system, PKG picks a master key M.KBob for user Bob and publishes
system parameters set <G1, G2, e, P , H1, H2, PBob, QBob>:
• Group G1 - an elliptic curve from which the initial points are picked.
• Group G2 - the extended field to which the two points are mapped.
• Bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 - the rule governing how initial points are
mapped to the extended field.
• Group generator P - which generates the l-torsion group G1.
• Cryptographic hash functions [37] H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 - maps a string of any
length to an element in group G1, i.e. transform any string to a point over
curve G1. For example, Bob’s ID can be transformed to an elliptic curve point
over G1.
• Hash functions H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n - maps an element of group G2 to a string
of n bits, where n is the bit-length of the plaintext message m.
• Master key M.KBob ∈ Z∗ - this master key can be a random number. It is
used to generate the public key and the private key and must be kept secret.
• Point PBob = [M.KBob]P - Bob’s public key, generated by the PKG.
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• Point QBob = H1(IDBob) - an element in group G1, calculated using IDBob and
hash function H1.
The identity number of each entity is public (IDAlice, IDBob). Thus, any party can
generate QBob of entity Bob using hash function H1. Note that, in this system, the
master key M.KBob chosen by PKG is used to generate both the public key and the
private key.
Key Generation Bob’s private key KBob = [M.KBob]QBob = [M.KBob]H1(IDBob) is
also generated by PKG, but should be kept secret and given to Bob through some
secure channel.
Encryption When Alice wants to send Bob an n-bit plaintext message m, she
first computes QBob = H1(IDBob) with Bob’s identity information IDBob and public
system parameter H1. Alice picks a random integer r ∈ Z∗ and encrypts m into a
ciphertext pair {Pr, c}:
{Pr, c}, where
{
Pr = [r]P ∈ G1
c = m⊕H2(e(QBob;PBob)r) ∈ {0, 1}n
(2.14)
This ciphertext pair is then transmitted to Bob, through an insecure channel.
Decryption On receiving the ciphertext, Bob decrypts the message as:
m′ = c⊕H2(e(KBob;Pr)) (2.15)
Expanding all elements in equation 2.15, Bob gets:
M ′ = m⊕H2(e(QBob; [M.KBob]P )r)⊕H2(e([M.KBob]QBob; [r]P )) (2.16)
Note that the bilinearity property of pairings ensures:
e(QBob; [M.KBob]P )
r = e([M.KBob]QBob; [r]P
The hash function H2 is published by the PKG. The value H2(e([M.KBob]QBob; [r]P ))
computed by Bob is the same as that computed by Alice. Thus, with the correct
private key KBob, Bob can decrypt the plaintext message m from Alice.
Compared to the original IBE scheme illustrated in Fig. 2.3, the pairing based
IBE scheme in Fig. 2.7 employs the pairing algorithm as the specific encryption
and decryption algorithm. Moreover, for calculation convenience, two cryptographic
hash functions, H1 and H2, are used to change the user’s identity information into
strings of suitable length.
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Fig. 2.8: Pairing based ABE scheme
An eavesdropper Eva may hold the public system parameters published by PKG
and the ciphertext transmitted in the insecure channel. However, to solve for m,
Eva needs to solve e(QBob; [M.KBob]P )
r or e([M.KBob]QBob; [r]P ) from the system
parameter set < G1, G2, e, P,H1, H2, PBob, QBob > and [r]P . This task is related to
solving an ECDLP [4].
2.5.4 Bilinear Pairings applied in ABE
ABE scheme of Fig. 2.3 can be implemented as illustrated in Fig. 2.8 using bilinear
pairings [6].
The construction of this ABE system follows:
Setup This algorithm initiates:
• Select a bilinear group G1 of prime order p, with bilinear map e : G1×G1 → G2.
• Let Zp represent the set of positive integers. Define the Lagrange coefficient
∆i,S for i ∈ Zp and a set, S, of elements in Zp:
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∆i,S(x) =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
x− j
i− j .
The polynomial interpolation operation of this Lagrange polynomial can be
used to simplify the exponent in the decryption step.
• Let γtotal represent the set of all attributes. Define the universe, U , of N ele-
ments. For simplicity, take the first N elements of Zp to be the universe, i.e. the
integers 1,...,N(mod p). Each integer in U associates with an attribute in γtotal.
• Choose random elements y, t1, ..., tN in Zp and a random generator g of G1.
• Hash function H2 : G2 → {0, 1}n - maps an element of group G2 to a string of
n bits, where n is the bit-length of the plaintext message m.
To set up this scheme, the PKG computes: T1 = g
t1 , ..., TN = g
tN , Y = e(g, g)y. The
public key is PK =< e, g, Y, T1, ..., TN >. The master key is MK =< y, t1, ..., tN >.
Encryption Encryptor processes the message m with the public identity γe as fol-
lows. Pick a random value s ∈ Zp, then publish the ciphertext as:
E = (d, γe, E
′ = m⊕H2(Y s), {Ei = T si }i∈γe)
Note that the identity, γe, is included in the ciphertext.
In the case of this ABE system, Alice has γe = {A1, A3, A4} and calculates
Ei = {E1, E3, E4} = {T s1 , T s3 , T s4 }. Alice sets the attribute requirement number
d = 2 and publishes (d, γe, E
′, {E1, E3, E4}) to the insecure channel.
Key Generation To generate a private key for identity γ1 ⊆ U , the following steps
are taken by the PKG. A d − 1 degree polynomial q is randomly chosen such that
q(0) = y. Compute Di = g
q(i)
ti for every i ∈ γ1. The private key SK = (Di)i∈γ1 .
Decryption Suppose that a ciphertext, E, is encrypted with a key for identity γe
and the decryptor has a private key for identity γ1, where |γe ∩ γ1|≥ d. Choose an
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arbitrary d-element subset, S, of γe ∩ γ1, then the ciphertext can be decrypted as:
E ′ ⊕ (∏
i∈S
(e(Di, Ei))
∆i,S(0))
= m⊕H2(e(g, g)sy)⊕H2((
∏
i∈S
(e(g
q(i)
ti , gsti))∆i,S(0)))
= m⊕H2(e(g, g)sy)⊕H2((
∏
i∈S
(e(g, g)sq(i))∆i,S(0)))
= m⊕H2(e(g, g)sy)⊕H2((e(g, g)
s
∑
i∈S
q(i)∆i,S(0)
)) (1)bilinearity
= m⊕H2(e(g, g)sy)⊕H2(e(g, g)sq(0)) (2)polynomial interpolation
= m.
(2.17)
In equality (1) of equation 2.17, the bilinearity property of the pairing calculation
transforms the successive multiplication into the exponent of a sum. Equality (2) is
derived using polynomial interpolation in the exponents. Since the polynomial sq(x)
is of degree d− 1, it can be interpolated using d points.
In the case of this ABE system, Bob holds attribute set γ1 = γBob = {A1, A3}.
Bob asks the PKG for the corresponding secret set. PKG confirms Bob’s identity and
generates a polynomial qBob specifically and calculates and sends Bob {DBob1 , DBob3 }
accordingly. Bob picks E1 and E3 from the information published by Alice and
calculates equation 2.17 and gets plaintext m.
Note that in the original ABE scheme introduced by Sahai and Waters in [6],
cryptographic hash functions are not used. Adding hash functions improves the
flexibility of ABE schemes, but on the other hand, makes the security of the entire
scheme rest not only on the security of the pairing based ABE scheme but, also on
the security of the cryptographic hash function used.
2.5.5 Security of Pairing based cryptosystem
In addition to brute force attack, researchers have developed various attacks to solve
the mathematical problems in elliptic curve based cryptosystems [96, 92, 93]. How-
ever, none of these methods would be effective for a carefully chosen elliptic curve
[51]. The ECDLP and other equivalent problems provide very good security. The
field sizes of Elliptic Curve cryptography over GF (2m) and the equivalent security
levels of symmetric key cryptography are listed in Table 2.1.
In Table 2.1, the required key length for a symmetric-key cryptosystem of equiva-
lent security is chosen as a standard [93]. For security at 80 bit level, Iyama et al has
proved that the ηT pairing algorithm provides the fastest calculation [86] amongst
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Symmetric ηT
key size over field
66 GF (2233)
72 GF (2283)
80 GF (2409)
88 GF (2457)
96 GF (2571)
128 GF (21223)
Tab. 2.1: Equivalent security level of ηT pairing algorithm
RSA [23], ECC over non-supersingular [81] and other pairing algorithms. For higher
security level, for example 128 bit, ηT pairing is considered inefficient because the
field size it requires is too large and the hardware resources and time required for its
calculation no longer outperform the other cryptographic schemes [87].
The security of the pairing based cryptographies relies on how hard it is to solve
the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) [4]. This problem is considered as hard
as an ECDLP because the pairing computation part of the BDHP can be done in
polynomial time. The detail of BDHP is described here. In the l-torsion group of
points < P > the designer picked which is generated by P ∈ E(GF (2m))[l], given
P , [a]P , [b]P ,[c]P ∈ E(GF (2m))[l], solve e(P ;P )abc ∈ E(GF (24m))∗ is a BDHP in
this case. An attacker may try to solve a from P and [a]P and then compute [ab]P
followed by e([ab]P ; [c]P ) = e(P ;P )abc.
Certicom, the ECC cryptography provider, stated that ECDLP over finite fields
of size larger than 163-bit is believed computationally infeasible [75]. Thus, m = 163
will be the minimum size of a pairing based cryptography to implement. Different
group order l gives different security level of ECDLP. Recommended by NIST [23],
a pairing based cryptosystem should have a security level equivalent to an 80-bit
symmetric key encryption. Also, Koblitz and Menezes [88] suggested that under this
security level, a group E(GF (2m))[l] helps prevent the Pollard-ρ attack [92] on the
DLP in the group.
Another factor that affects the system security is the size of the finite fieldGF (2m)
on which the elliptic curve E(GF (2m))[l] is picked, i.e. m affects the security. The
extension field GF (24m) is always expected to be large enough to prevent an index
calculus [89] attack on the DLP in the field. As stated by Thome in [76], under MOV
reduction, for an extended field GF (24m), the discrete logarithm is considered very
hard when 4m exceeds 1000. For security equivalent to, or better than, 1024 bit
RSA, 4m should go above 1200. Furthermore, an odd m or, more strongly, a prime
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m, can make sure that the DLP on the chosen elliptic curve cannot be reduced [90].
Thus, for a security cryptosystem, the field size m should be chosen to be a prime
larger than 250. For a cryptosystem of better security than 80-bit symmetric key
encryption, m should be a prime larger than 300.
Thus, in this thesis, the basic field size m = 163 is used, with results up to
m = 571 to show the structure and implementation of the pairing algorithm.
2.6 Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is the study of methods to reveal the concealed message in a ciphertext
without knowing the secret key an intended receiver used to decrypt it. For any form
of ciphertext, the simplest method of attack is the brute force attack, also known as
exhaustive key search. To perform such an attack, the attacker tries every possible
value of the secret key to decrypt the ciphertext until the plaintext is revealed. In
attacking a pairing computation over an elliptic curve E(GF (2m)), where m > 160,
this method becomes computationally infeasible.
2.6.1 Side Channel Analysis Attacks
Mathematically, choosing a large finite field provides good security for a crypto-
graphic scheme. However, in implementing a cryptosystem, the hardware may show
physical weakness that an attacker can make use of. Side channel analysis (SCA)
attacks make use of the leaked information from a hardware device in which a cryp-
tographic algorithm is operating. The attacker needs physical access to the hardware
device. Any side channel information that can be measured, such as power consump-
tion [13], timing information [14] and electro-magnetic radiation [15], can be used in
such SCA attacks. These can be performed on different types of hardware devices
such as FPGA [93, 16, 94] and smartcards [95]. This thesis focuses on power analysis
attacks against FPGAs.
Power analysis attacks can be divided into simple power analysis (SPA), dif-
ferential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA). Several SCA
attacks have been proposed against hardware implemented cryptographic algorithms.
In 1999, Kocher et al. [18] successfully performed a SPA attack and a DPA attack on
a DES implementation and revealed the secret key. In 2005, Page and Vercauteren
[16] presented a theoretical DPA attack against Duursma and Lee’s algorithm [26]
for characteristic three. In 2004, Brier et al. [96] performed a CPA attack against
FPGA implementations of DES and AES.
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Here it is assumed that an attacker has access to a hardware device in which a
cryptographic algorithm is operating and the power traces can be measured by the
attacker. The SPA attacks determine what operations are executed by the comparing
the profiles and shapes of the measured power traces. This attack can be prevented
by introducing redundant operations and making the operations always the same for
any secret key. For elliptic curves, several algorithms [97, 98, 99] have been proposed
as countermeasures to SPA.
More advanced DPA and CPA attacks apply statistical analysis to the measured
power traces to determine the secret key. DPA attack makes use of the difference of
mean values of different sets of power traces [18]. CPA takes advantage of the linear
correlation between hamming distance and power consumption [96]. In this work,
statistical analysis using a CPA attack method is assumed.
2.6.2 Hardware Power consumption
To analyze the relationship between the intermediate variables operated upon in
the FPGA and the power consumption of the related operations, the correct power
consumption model that links the two aspects must be considered.
Complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technology is widely used
in modern ICs. The power consumption of a CMOS circuit consists of two parts,
the static part and the dynamic part. CMOS circuits have very low static power
consumption.
Take a CMOS inverter as a simple example, shown in Fig. 2.9. When the input
is at logic 0, the n-MOS device is OFF and the p-MOS device is ON. The output is
at logic 1, connected to supply voltage VCC . On the contrary, when the input is at
logic 1, the n-MOS is ON and the p-MOS is OFF. The Output voltage is at logic 0
and connected to GND.
There are no appreciable current flows into the gate terminal and no significant
dc current path from VCC to GND. However, a leakage current exists due to reverse-
bias leakage between diffused regions and the substrate. Thus, the static power
consumption PS can be calculated as in equation 2.18 [100]:
PS = VCC × ICC (2.18)
where:
VCC = supply voltage
ICC = current into a device (sum of leakage currents)
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Fig. 2.9: A general CMOS inverter
This power exists in all CMOS components in an FPGA device. When a CMOS
device stays static and does not switch, this power contributes to the system noise
in power measurement and power analysis.
When a CMOS device switches from one logic state to another, one of the MOS
transistors turns on while the other turns off at the same time. During this brief
transition, there exists a switching current. This current causes a transient power
consumption PT which dominates the dynamic power consumption of a CMOS de-
vice. In addition, when a CMOS device switches, the external capacitance is charged.
This causes current and capacitive-load power consumption PL which adds to the
dynamic power consumption as well. The dynamic power consumption PD can be
calculated as in equation 2.19 [100]:
PD = PT + PL = (Cpd ×NSW +
∑
CL)× V 2CC × f (2.19)
where:
Cpd = power-consumption capacitance
f = system frequency
VCC = supply voltage
NSW = total number of bits switching.
CL = load capacitances at each output.
It can be abstracted from equation 2.19 that in the case when there is no output,
during a single clock period, the dynamic power consumption of a CMOS IC caused
by bits switching can be calculated as in equation 2.20:
PSW = Cpd × V 2CC ×NSW × f (2.20)
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Equation 2.21 gives a general idea of the relationship between power consumption
of digital circuits and the data being operated upon inside such circuits, i.e.: under
certain technology (Cpd is constant) and stable power supply (VCC is constant), the
power dynamic consumption is linearly related with, NSW , the total number of bits
switching on the board.
PSW ∝ NSW (2.21)
The more bits switching at a time, the more power consumed at that time. This is
a weak point of practical digital IC design and provides the power analysis attackers
with an opportunity to reveal the secrets in hardware cryptosystems.
2.6.3 Weakness in pairing based protocols to side channel attacks.
The pairing based systems were designed for use in public key cryptography, for
example the pairing based IBE schemes described in section 2.5.3. Any protocol
applied on an insecure channel will have to face a problem: an ill-intentioned attacker
may intercept the message and forward the altered message to the intended receiver.
Take the pairing based public key schemes, sender Alice has to send the cypher
text and some useful information for decryption, namely a {U, V } pair. This {U, V }
pair can have specific names in different public key schemes and will be addressed in
IBE and ABE schemes in detailed discussions in section 5.3. Assume Eva is a side
channel attacker who can get physical access to Bob’s hardware devices. Thus, Eva
can intercept {U, V }, the public value exposed in the insecure channel and forward
the altered values {U ′, V ′} to Bob. Also, Eva can monitor and obtain the power traces
of Bob’s decryption process in the hardware devices. Originally, for decryption, Bob
computes e(KBob;U) when he receives a ciphertext {U, V } from Alice. When the
cipertext was distorted to {U ′, V ′} by Eva, Bob computes e(KBob;U ′). This will
result in an incorrect plaintext which will be abandoned by Bob’s end automatically.
However, by doing the same operation a number of times using different {U ′, V ′}
(usually N times, where 500 ≤ N ≤ 10000 [13, 101, 102]), Eva can collect the power
consumption traces of Bob’s ‘no sense’ operations. Under this condition, Eva knows
the structure of the pairing algorithm e, the value of U ′ and the power consumption
of the N calculations. Eva is then able to perform a power analysis attack trying to
reveal the secret operator KBob according to the above information. The details of
how Eva can perform a CPA attack and get Bob’s private key KBob can be found in
Chapter 5.
41
2.7. Hardware Accelerators
2.6.4 Countermeasures against power analysis attacks
Because SCA attacks can be applied on hardware implementations of cryptosystems
to reveal the secret information, designers of the cryptographic algorithms have put
forward some countermeasures. The weakness mentioned above exists because in
the operation e(KBob;U
′), operand U ′ is known by attacker Eva. Designers should
try to make it impossible for Eva to use the knowledge she holds to perform an SCA
attack.
Several countermeasures to SCA attacks have been suggested for affected cryp-
tosystems. [16, 17, 18, 103, 104, 105] The architecture level countermeasures can be
implemented by noise insertion [18], random clock frequency [103], or randomization
of the instruction streams [104]. Although these methods succeed in changing the
implementation’s power consumption pattern, it is still possible for an attacker to
reconstruct the original pattern [18, 105].
The algorithm level countermeasures operate on the intermediate variables in
the calculation flow. Page and Vercauteren [16] pointed out that the bilinearity
property of the pairing algorithms can be used. Scott [17] proposed a countermea-
sure which multiplies a randomly picked variable with the input point to mask it.
Coron [18] pointed out that using projective coordinate rather than the conventional
affine coordinates helps hide the secret information. However, projective coordinate
solutions to the ηT pairing algorithm requires additional operations. Thus, in imple-
menting the original ηT pairing algorithm, such solutions are not included. Instead,
these methods are considered as countermeasures against SCAs to help improve the
security of the ηT pairing and their implementations are investigated in Chapter 6.
As the algorithm level countermeasures all introduce additional operations based
on the original algorithm, area and calculation time overheads follow. The extra
security should not come at the expense of excessively increasing the hardware re-
sources required. Therefore, apart from the enhanced security aspect, the overhead
cost of the countermeasures must be considered.
2.7 Hardware Accelerators
As can be seen in the pairing based IBE scheme and ABE scheme in section 2.5.3,
there are pairing operations in the encryption step and corresponding pairing oper-
ations in the decryption step. This makes the cryptosystem very computationally
intensive because a pairing requires many finite field operations. Such schemes can
be applied by implementing software on a general purpose processor. However, gen-
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eral purpose processors perform operations serially. This does not suit the finite field
operations required in pairings. Moreover, a general purpose processor processes a
word length of 32 or 64 bits, while the word length of an element in the pairing is
suggested to be at least 160 bits [23].
A dedicated hardware accelerator can easily solve the problems a general pur-
pose processor meets [37]. The word length of a dedicated hardware accelerator is
assigned by the designer. Dedicated hardware accelerators can be designed to ex-
ploit the parallelism and improve the system performance substantially. By carefully
arranging the hardware, techniques such as loop unrolling and pipelining can help
speed up the operations in a pairing calculation. Take the ηT pairing algorithm as
an example. The ηT design over the finite field GF (2
307) on a Pentium IV processor
with an operating frequency of 3000 MHz computes the algorithm in 3500 µs [106],
while a similar design on a Xilinx FPGA Virtex-II Pro with an operating frequency
156 MHz computes the pairing algorithm over GF (2313) within only 213 µs [107].
The hardware processor accelerates the calculation by 16 times which is a significant
improvement.
2.7.1 Field Programmable Gate Arrays
A Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is an integrated circuit that can be
programmed and reconfigured by the customers to carry out some specific logic
functions. What makes the FPGA ‘field programmable’ are the individual Con-
figurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) and a hierarchy of reconfigurable interconnects that
allow the CLBs to be ‘wired together’. The function of the blocks can be specified
by the customers using a Hardware Description Language (HDL). Software synthesis
tools allow a designer to take a high level design description and transform it into a
programming file for the FPGA.
The leading FPGA manufacturers are Xilinx [108] and Altera [109]. In this work,
the designs are implemented on Xilinx Virtex-V [84] FPGAs. An FPGA consists of
the following components:
• Input/Output Blocks (IOBs): the simplest block that provides interconnec-
tion between the FPGA and other devices on the board. Each IOB supports
bidirectional data flow and 3-state operation.
• Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs): basic functional part of an FPGA which
contains flexible look-up tables (LUTs) that can implement logic. Each CLB
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Model IOBs CLBs(row × col) Slices Registers LUTs BRAM(Kbits)
xc5vlx50 560 120×30 7,200 28,800 28,800 1,728
xc3s400A 311 40×24 3,584 7,168 7,168 360
Tab. 2.2: Xilinx Virtex-V xc5vlx50 and Spartan-3A xc3s400A product specifications
contains several interconnected slices. Within each slice, there are LUTs and
flip flops (FFs).
• Block RAM: provides data storage in the form of dual-port blocks. These block
RAMs can be used to synchronously store large amounts of data.
In the design of dedicated hardware accelerators, a reduction in computation time
is always the aim. In the meantime, using less circuit area is also a goal. To speed up
the calculation of a hardware accelerator, new technology can bring higher operation
frequency and faster calculation speed. Other than using different technologies, a
designer can minimize the number of clock cycles required using appropriately opti-
mized algorithms. Also, using more hardware resources to increase parallelism can
decrease calculation time, at the cost of greater resources used. When implementing
an algorithm on a hardware accelerator, usually there are many different methods of
parallelizing the operations, resulting in different operation times and circuit areas.
Typically, there exists a trade-off between area and speed of a hardware design.
2.7.2 SASEBO-GII board
The SASEBO-GII evaluation board [110] was designed and developed specifically for
side-channel attack experiments. The board has two Xilinx FPGAs: the Virtex-5
xc5vlx50 as a cryptographic FPGA and a Spartan-3A XC3S400A [111] as a control
FPGA. These two FPGAs are connected using a 38-bit general purpose input/output
common bus. In this work, the hardware accelerators are mounted on the Virtex-5
FPGA. The Spartan-3A acts as a connector between the Virtex-5 FPGA and the
PC. The main specifications of the FPGAs are shown in Table 2.2. There is a shunt
resistor of only 1Ω inserted between the VDD side of the cryptographic FPGA and
the power supply for measuring power traces. Fig. 2.10 shows a block diagram of
the SASEBO-GII board and the experimental setup.
In power analysis experiments, the control FPGA communicates with the host PC
through a USB connector. The cryptosystem is implemented on the crypto FPGA.
All input and output operations between the host computer and the crypto FPGA
are transferred through the control FPGA. This prevents direct communications
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Fig. 2.10: SASEBO-GII board block diagram
between the host computer and the crypto FPGA (which is always the target of the
power analysis attack) and reduces the environmental noise in the power analysis
attacks.
The board has an external power source which supplies the on-board power reg-
ulators and the FPGAs with 5.0V. The on-board oscillator provides a clock signal of
24MHz and there is a port which supports external clock input of different frequen-
cies. Different operations in the cryptographic algorithm lead to different numbers
of transistors switching. According to equation 2.20 the difference in the number
of switching transistors can cause different dynamic power consumption values. A
differential probe of the oscilloscope, connected to the two ends of the shunt resis-
tor, records the voltage difference values. These values are linearly related to the
dynamic current through the shunt resistor and can be used for a power analysis of
the cryptosystem.
2.7.3 Efficiency Evaluation of Hardware Designs
The most common aspect of a hardware accelerator of concern to the designer is the
computation time or speed. Generally, this can be calculated using the total num-
ber of clock cycles needed per computation and the maximum clock frequency. The
calculation flow of a cryptographic algorithm is decided by the algorithm mathemat-
ically. Once an algorithm is chosen, the computation flow is fixed. The designer’s
work is to minimize the clock cycles required for each sub-operation and to optimize
the hardware architecture for a higher operating frequency. To minimize the clock
cycles required, a popular method is to make operations run in parallel with more
hardware resources. For example, two multiplications, where each calculates the re-
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Fig. 2.11: Time scheduling for different number of multipliers
sult in n clock cycles, can be operated in 2n+4 clock cycles using only one multiplier,
as shown in Fig. 2.11. Using a parallel method, by adding one more multiplier and
some control units in hardware, the multiplication can be calculated in n + 3 clock
cycles. This method reduced the calculation time by n + 1 clock cycles. Another
useful method to speed up a hardware accelerator is to shorten the critical path.
In FPGA design, a critical path indicates the longest path a signal encounters
from one register to another. This usually happens where complicated logic cells are
required. A popular way to optimize such a case is called pipelining and is achieved
by inserting registers between the logic cells and split the original ‘one clock cycle
operation’ into two clock cycles. Fig. 2.12 shows the logical path of a calculation
x = (a× b) + (c× d). The longest path here is from a (Flip-Flop 1) to x (Flip-Flop
5), i.e. route1 + gate1 + route2 + gate2 + route3. By adding intermediate registers,
the longest path in this block should be either route4 + gate1 + route5 or route6 +
gate2 + route7. This method does not precisely half the original critical path, but
shortens it. The operation x = (a × b) + (c × d) is then divided into two stages,
the ‘×’ stage and the ‘+’ stage and requires 2 clock cycles for calculation. This can
lead to more clock cycles and may require more hardware resource, but will increase
the maximum frequency at which the entire system can be operated. However, by
applying the pipeline method, when the ‘×’ stage is finished, the system can put
the next operation, x2 = (a2 × b2) + (c2 × d2), into the structure rather than wait
until the calculation of x is finished. This pipeline method can save clock cycles and
improve the hardware efficiency.
The area of the architecture is also important. For FPGAs the area is usually
measured in terms of slices or look-up tables (LUTs). The tristate buffers, block
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Fig. 2.12: Cutting down the critical path
RAMs and ROMs etc. are also important parts of an FPGA. Basically, the more
such resources are required the larger the area an FPGA design takes. Slices are
the underlying units in a Xilinx FPGA. Each slice contains a number of LUTs and
several flip-flops. For example, in the Xilinx Virtex-V FPGA [84], each slice contains
4 LUTs and 4 flip-flops. Thus, when listing the implementation result, it is important
to attach the FPGA type. Comparison between different type of FPGA chips is
meaningless.
As can be seen from the methods to optimize the calculation speed, most ways to
decrease the calculation time will increase the area taken by the architecture. In such
a case a trade-off is desired. In this work the area-time (A*T) product is introduced
as a parameter to compare designs. This is the product of the computation time and
the required area. Increasing the parallelism in the design decreases the computation
time but simultaneously requires more area. The A*T product judges whether the
increase in area outweighs the decrease in computation time. The design with the
minimum A*T product is said to provide the best trade-off between area and speed.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, the background information required for the rest of the thesis has
been provided. The IBE and ABE schemes are two popular public key schemes that
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satisfy the demands of security nowadays. The IBE scheme provides an approach
to peer to peer communication and the ABE scheme provides a peer to multi-peer
solution to the morden communication. Elliptic curve cryptography and, in partic-
ular, pairing based cryptography can be used in both the IBE and ABE schemes in
practical applications. The pairing based cryptography is chosen in this work as an
efficient way of implementing the public key schemes. Considering both security and
efficiency aspects, implementations of the ηT pairing algorithm over fields of size m
between 163 and 571 will be investigated.
SCA attacks are considered in this thesis to investigate and improve the security of
the proposed public key cryptosystem. Using cryptanalysis methods to test and find
the weaknesses existing in the cryptosystem and applying countermeasures to protect
the system is an efficient way to improve the security aspect of the cryptosystems.
This methodology is used in this thesis. Both the hardware power consumption
model and the usage of the cryptographic algorithm in the public key schemes are
considered to find out the possible weaknesses in these schemes.
A SASEBO-GII evaluation board which consists of both the FPGA components
and the power measurement ports is used for implementation and SCA attacks in this
thesis. The flexibility of FPGAs makes them highly suitable for accelerating crypto-
graphic applications as the processors can easily be reconfigured to support different
design parameters. This makes it a good platform for implementing accelerators for
the cryptosystems. The shunt resistor provides convenience for cryptanalysis. In
this thesis, the power analysis attacks are based on the power collected from this
platform.
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3. ARITHMETIC ARCHITECTURES OVER THE FIELD GF (2M)
3.1 Introduction
As introduced in Chapter 2, pairings are basically operations on two points over an
elliptic curve. Thus, the efficiency of the reconfigurable hardware design of a pair-
ing algorithm depends on the efficiency of the basic operations, including addition,
squaring, multiplication and division, over the finite field. Hardware architectures of
these arithmetic operations over the field of characteristic 2, i.e. over GF (2m), are
presented in this chapter.
Section 3.2 discusses the targeted finite field size m. The irreducible polynomials
that generates such fields are listed. Section 3.3 introduces the basic addition opera-
tions over finite fields GF (2m). Section 3.4 presents some popular GF (2m) multipli-
cation structures, including the digit-serial multiplier and the Karatsuba multiplier.
Section 3.5 presents a parallel structure for implementing the GF (2m) squaring. In
sections 3.6 and 3.7, two methods of implementing the GF (2m) division/inversion
are introduced. For all the GF (2m) operation blocks, the details of the structures
are analyzed and simple examples are illustrated to highlight the calculation flow in
the operations.
3.2 Choice of Finite Fields
An element a(x) of the finite field GF (2m) in this work is represented using a de-
gree (m − 1) binary polynomial, a(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i, ai ∈ {0, 1} which maps well to
hardware. There are basic operations of addition, squaring, multiplication and divi-
sion/inversion over field GF (2m). If the basic operations generate a result of degree
higher than m− 1, this result must go through a reduction operation, modulo f(x),
which reduces the degree down to m− 1 or lower. This f(x) is the irreducible poly-
nomial of the corresponding finite field, of degree m. The value of f(x) depends on
the field size m. For efficient field operations, polynomials of low hamming weight
are preferred. Normally an irreducible trinomial f(x) = xm + xk + 1 will be chosen,
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if one exists. A trinomial is preferred in the implementations as it requires the least
hardware resources. However, if no irreducible trinomial exists, then a pentanomial
f(x) = xm + xa + xb + xc + 1 is selected. The particular pentanomial chosen has the
following properties: the second term xa has the lowest degree among all irreducible
pentanomials of degree m; the third term xb has the lowest degree among all irre-
ducible pentanomials of degree m and second term xa; and the fourth term xc has
the lowest degree among all irreducible pentanomials of degree m, second term xa
and third term xb [1].
As introduced in chapter 2, the suggested field size m of GF (2m), where elliptic
curves are picked, varies from 163 to 571, as suggested by NIST in [93]. The curves
over binary fields are carefully chosen because the coefficients of these specific curves
and underlying field were selected to optimize the efficiency of the elliptic curve
operations. Here are the polynomials for the field sizes of interested:
m = 163 : f(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1
m = 233 : f(x) = x233 + x74 + 1
m = 283 : f(x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1
m = 571 : f(x) = x571 + x10 + x5 + x2 + 1
Note that the coefficients of the irreducible polynomials selected for the correspond-
ing field sizes all follow the rules introduced in last paragraph. To find an irre-
ducible polynomial, or to test the irreducibility of a polynomial, designers can refer
to [112, 113, 114, 115].
3.3 Choice of Basis
In order to perform operations on elements of binary fields and their corresponding
extension fields, a basis representation must be defined first. Different bases including
polynomial basis [116], normal basis or dual basis [117] are available to represent
elements over binary fields.
In polynomial basis, let a be an element over GF (2m). The polynomial basis of
GF (2m) is:
{1, a, a2, ..., am−1} (3.1)
The set of elements over of GF (2m) in polynomial basis is:
{0, 1, a, a2, ..., a2m−2} (3.2)
Note that in binary fields, an irreducible polynomial can be used to reduce for terms
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of degree higher than m to at most m − 1. When using binary strings to represent
elements in polynomial basis, for example in GF (24), the most significant bit repre-
sents a3, the least significant bit represents a0 i.e. 1. A binary string “1011” over
GF (24) represents the element “a3 + a+ 1”.
In normal basis, let b be an element over GF (2m). The normal basis of GF (2m)
is:
{b, b2, b22 , ..., b2m−1} (3.3)
Different from polynomial basis, the most significant bit in normal basis represents
b8, the least significant bit represents b. The binary string “1011” over GF (24) in
normal basis represents the element “b8 + b2 + b”.
A dual basis is not a concrete basis like polynomial basis or normal basis. It
only provide a way to easily communicate between systems using different bases and
convert elements from one basis to another. In this work the operands are distributed
by the same PKG. Thus, only one basis is needed in the cryptosystem and dual basis
is not considered.
The IEEE standards for public key cryptography [32] recommend polynomial or
normal basis. For both types of basis, there are different architectures for field opera-
tions including addition, multiplication, squaring and division/inversion. Beth [118]
investigated the differences between the three bases mentioned above and proved
that they all show some advantages in certain conditions. Normal basis needs less
steps in calculating exponentiations, but the advantage is not obvious. When area
constraints are considered, polynomial basis shows an advantage against normal ba-
sis. Moreover, polynomial basis offers hardware multiplication with lower complexity
than normal basis [119]. Thus, polynomial basis is chosen in this thesis.
3.4 Addition over GF (2m)
Addition operation over GF (2) is the same as the logic operation exclusive-or (XOR).
Note that in binary finite field operations, as 0 + 0 = 0 and 1 + 1 = 0, there exists
−a = a for all a ∈ GF (2m) i.e. subtraction equals addition.
As the addition operation can be expressed by a logical XOR operation, in a
hardware implementation, a one bit addition is performed by a two input XOR gate,
and an addition of two m-bit elements is performed by an array of m two input XOR
gates, as shown in Fig. 3.1.
In a hardware implementation, because XOR gates do not require large area,
designers may prefer to trade operation time with area. For time efficiency, an m-
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Fig. 3.1: Architecture of an adder
XOR-gate chain can be used to perform an m-bit addition operation in parallel.
Typically, in a hardware implementation of an adder, each XOR gate is mapped to
a LUT in FPGA. Thus, for field size m, a GF (2m) Adder requires m LUTs. When
the field size m increases, the area taken by the adder increases as well.
The calculation time is equal to the delay through one XOR gate because all m
XOR gates operate in parallel. In the Virtex-5 FPGA, 65 nm technology is applied.
The time for a signal to propagate through an XOR gate, plus the time for the target
register to setup and hold, is 1.249 ns. The maximum operation frequency is 800
MHz. When implementing the GF (2m) operation blocks, one would find that an
Adder takes least area and calculation time. The critical path of a crypto processor
with many units will generally not include an adder.
3.5 Multiplication over GF (2m)
Over the basic binary field GF (2m), a multiplication of two elements a(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i
and b(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
bix
i can be represented as per equation 3.4. The multiplication
operation can be divided into two stages: the polynomial multiplication and the re-
duction stage modulo the irreducible polynomial f(x), i.e. mod f(x) in the following
sections.
z(x) = a(x) · b(x) = a(x) ·
m−1∑
i=0
bix
i
= a(x)bm−1xm−1 + · · ·+ a(x)b2x2 + a(x)b1x+ a(x)b0 =
2m−2∑
i=0
zix
i
c(x) = a(x) · b(x) mod f(x) = z(x) mod f(x)
(3.4)
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The maximum degree of the multiplication result z(x) is (2m − 2). It must be
mapped to an element of GF (2m) through the reduction operation modf(x). The
reduction process repeatedly adds the irreducible polynomial and its transforms to
z(x) until the result is reduced to degree (m− 1) or less.
To illustrate the process of the multiplication operation and how the modulo
stage mod f(x) works, consider the field GF (24) with irreducible polynomial f(x) =
x4 + x + 1. The multiplication of elements a(x) = x3 + 1 and b(x) = x3 + x + 1 is
computed. The polynomial multiplication stage is performed as per equation 3.5.
z(x) = a(x) · b(x)
= (x3 + 1) · (x3 + x+ 1)
= x6 + x3 + x4 + x+ x3 + 1
= x6 + x4 + x+ 1
(3.5)
Note that x3 + x3 = 0, thus, only 4 terms remain in the result of the degree 6
polynomial z(x). Since f(x) = 0 over GF (2m), terms of degree higher than 3 can be
reduced using the transforms of the irreducible polynomial f(x) = 0 as per equation
3.6.
f(x) = x4 + x+ 1 = 0
→ x4 = x+ 1
→ x5 = x2 + x
→ x6 = x3 + x2
(3.6)
c(x) = z(x) mod f(x)
= x6 + x4 + x+ 1 mod f(x)
= (x3 + x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x6
+ (x+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x4
+x+ 1
= x3 + x2
(3.7)
Using these transforms of f(x), z(x) can be reduced to c(x) of degree less than
(m−1), as per equation 3.7. This maps the degree 6 element z(x) back to an element
over GF (2m). From equation 3.7 it also can be seen that the reduction of terms x6
and x4 can be done at the same time. Thus, in a hardware implementation over
FPGA platforms, all terms of degree higher than (m− 1) can be reduced in parallel
using XOR gates, i.e. addition operations in binary fields, as shown in line 3 of
equation 3.7. Also, the reduction result can be output after the delay of the XOR
gates in the same clock cycle.
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Algorithm 3.1 Right-to-Left Shift-and-add field multiplication over GF (2m)
Input: binary polynomials a(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i and b(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
bix
i
Output: c(x) = a(x) · b(x) mod f(x)
1: If b0 = 1 then c← a; else c← 0;
2: for i from 0 to m− 1 loop
3: a = a · x mod f(x)
4: if bi = 1 then c← c+ a
5: end for
6: return c(x)
3.5.1 Bit parallel multiplier and Bit serial multiplier
As mentioned in previous sections, the range of field sizes chosen in this work is
163 ≤ m ≤ 571. For large finite fields, there are many different architectures suitable
for implementing GF (2m) multiplications.
A bit-parallel multiplier architecture, introduced in [120, 121, 107, 122, 123],
performs the multiplication in one clock cycle. It multiplies a(x) by all the bits of
b(x) in the same clock cycle and produces a (2m− 2) degree polynomial z(x), which
then goes through the reduction block modulo f(x) and transforms into the (m− 1)
degree polynomial c(x), namely the product. This bit-parallel multiplier produces
the product in only one clock cycle. It is a very fast method, but requires large
circuit area to perform the calculation of a(x) · b(x) = z(x) in one clock cycle for
field sizes required in this thesis. For an m-bit multiplication, the number of gates
required for this architecture is proportional to m2. This bit-parallel architecture
is not suitable for use in area constrained applications because of the its large area
requirement.
A smaller sized multiplier, the original Right-to-left shift-and-add method [52] for
field multiplication, is described as in Algorithm 3.1. This method was mentioned
in [124, 120, 125] and was named Bit Serial Multiplication.
This algorithm takes as inputs a(x) and b(x) and returns the product c(x) modulo
the irreducible polynomial f(x). This architecture is based on the observation of
equation 3.4 that a(x) is multiplied by each bit of b(x). As can be seen in Algorithm
3.1, element a(x) is shifted one bit in every iteration. It takes (m− 1) iterations to
complete this multiplication. A reduction modulo f(x) is performed in each of the
iterations to make sure that a(x) is of, at most, degree (m − 1). In the hardware
architecture of Algorithm 3.1, as the Hamming weight of f(x) is always small, only
at most 5 XOR gates are needed to complete the process of the reduction operation.
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←−
B[0] b(3) b(2) b(1) b(0) ↓
B[1] b(7) b(6) b(5) b(4)
B[2] b(11) b(10) b(9) b(8)
...
...
...
...
...
B[40] 0 b(162) b(161) b(160)
Tab. 3.1: 163 bit element b(x) divided by digit d = 4
Thus, the bit-serial multiplier requires only a small amount of hardware resource.
They are suited for use in area constrained environments where long calculation time
is acceptable in order to minimize area.
3.5.2 Digit serial multiplier
Other than the two extremes of finite field multipliers, a digit-serial architecture for
calculating GF (2m) multiplications is proposed by Song and Parhi in [126]. It pro-
vides a trade-off between the min-area max-time and the max-area min-time designs.
In this digit-serial multiplier (DSM), element b(x) divided into several blocks, each
is of d bits, where d is named the digit size of the multiplier. Take m = 163 as an
example, if d = 4, element b(x) is then divided into 41 blocks (B[0]-B[40]), as shown
in Table 3.1. Note that element b(x) is divided into n = dm
d
e blocks. For the last
block B[40], the empty bits of B-blocks are filled with ‘0’.
In the DSM, element a(x) is multiplied by B[i], i.e. d bits of element b(x) from
right to left, in clock cycle i. It takes n = dm
d
e clock cycles to finish the calculation.
Choosing a larger digit size d requires more hardware resources but, at the same
time, reduces the calculation time required. Larger d brings smaller n. This is the
trade-off between area and speed. The bit-serial and the bit-parallel, multipliers
can be seen as two extreme conditions of the digit-serial multiplier (DSM): d = 1
is equivalent to a bit-serial multiplier whilst d = m is equivalent to a bit-parallel
multiplier.
The digit-serial multiplication algorithm is given in Algorithm 3.2. Similar to
Algorithm 3.1, this algorithm takes as input a(x) and b(x) and computes the product
c(x). As mentioned in Table 3.1, if the field size m is not an integer multiple of the
digit size d, it is necessary to fill the extra bits with ‘0’ and form a new element b′(x)
of m′ bits, as shown in definition 1 of Algorithm 3.2. Then this new element b′(x) is
divided into n B-blocks (B[0]∼B[n-1]), each B-block is of d bits.
In Algorithm 3.2, c′(x) is initiated as 0 ∈ GF (2m), followed by n = dm
d
e iterations.
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Algorithm 3.2 Digit-Serial multiplication over GF (2m)
Input: binary polynomials a(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i and b(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
bix
i
Output: c(x) = a(x) · b(x) mod f(x)
Define1: m′ = m+ (m mod d), b′(x) =
m′−1∑
i=0
b′ix
i, b′i =
{
0, i > m− 1
bi, i ≤ m− 1
Define2: n = dm
d
e, B[i] =
d−1∑
k=0
b′(i ∗ d+ k)
1: c′(x)← 0
2: for i from n− 1 downto 0 loop
3: c(x)← c′(x) + a(x) ·B[i] mod f(x)
4: if i > 0 then
5: c′(x)← c(x) · xd mod f(x)
6: end if
7: end for
8: return c(x)
Within each of the iterations i of the ‘for’ loop in steps 2-7, the element a(x) is
multiplied by a B-block . The products of a(x) and B-blocks are degree (m+ d− 2)
polynomials. These polynomials then go through a reduction block modulo f(x) and
return as a degree (m−1) polynomial c(x). Except for the last iteration, this c(x) is
then extended by appending d zero bits from the least-significant end and becomes
a degree (m+ d− 1) polynomial (c(x) · xd), i.e. in step-5,
c′(x) = c(x) · xd mod f(x) =
m+d−1∑
i=0
c′ix
i mod f(x), c′i =
{
0, c < d
ci, i ≤ d
Another reduction is applied here to reduce c′(x) to a degree (m − 1) polynomial.
Note that this reduction is different from the one in step-3, which is a (m + d − 2)
to (m− 1) reduction. After n iterations each B-block is processed and the result is
returned in c(x).
To illustrate the mechanism of Algorithm 3.2, consider again the example in
equation 3.5, the calculation of a(x) · b(x) = (x3 + 1) · (x3 + x + 1) over GF (24)
with f(x) = x4 + x + 1. Assume d = 2 and n = 2. As m = 4 and (m mod d = 0),
there exists b′(x) = b(x). b′(x) here can be divided into 2 B-blocks and each of them
contains 2 bits: B[1] = x+ 0, B[0] = x+ 1.
Table 3.2 shows the calculation flow and the values of the multiplication over
GF (24). After 2 iterations, the correct result (x3 + x2) is contained in c(x). In a
hardware implementation, the corresponding architecture of Algorithm 3.2 is shown
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a(x) x3 + 1
b(x) x3 + x+ 1
b′(x) x3 + x+ 1
B[1] x
B[0] x+ 1
Iteration number i i = 1 i = 0
a(x) ·B[i] x4 + x x4 + x3 + x+ 1
a(x) ·B[i] mod f(x) 1 x3
c(x)← c′(x) + a(x) ·B[i] mod f(x) 1 x3 + x2
c(x) · xd x2 n/a
c(x)← c(x) · xd mod f(x) x2 n/a
Tab. 3.2: Calculation flow of Digit-Serial Multiplication example over GF (24)
reduction
block a shifted z
XOR
z
...
...
0
z
reduction
block b
a mod f
z Register
...... 0m−1
m−2
m−1
m+dm+d−1
m
d
mmm m m
m−2b
c = a*b
Fig. 3.2: Architecture of a Digit-Serial multiplier
in Fig. 3.2.
In Fig. 3.2, ⊗ represents a multiplication block over a binary field, takes as inputs
the m-bit element a and d-bits of operand b and returns c(x) consisting of (m+d−1)
bits. The multiplication block requires m ∗ d AND gates and (m− 1) ∗ (d− 1) XOR
gates in total, no matter how the field polynomial is picked. The two extreme cases,
the bit-serial (d = 1) and the bit-parallel (d = m), require m AND gates and m2 AND
gates + (m − 1)2 XOR gates respectively. Note that in a real bit-serial multiplier,
unlike in the digit-serial structure, the multiplication block is not necessary and a
multiplexor is applied instead.
This c(x) output from the multiplication block then goes through the first re-
duction block and is reduced to m bits. The reduction blocks are XOR networks
based on the irreducible polynomial f(x). For the input polynomial, each term of
degree higher than (m − 1) is mapped to 3 (for trinomial) or 5 (for pentanomial)
lower degree terms and XORed with the lower bits of the input polynomial. Thus,
the hardware resources taken by the reduction blocks depend on the field size and
the digit size.
The result output from ‘reduction block a’ is then accumulated with previous
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result from the last iteration through an XOR chain, where an array of m XOR
gates are used. A finite state machine controls the execution of Algorithm 3.2, the
architecture being illustrated in Fig. 3.2. Except for the last iteration, the output
of the XOR chain is extended by d ‘0’ bits from the least significant side and sent
through another reduction block, the ‘reduction block b’, which reduces the extended
result back to degree of, at most, (m− 1). The multiplication result is stored in an
m-bit register and is accumulated with the output of ‘reduction block a’ in every
iteration. After n clock cycles, the calculation is finished and the correct result is
stored in the ‘z Register’. The multiplier then sets a ‘done’ signal to inform the
system controller that the calculation is completed. For different field size and digit
size pairs, the calculation time varies. Thus, in hardware designs where this ‘done’
signal is applied, the system always takes the ‘done’ signal as permission to read the
result from the ‘z Register’.
Theoretically the digit size d can be chosen between 1 and m. It is obvious that
when using larger digit size d, the number of clock cycles required for the DSM
is reduced. In [52] digit size d=4 and 32 are discussed for DSM calculation over
GF (2163). In [127] digit size d ranging from 4 to 16 was discussed for its area and
timing performance. In addition, in different Tate pairing implementations using
DSMs [8, 7, 12, 128], digit sizes of d = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 32 were used for different
field sizes. To show the trends of how the calculation performances of the DSMs
change when digit size d changes, in this work the digit sizes d = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 and
32 are all applied.
The implementation results of DSM with different field size m and digital size
d are shown in Table 3.3. As can be seen, for the same field size m, the DSMs
require almost the same number of registers, which is about 3 times the field size
m. However, the size of the multiplication block a × B[i] is determined by both
the field size and the digit size. Along with the increase of the digit size d, the
number of LUTs required increases too. This results in a complicated critical path
and, thus, decreases the maximum frequency of the DSM. The calculation times of
the DSMs are listed. A*T represents the Area*Time product, which is a parameter
chosen to show the total resource required for the implementations. As can be seen,
when digit size d doubles, the number of clock cycles halves. However, in the same
time, the clock frequency of the DSM reduces as a general trend. Note that, due to
the look-up table structures in the FPGAs, there can be exceptions in such trend
(m=163, d=2 and m=233, d=2). The increase of d helps decrease the A*T product
because the multiplication block ‘⊗’ in the DSM structure does not dominate the
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m d n LUTs Regs
Freq. Time A*T
(MHz) (ns) (LUT*µs)
163
1 163 345 500 397.3 410 141.5
2 82 512 502 506.5 162 82.9
4 41 691 502 398.3 103 71.1
8 21 880 502 336.2 62 55.0
16 11 1587 509 302.8 36 57.7
32 6 2940 543 263.5 23 66.9
233
1 233 485 710 455.0 512 248.4
2 117 721 710 528.4 221 159.6
4 59 964 711 438.4 135 129.7
8 30 1208 714 387.3 77 93.6
16 15 2185 713 358.2 42 91.5
32 8 4084 728 295.2 27 110.7
283
1 283 591 861 446.7 634 374.4
2 142 874 861 445.8 319 278.4
4 71 1162 860 368.8 193 223.7
8 36 1482 863 334.8 108 159.4
16 18 2659 863 308.4 58 155.2
32 9 5138 861 254.4 35 181.8
571
1 571 1170 1726 427.2 1337 1563.8
2 286 1744 1726 440.7 649 1131.8
4 143 2325 1726 396.7 360 838.1
8 72 2914 1728 336.0 214 624.4
16 36 5252 1727 307.3 117 615.3
32 18 9937 1726 269.8 67 663.0
Tab. 3.3: GF (2m) Digit Serial Multiplier implementation Results on Virtex-V FPGA
area when d is small. However, when d is large enough (d=8 for GF (2163) and
d=16 for GF (2233), GF (2283) and GF (2571)), the A*T product reaches a minimum
value. In this circumstance the ‘⊗’ block dominates the area of the DSM. The
calculation time reduction accrued by increase of d over 16 does not compensate for
the corresponding area increment. Using d = 32 does not give a better resource
efficiency (A*T product) than using d = 16.
3.5.3 Karatsuba Multiplier
Another popular multiplier, the Karatsuba multiplier, was proposed by Karatsuba
et al in 1963 [77]. This multiplier was used in many Pairing designs [129, 130].
Let A and B be 2n-bit integers. Split A and B into halves as A = a12
n + a0 and
B = b12
n + b0. The product P of A and B, using polynomial multiplication, is given
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n x n n x n
n x n
XOR
XOR
XOR XOR
XOR XOR
2n A=a1*2 +a0
4n P=A*B
a1 a0 b1 b0 a1 b1 a0 b0
2n nn B=b1*2 +b0
P P P P4n−1~3n 3n−1~2n 2n−1~n n−1~0
A:[2n−1~0]
B:[2n−1~0]
P:[4n−1~0]
a0:[n−1~0]
a1:[n−1~0]
b0:[n−1~0]
b1:[n−1~0]
2n x 2n
Fig. 3.3: Karatsuba multiplier of 2n-bit×2n-bit
by
P = A ·B = (a12n + a0) · (b12n + b0)
= a1b12
2n + (a1 · b0 + a0 · b1)2n + a0 · b0.
(3.8)
The Karatsuba method makes use of the relationship between the most and least
significant digits, that is (a1 · b0 + a0 · b1) = (a1 + a0) · (b1 + b0) − (a1 · b1 + a0 · b0)
and product P can be calculated as per equation 3.9. The calculation of an m-bit
multiplication consists of 3 m
2
-bit multiplications and 6 additions. Examining one of
the three m
2
-bit multiplications reveals that it consists of three m
4
-bit multiplications
and 6 additions etc..
P = a1b12
2n + ((a1 + a0) · (b1 + b0)− (a1 · b1 + a0 · b0))2n + a0 · b0. (3.9)
The original Karatsuba multiplier computes the multiplication of any bitwidth
in only one clock cycle. A one level Karatsuba multiplier is shown in Fig. 3.3.
This structure calculates a 2n × 2n multiplication. Both inputs are of 2n bits and
the output is a 4n-bit array. There are 6 XOR chains and 3 sub-multipliers which,
together calculate the multiplication of n×n size. The n×n sub-multiplication blocks
in Fig. 3.3 are of the same structure as the 2n × 2n multiplier, but the bitwidth
of the buses is halved. This structure makes use of equation 3.9 by replacing an
n × n sub-multiplier by 6 XOR chains. This reduces the hardware resources used.
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m n× n # of sub-mults sub-mult for MSBs
163 22×22 27 9×9
233 15×15 81 8×8
283 18×18 81 13×13
571 18×18 243 13×13
Tab. 3.4: Sub-mult stratagy of Karatsuba multiplier over GF (2m)
The Karatsuba multiplier can be successively split into smaller sub-units until the
bitwidth is sufficiently small and the cost of an n×n sub-multiplier is equal to or less
than the 6 XOR chains. In this case, an n × n will not be split using a Karatsuba
structure again, but will use the bit-parallel multiplier structure. This smallest
bitwidth equals 9 in Xilinx Virtex 5 FPGAs, i.e. implementing an 18× 18 multiplier
using the Karatsuba multiplier structure, or using the bit-parallel structure described
in section 3.5.1, consumes equal area. However, considering the complicated critical
path brought by the Karatsuba structure, as suggested by Rebeiro [130], a sub-
multiplier bitwidth of approximately 20 gives the best hardware efficiency. The
trade off between sub-multiplier level and size is discussed in Rebeiro’s work.
By calculating all inputs in the same clock cycle, the Karatsuba method requires
substantial hardware resources. Let n be the number of input bits of a sub-multiplier
block and thus, for field size m, rather than consuming hardware resources propor-
tional to m2 (as a bit-parallel multiplier does), the hardware resources required for a
Karatsuba multiplier is proportional to n2 × 3log2 mn . In most implementations using
Karatsuba multipliers [129, 130, 9] n is the smallest sub-multiplier size. i.e. if the
n × n sub-multiplier is replaced by another Karatsuba structure which uses three
n
2
× n
2
sub-multipliers and some XOR chains, the hardware efficiency will be lower.
Normally n is a constant or varies within a constant range for specific technologies.
For example, 4 levels of sub-multipliers of size n = 18 shows the best efficiency for
Virtex-V technology in this work. In the case of field size m = 283 and sub-multiplier
block size n = 18, 81 such sub-multiplier blocks are required. However, the 81 18×18
sub-multiplier blocks provide a multiplication of 288 × 288. The most significant 5
bits are not necessary. In this case, the size of the sub-multiplier block which cal-
culates the most significant bits (MSBs) of the input array is given by n = 13, i.e.
80 18 × 18 sub-multiplier blocks and one 13 × 13 sub-multiplier block. For other
field sizes m, the sub-multiplier block for the MSBs are treated alike. The size and
number of sub-multiplier blocks used in this work are listed in Table 3.4
In addition to the large area required, this Karatsuba structure results in a long
61
3.5. Multiplication over GF (2m)
Input XOR Chain
Pre−mult Reg Bank
Sub−m2 Sub−m1
Output Reg Bank
Output XOR Chain
post2 post1
Sub−m81
post81
Fig. 3.4: Top level architecture of Karatsuba Multiplier with Registers inserted
critical path. In the worst case, a signal goes through 3 XOR chains in each level
down from m to n. A popular method of solving this problem is to insert registers
into the Karatsuba multiplier to shorten the critical path. Beuchat et al in [9]
proposed a general method which improves the operation speed of this Karatsuba
multiplier by inserting registers before and after the sub-multiplier blocks. The top-
level architecture of the improved Karatsuba multiplier is shown in Fig. 3.4. In the
figure, ‘Sub-m1∼Sub-m81’ represents the sub-multiplier blocks. The ‘Pre-mult Reg
Bank’ represents the registers inserted before the sub-multiplier blocks. The results
of the sub-multiplier blocks go directly into another set of registers, called the post
multiplication registers, represented as ‘post1∼post81’. This method improves the
critical path of the Karatsuba multiplier. Since this multiplier usually contains the
most complex critical path in a design, which leads to the lowest frequency of the
Pairing system, this method improves the whole Pairing calculation.
The implementation results of the Karatsuba multiplier are shown in Table 3.5.
As can be seen, inserting registers increases the maximum frequency by about 70%.
Both methods of inserting and not inserting registers require large amounts of LUTs.
The number of registers required for the register insertion method is almost triple
that of the original Karatsuba multiplier. However, because there are equal numbers
of LUTs and registers in a slice of a Virtex-V FPGA, this makes use of the unused
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m
Regs
LUTs Regs
Freq. Single Run Pipeline A*T
Inserted? (MHz) (ns) (ns) (µ*LUT)
163
N 7151 1247 201.8 5.0 n/a 35.4
Y 6937 3923 338.9 8.9 3.0 20.5(p)
233
N 12049 1797 206.2 4.8 n/a 58.4
Y 12269 5662 345.6 8.7 2.9 35.5(p)
283
N 16269 2187 188.9 5.3 n/a 86.1
Y 16316 6884 328.1 9.1 3.0 49.7(p)
571
N 53441 6353 174.3 5.7 n/a 305
Y 49873 20544 292.7 10.2 3.4 170(p)
2nd-level N 18345 4593 175.1 28.5 n/a 524
571 Y 18702 10344 359.2 19.5 n/a 364
Tab. 3.5: FPGA implementation result of Karatsuba multipliers, over Xilinx Virtex-V
registers in the slices and does not consume extra slices.
As can be seen from Table 3.5, when registers are inserted into the Karatsuba
multiplier structures, the number of clock cycles required for a single Karatsuba mul-
tiplication increases from one to three. However, by applying the pipeline method, at
most three multiplications can share the same Karatsuba multiplier. The first mul-
tiplication operation requires 3 clock cycles. After that each multiplication requires
only one additional clock cycle for its calculation. If there are n multiplications,
a total of n + 2 clock cycles will be required for their calculation. In Table 3.5,
superscript ‘(p)’ indicates that the A*T product corresponds to the pipelined design.
In a Xilinx Virtex-V LX50 FPGA, there are only 28800 LUTs. For design over
a field size m = 571, larger FPGA chips or smaller multipliers should be chosen.
In pairing systems, the Karatsuba multiplier is usually around 300-bit size because
the Karatsuba multiplier requires too many hardware resources. Making use of
equation 3.9, a 571-bit multiplication can be achieved by performing three 286-
bit multiplications (80 18 × 18 sub-multiplier blocks and one 16×16 sub-multiplier
block) and 4 field additions (which simply require XOR-chains). This structure is
called a 2nd-level 571-bit Karatsuba multiplier. The implementation results of such
a multiplier are also listed Table 3.5. In the structure of a 2nd-level Karatsuba
multiplier, the operations before and after the three 286-bit multiplications each
require one clock cycle for the calculation. Thus, a 2nd-level Karatsuba multiplier
requires 5 clock cycles for its calculation if there are no registers inserted, or 7 clock
cycles with registers inserted (with the pipeline method applied on the three 286-
bit multiplication). This 2nd-level Karatsuba multiplier structure reduces the area
requirement of the large size Karatsuba multiplier at the cost of more clock cycles.
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3.6 Squaring over GF (2m)
The squaring operation over GF (2m), c(x) = a2(x) mod f(x), can be performed by
simply assigning the two inputs to the same value using the multipliers described in
the previous section and calculating a multiplication. However, there are dedicated
squarer architectures that provide significantly greater efficiency when calculating
c(x) = a2(x) mod f(x) over a binary field.
The squaring operation over binary fields is a linear operation [52]. The operation
of squaring a binary polynomial can be calculated in a very short time with little
cost when compared with performing a binary multiplication. The squaring over
GF (2m) can be described as: if a(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i, then a2(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
2i. In binary
representation, a2(x) is obtained by simply inserting ‘0’ bits between consecutive bits
of the binary representation of a(x). Fig. 3.5 shows how the m-bit polynomial is
extended into a (2m− 1)-bit polynomial. In a hardware implementation, this step is
wiring, in which no logical operation is performed. To form an individual operation
block over GF (2m), after ‘0’ bits are inserted, the extended result must go through
a reduction block modulo irreducible polynomial f(x). The output of the reduction
block, an m bits polynomial, is the result of the squaring operation.
To illustrate this bit parallel squaring structure, consider the following example.
Let a(x) = x3 + x2 + x + 1 = ‘1111′ be a 4-bit polynomial over GF (24) and the
irreducible polynomial f(x) be f(x) = x4 + x + 1. The calculation flow of c(x) =
a2(x) mod f(x) is given in equation 3.10. Firstly, ‘0’ bits are inserted into the input
a(x), forming array ‘1010101’, represented in binary polynomial form as given in
equation 3.10. a2(x) then goes through the reduction modular block. Considering
the transforms of the field polynomial f(x) in equation 3.6, the output c(x) can be
calculated as per equation 3.11.
a2(x) = x6 + x4 + x2 + 1 (3.10)
c(x) = a2(x) mod f(x)
= x6 + x4 + x2 + 1 mod f(x)
= (x3 + x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x6
+ (x+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
x4
+x2 + 1
= x3 + x
(3.11)
The implementation results of the bit-parallel squarer architecture on FPGA are
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a0
a0
a2 a1am−1
am−1 a2 a1
4 3 2 1 0c c c c c2m−2 2m−1c c
......
’0’’0’’0’ ......
a
c = a2
Fig. 3.5: Calculating a2(x) is achieved by inserting ‘0’ bits into a(x)
m LUTs Freq.(MHz) Time(ns) A*T(LUT*µs)
163 163 253.2 3.95 0.64
233 153 277.8 3.60 0.84
283 283 248.1 4.03 1.14
571 571 264.4 3.78 2.16
Tab. 3.6: FPGA implementation result of bit-parallel squarer, over Xilinx Virtex-V
presented in Table 3.6. When implementing the squarer, because the reduction block
takes up most of the area, the complexity of the irreducible polynomial decides the
hardware consumption. As can be seen in Table 3.6, for field size of m = 163, 283
and 571, the field polynomials are all pentanomial. The larger the field size is, the
more hardware resources are required. However, for field size of m = 233, because
the field polynomial is a trinomial, the squarer takes less area than that of m = 163.
3.7 Inversion/Division over GF (2m)
In this section, the binary polynomial a(x) is denoted by a for simplicity. Recall
that in section 2.4.2, the inverse of a nonzero element a ∈ GF (2m) is the unique
element g such that a · g = 1 ∈ GF (2m), i.e. a · g mod f ≡ 1. This element g is
denoted a−1 mod f or a−1 for simplicity. Division in GF (2m) can be described as c =
a
b
mod f . The division operation is equivalent to an inversion 1
b
mod f followed by
a multiplication c = a.1
b
mod f . Or, on the contrary, the inversion can be performed
using a division operation whose first operand is set equal to 1 ∈ GF (2m). Therefore,
division and inversion are interchangeable.
Based on the observation that for element a over field GF (2m), there exists
a = a1 = a2
m
(see Fermat’s Little Theorem [131]), there exists a−1 = a2
m−2. This
relationship shows that the inversion operation can be equivalently performed using
only multiplications and squarings rather than a dedicated inversion operation. An
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Algorithm 3.3 Itoh-Tsujii Inversion over GF (2m)
Input: binary polynomials a(x) =
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i and b(x) = m− 1 =
i=r−1∑
i=0
bi2
i
Output: a(x)−1 ∈ GF (2m)
1: Initialize :χ = a; k = 1
2: for i← r − 2 to 0 do
3: µ = χ
4: for j ← 1 to k do
5: µ = µ2
6: endfor
7: χ = µ · χ
8: k = 2 · k
9: if bi = 1 then
10: χ = χ2 · a
11: k = k + 1
12: endif
13: endfor
14: return a−1 = χ2
algorithm was developed by Itoh and Tsujii [132] as shown in Algorithm 3.3. This
algorithm allows the calculation of the inverse of an element over binary field GF (2m)
using the existing operation blocks for multiplication and squaring.
It can be seen from Algorithm 3.3 that the calculation requires (m−1) squarings
and at least r − 1 + s − 1 multiplications, where r is the bit length of the binary
representation of (m− 1) and s is the Hamming weight of the binary representation
of (m − 1). Performing the squarings and multiplications in parallel is not possible
because their results are used in the next iteration. In FPGA implementations, at
least 2 clock cycles are necessary to operate a squaring operation, one clock cycle to
load the operand into the squaring block and the other to calculate the result. As
discussed in previous subsection 3.3.2, it takes n = dm
d
e clock cycles to calculate a
GF (2m) multiplication. Thus, at least 2 ∗ (m− 1) + n ∗ (r + s− 2) clock cycles are
needed to perform an inverse operation using Algorithm 3.3. Table 3.7 shows the
cost of the Itoh-Tsujii (IT) Inversion for different field sizes. As can be seen, the
calculation time of this IT Inversion depends on the scheme of multipliers used in
the algorithm.
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m GF (2m) Mults GF (2m) Sq
163 9 162
233 10 232
283 11 282
571 13 570
Tab. 3.7: Operational cost of Itoh-Tsujii Inversion
3.8 Dedicated Inversion and Division architecture over GF (2m)
Apart from the Itoh-Tsujii algorithm which utilizes existing operations, there are
dedicated architecture for calculating c = a
b
mod f over finite fields. In [133, 134,
135], the classical Euclidean algorithm was introduced. This algorithm can calculate
field division and inversion (by setting input a to 1 ∈ GF (2m)). However, a disad-
vantage of the classical Euclidean algorithm is that it does not involve a fixed number
of iterations for computing c in a given field. This makes it difficult to implement on
hardware platforms. To overcome this disadvantage, the Extended Euclidean Algo-
rithm (EEA) [134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139] was developed. The EEA can calculate
the inversion [134, 135, 136, 137] and division [138, 139] directly. The EEA division
algorithm is based on the extended expression of division below. Let a and b be two
elements in GF (2m) defined by the primitive polynomial f and c = a
b
mod f , then
there exists:
b · c+ f · d = a (3.12)
for some element d in GF (2m) and c is the inverse of b when a = 1. In [140]
both an inverter and divider based on the EEA were prototyped on an FPGA.
Both architectures compute the results in 2m clock cycles. It was found that the
divider requires less hardware resources and gives a higher maximum clock frequency.
Consider that, as mentioned before, a divider can perform inversion simply by setting
operand a to 1 ∈ GF (2m), while an inverter needs to perform an inversion followed
by a multiplication to calculate a division. Thus, in a hardware implementation, a
divider gives better performance.
A clarified version of the EEA algorithm described in [138] is given as in Algorithm
3.4. This algorithm is also presented in [140]. It efficiently makes use of properties
of the binary field. There are two pairs of polynomials, (r, s) and (u, v). Note that
(u, v) are degree (m− 1) polynomials and (r, s) are of degree m. A ‘for’ loop which
runs 2m times makes up the main body of the algorithm. In each iteration the two
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Algorithm 3.4 EEA division over GF (2m)
Input: a(x), b(x) ∈ GF (2m)
Output: c(x) = a(x)
b(x)
mod f(x) ∈ GF (2m)
1: Init: s(0) = f, r(0) = b, u(0) = a, v(0) = 0, δ(0) = 1
2: for i← 1 to 2m do
3: if r
(i−1)
0 = 0 then
4: r(i) = (r(i−1))/x
5: s(i) = s(i−1)
6: u(i) = (u(i−1))/x mod f(x)
7: v(i) = v(i−1)
8: δ(i) = δ(i−1) + 1
9: else
10: if δ(i−1) > 0 then
11: r(i) = (r(i−1) + s(i−1))/x
12: s(i) = r(i−1)
13: u(i) = (u(i−1) + v(i−1))/x mod f(x)
14: v(i) = u(i−1)
15: δ(i) = −δ(i−1) + 1
16: else
17: r(i) = (r(i−1) + s(i−1))/x
18: s(i) = s(i−1)
19: u(i) = (u(i−1) + v(i−1))/x mod f(x)
20: v(i) = v(i−1)
21: δ(i) = δ(i−1) + 1
22: endif
23: endif
24: endfor
25: return c(x) = a(x)
b(x)
= v
polynomial pairs are updated independently of each other.
In Algorithm 3.4 superscripts are used to indicate which iteration the polynomial
is from, i.e. r(i−1) indicates the value of polynomial r from the previous iteration.
In Algorithm 3.4, division by x is sometimes required. For terms of degree higher
than 1, a division is simply a one bit right shift in hardware. However, for a degree
1 term, i.e. 1, a division by x requires a modulo f(x) operation in addition. For
example, in step 6 the operation u(i−1)/x can create a polynomial with term 1
x
. This
term must be mapped back to GF (2m) modulo f(x) as follows. Let f(x) =
m∑
i=0
fix
i.
Recall that f(x) = 0 and f0 ≡ 1 ∈ GF (2m). Therefore, f0 = 1 =
m∑
i=0
fix
i. This
yields:
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i δ r(x) s(x) u(x) v(x)
0 1 x3 + x+ 1 x4 + x+ 1 x3 + x2 0
1 0 x3 + x2 x3 + x+ 1 x2 + x x3 + x2
2 1 x2 + x x3 + x+ 1 x+ 1 x3 + x2
3 2 x+ 1 x3 + x+ 1 x3 x3 + x2
4 -1 x2 x+ 1 x x3
5 0 x x+ 1 1 x3
6 1 1 x+ 1 x3 + 1 x3
7 0 1 1 x3 + 1 x3 + 1
8 1 0 1 0 x3 + 1
Tab. 3.8: Calculation flow of an EEA Division over GF (24)
1
x
=
m−1∑
i=0
fi+1x
i (3.13)
For example, in GF (24) generated by f(x) = x4 + x+ 1, there exists:
f(x) = x4 + x+ 1 = 0
1 = x4 + x
1
x
= x3 + 1
(3.14)
Table 3.8 the operations over GF (24) with primitive polynomial f(x) = x4 +x+1
are taken as an example to illustrate how the division algorithm works. The division
being calculated here is c(x) = a(x)
b(x)
mod f(x), where a(x) = x3 + x2 and b(x) =
x3 + x + 1. The values of the variables in every iteration are shown in Table 3.8.
The correct result c(x) = x3 + 1 can be derived from v(x) after 2m clock cycles, i.e.
8 iterations are required in the division over GF (24).
As mentioned above, in Algorithm 3.4 the intermediate polynomial pairs (r, s)
and (u, v) update independently of each other. A slice-wise architecture described
in [140] is applied here for the EEA divisor. In this architecture, a calculation slice
chain of (m+ 1) slices, the RS slice chain, is used to update each bit of the r and s
polynomials. Another chain of m slices, the uv slice chain, updates each bit of the u
and v polynomials. The structures of the rs slice and the uv slice are illustrated in
Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7 respectively. The bit of the irreducible polynomial f(x) being
‘0’ or ‘1’ affects the output of the corresponding slice. To optimize the hardware
consumption, f(x) can be hard coded into the design of the architecture. The input
bit ‘d’ in Fig. 3.6 and 3.7 represents the δ signal and the input bit q is generated by
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Fig. 3.7: uv slice of EEA divider
q = u0 XOR v0 (3.15)
The architecture of the GF (2m) EEA divisor is shown in Fig. 3.8. The hardware
resources required by this architecture depends on the field size m. The larger the
field size the more rs slices and uv slices are needed. A 2m bit counter is required
in the controller to indicate when the calculation of the divisor is completed. The
divider requires (2m+ 2) clock cycles to perform the division.
The implementation results for the EEA divisor architecture on the Virtex-V
FPGA are shown in Table 3.9. Since in the rs slices and the uv slices, the bits of the
polynomials are updated independently, the adjacent bits don’t affect each other.
Thus, the EEA divider architecture results in a high operating frequency.
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Fig. 3.8: GF (2m) EEA Divisor architecture
m LUTs Regs Freq.(Mhz) Time(µs) A*T(LUT*µs)
163 836 991 429.7 0.76 638
233 1184 1411 430.0 1.09 1288
283 1438 1712 398.3 1.43 2051
571 2880 3441 308.7 3.71 10673
Tab. 3.9: GF (2m) EEA divider implementation Results, over Xilinx Virtex-V
3.9 Conclusions
In this chapter hardware architectures for performing GF (2m) arithmetic were dis-
cussed. The particular architectures required for operations in the ηT pairing algo-
rithm include adders, multipliers, squarers and dividers/inverters. Among them the
adder is basically an m-bit XOR chain. Similar to the adder, the squarer consists
of a wiring part and a reduction block. These adder and squarer architectures are
simple and require only one clock cycle for calculation.
TheGF (2m) Multiplier is much more complicated than the adder and the squarer.
A digit-serial multiplier was presented for calculating GF (2m) multiplication. This
architecture provides a trade-off between area and speed for it has a variable digit
size. This is advantageous as it allows processors based on such a multiplier to be
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tailored to resource constrained systems. Contrary to the reconfigurable DSM, a fully
parallel Karatsuba multiplier was introduced. This multiplier is fast, but requires
substantial hardware resource, suitable for large cryptosystems which take speed as
their first priority.
The algorithm for an IT inversion over GF (2m) using existing squarer and mul-
tiplier operations was introduced. The performance of this inversion algorithm de-
pends on the squarer and the chosen multiplier in the designs. Another method,
the dedicated EEA divider architecture, was also discussed. Either method can be
used to implement a GF (2m) division. In the Tate pairing implementation in this
work, the EEA divider architecture is chosen because this architecture requires ex-
tra hardware resources and introduces more noise into the power analysis. From
the attacker’s point of view, the more complicated the cryptosystem that can be
successfully attacked, the stronger the attack method is.
Implementation results including calculation time, area and A*T products of
the dedicated architectures of the GF (2m) operations are presented in this chapter.
Among them the divider consumes the longest calculation time and the highest A*T
product, i.e. the most hardware resources. The multiplier architectures require
less hardware resources than the divider does. However, a digit-serial structure
still requires several clock cycles for its calculation. On the contrary, a Karatsuba
multiplier of fully parallel structure can perform a GF (2m) multiplication in a very
short time but requires extra area. The adder and squarer structures require the
least hardware resources and calculation time for their calculations.
72
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TATE PAIRING OVER
EXTENSION FIELD GF (24M)
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 introduced the architectures of the arithmetic operation blocks over the
fieldGF (2m). The Tate pairing requires Multiplication, Squaring and Division/Inversion
over the extension field GF (24m). These operations over the extension field consist
of the basic operations over GF (2m). There have been many designs presented in
the literature that consider extension field arithmetic. This chapter introduces the
architecture of the GF (24m) operations and how they can be composed using the ba-
sic operation blocks. For simplicity, in this chapter the basic operations of addition,
multiplication, squaring and division/inversion over GF (2m) are represented as A,
M, S and D/I respectively.
Section 4.2 introduces the calculation flows of the GF (24m) operations. The
schemes for managing the basic GF (2m) operations in the calculations are described.
Section 4.3 analyzes the top-level architecture of the pairing based algorithms and
two architectures are chosen for the implementation of the Tate pairing algorithm
in this work. Implementation results of reconfigurable designs for different field
size m, different number of multipliers and choice of multipliers are listed. Section
4.4 analyzes the implementation results and compares the results with earlier Tate
pairing implementations. How the changes in architectures, components and other
parameters affect the performances of the implementations are discussed.
4.2 Architecture for computations over GF (24m)
In polynomial basis, an element over field GF (24m) consists of 4m bits. The most
straight forward representation would be to consider the field GF (2n) where n =
4m. In this case, the arithmetic over GF (24m) can be implemented on the same
architecture as over GF (2m). However, the resource requirement would differ a lot.
For example, a multiplication over GF (24m) will be 16 times larger than that over
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GF (2m).
As suggested by Blake et al [71], in this work the field GF (24m) will be represented
as GF (2m)4 which is an isomorphism of GF (24m). The only difference between them
is that the elements are represented in a different way. From now on GF (24m) can
be considered as shorthand for GF ((2m)4). Elements of GF (24m) are represented in
the form of polynomials of degree 3 with coefficients in GF (2m):
a(t) =
3∑
i=0
ait
i ∈ GF (24m), (4.1)
where ai ∈ GF (2m).Arithmetic operations over GF (24m) are defined modulo a degree
4 irreducible polynomial p(t) whose coefficients are in GF (2m). However, if 4 does
not divide m, the coefficients pi of the irreducible polynomial can be chosen from
{0, 1} [72]. This greatly simplifies the modular reduction process.
In the ηT pairing algorithm shown in Algorithm 2.2, the intermediate variable
C(t) ∈ GF (24m) is represented as
C(t) = C0 + C1t+ C2t
2 + C3t
3,
where Ci ∈ GF (2m) and t4+t+1 = 0. C(t) is initiated as C(t) = 1+0t+0t2+0t3 = 1
in step 1 of Algorithm 2.2. Similarly, A(t) can be expressed as
A(t) = A0 + A1t+ A2t
2 + A3t
3,
where Ai ∈ GF (2m). In this work the irreducible polynomial p(t) = t4 + t + 1 is
chosen as is used in works [74, 8, 119].
To map an element in GF (2m) to the extension field GF (24m), a distortion map
must be applied, shown in equation 4.2.
Q∗ = R(Q(x, y)) = (x+ t2 + t+ 1, y + (t2 + t)x+ t), where t4 + t+ 1 = 0 (4.2)
This equation indicates that with the polynomial p(t) = t4 + t + 1, a point Q(x, y)
with coordinates x and y in GF (2m) can be mapped to a point Q∗, whose coordinates
are in GF (24m). In equation 4.2, t is the generator which generates the cyclic group
GF (24m) of order 15. The mapping operations in equation 4.2 extends two coordi-
nates on the elliptic curve over field GF (2m) to two coordinates over field GF (24m).
operations over the extension field GF (24m) can be seen as the operations between
polynomials as shown in equation 4.1.
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The computation of the pairings involves multiplications over field GF (24m). The
ηT algorithm transforms such multiplications into several multiplications over field
GF (2m). Moreover, the ηT algorithm integrates the operations in the distortion map
into the point operations. This makes it possible for the distortion map operations
to be calculated together with the other operations in the algorithm in parallel and
improves the efficiency.
4.2.1 GF (24m) Multiplication
The multiplication of two GF (24m) elements can be performed using polynomial
multiplication, c(t) = a(t) · b(t) = (a3t3 + a2t2 + a1t + a0) · (b3t3 + b2t3 + b1t + b0),
where ai and bi ∈ GF (2m). Naively expanding the polynomial multiplication and
computing the result modulo the irreducible polynomial p(t) above would cost 16M
and 9A. The Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm [77] provides a less resource consuming
method because addition and squaring require less hardware resources than multi-
plications. As introduced in section 3.5.3, a Karatsuba multiplier can calculate a
2n×2n multiplication at the cost of 3 n× n multiplications and 6 additions. By the
same method, a 4n×4n multiplication requires 3 2n×2n multiplications and thus, 9
n× n multiplications instead of 16 when the naive approach is used.
For the GF (24m) extension field, there are 4 coefficients in each element in
GF (24m). Rewriting the multiplication as in equation 4.3
c(t) = a(t) · b(t) mod p(t)
=
3∑
i=0
ait
i ·
3∑
j=0
bjt
j mod p(t)
=
6∑
i=0
zit
i mod p(t)
=
3∑
i=0
cit
i
(4.3)
The polynomial multiplication consists of two parts, a multiplication part followed
by a reduction operation modulo p(t). Using the Karatruba method, the partial
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products and the coefficients of ci are shown in equation 4.4.
q0 = a0b0 z0 = q0
q1 = a1b1 z1 = q0 + q1 + q4
q2 = a2b2 z2 = q0 + q1 + q2 + q5
q3 = a3b3 z3 =
∑8
i=0 qi
q4 = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) z4 = q1 + q2 + q3 + q6
q5 = (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2) z5 = q2 + q3 + q7
q6 = (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3) z6 = q3
q7 = (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3)
q8 = (
∑3
i=0 ai)(
∑3
i=0 bi)
(4.4)
With intermediate product z(t) generated, the next step is to perform the reduction
modulo p(t) operation, where p(t) = t4 + t + 1. Similar to equation 3.6 in section
3.5, the irreducible polynomial p(t) can be extended to terms greater than 4:
p(t) = t4 + t+ 1 = 0
t4 = t+ 1
t5 = t2 + t
t6 = t3 + t2
(4.5)
This operation gives the coefficients of the final result c(t), as shown in equation 4.6.
The total cost of a multiplication over field GF (24m) is 9M and 22A.
c0 = q0 + q1 + q2 + q3 + q6
c1 = q0 + q4 + q6 + q7
c2 = q0 + q1 + q5 + q7
c3 = q0 + q1 + q2 + q4 + q5 + q6 + q7 + q8
(4.6)
The architecture for multiplication in extension fieldGF (24m), designed by Shantz
et al [77] and presented in [141], is shown in Fig. 4.1. Using 9 multipliers achieves the
highest computation speed at the cost of largest area. Reducing the area (number
of multipliers) will result in an increase in computation time.
4.2.2 GF (24m) Squaring
Similar to the GF (2m) Squarer, although a squaring can be performed using a mul-
tiplier by setting both inputs the same, a dedicated GF (24m) squaring is much
more efficient in both timing and area. To compute a GF (24m) squaring c(t) =
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z(t) mod p(t) = a2(t) mod p(t), first compute the squaring stage as per equation 4.7.
The result z(t) is then reduced modulo p(t), as shown in equation 4.5. The final
result is given in equation 4.8.
z(t) = a2(t) = (a3t
3 + a2t
2 + a1t+ a0)
2
= a23t
6 + a22t
4 + a21t
2 + a20
(4.7)
C(t) = z(t) mod p(t) = a23t
3 + (a23 + a
2
1)t
2 + a22t+ (a
2
2 + a
2
0) (4.8)
Fig. 4.2 shows the architecture of a GF (24m) squarer which computes c(t) = a2(t)
mod p(t). Both GF (2m) squaring and addition require only 1 clock cycle. When
compared with the GF (24m) multiplication architecture, the squarer is much more
efficient in both timing and area.
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Algorithm 4.1 GF (pn) Inversion Algorithm
Input: a(t), p(t) such that deg(a(t)) < deg(p(t))
Output: c(t) = a(t)−1 mod p(t)
Initialize: b = 0; c = 1; p = p(t); g = a(t)
1: while deg(p) 6= 0 do
2: if deg(p) < deg(g) then
3: exchange p, b with g, c respectively
4: end
5: j = deg(p)− deg(g)
6: α = g2deg(g)
7: β = pdeg(p).gdeg(g)
8: γ = gdeg(g).pdeg(p)−1 − pdeg(p).gdeg(g)−1
9: p = α.p− (β.tj + γ.tj−1).g
10: b = α.b− (β.tj + γ.tj−1).c
11: if deg(p) = deg(g) then
12: p = gdeg(p).p− pdeg(p).g
13: b = gdeg(p).b− pdeg(p).c
14: end
15: end
16: return c(t) = a(t)−1 = b = p−10 .b
4.2.3 GF (24m) Inversion
An inversion over GF (24m) is required in the final exponentiation step in the ηT
pairing algorithm. An algorithm for inversion over GF (pn), presented in [119, 142],
is shown as Algorithm 4.1.
This algorithm is a general purpose algorithm for inversion operations over any
base field GF (p) and any extension degree n. In the case of this work, for the field
GF (pn), p is set to 2m and n = 4. In Algorithm 4.1, function deg(p) returns the
degree of the polynomial p(t). The input polynomial p(t) is set to t4 + t + 1, i.e.
initially of degree 4. The quantity a(t) in this algorithm is considered as a degree
3 polynomial. The while loop in this algorithm reduces the degree of p by one or
more in every iteration until the degree of p reaches zero. It is obvious that only ad-
ditions, multiplications and substractions, which are treated the same as additions,
are necessary in the ‘while’ loop. At the end of this algorithm, a division and 4 mul-
tiplications are performed to get the result c(t) such that (a(t) ∗ c(t)) mod p(t) = 1,
where a(t) =
∑3
i=0 ait
i.
Examining the algorithm for the case where the field is GF (24m), this algorithm
takes as inputs 4 coefficients of a(t), where each is over GF (2m). For optimization,
the irreducible polynomial p(t) of the extension field can be pre-stored in the reg-
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isters. Rewriting p(t) here: p(t) = t4 + t + 1 =
4∑
i=0
pit
i = p4t
4 + p1t
1 + p0t
0, thus,
there exists p4 = p1 = p0 = 1 ∈ GF (2m) and p3 = p2 = 0 ∈ GF (2m) pre-stored in
the registers. The ‘while’ loop between steps 1 and 15 runs a total of 3 times in this
GF (24m) inversion. The intermediate variables are all elements over GF (2m). They
are initiated at the start of the algorithm and are updated in every iteration. In
the beginning of this computation, g is assigned to values of input a(t) =
∑3
i=0 ait
i,
b(t) =
∑3
i=0 bit
i is set to 0 and c(t) =
∑3
i=0 cit
i is set to 0t3 + 0t2 + 0t+ 1, as shown
in equation 4.9.
Initiation:
g3 = a3 p4 = 1 b3 = 0 c3 = 0
g2 = a2 p3 = 0 b2 = 0 c2 = 0
g1 = a1 p2 = 0 b1 = 0 c1 = 0
g0 = a0 p1 = 1 b0 = 0 c0 = 1
p0 = 1
(4.9)
On the first iteration, intermediate polynomials p and b will be updated as given
in equation 4.10 and c and g will remain unchanged. This iteration reduces the
degree of p by two. Thus, the computation of this inversion requires only three iter-
ations of the ‘while’ loop.
Iteration 1:
α = g23 p4 = 0 b3 = 0
β = g3 p3 = 0 b2 = 0
γ = g2 p2 = β · g1 + γ · g2 b1 = β
p1 = α · p1 + β.g0 + γ · g1 b0 = γ
p0 = α · p0 + γ · g0
(4.10)
The updates of the intermediate polynomials in the second and the third itera-
tion are shown as in equation 4.11 and equation 4.12. Note that, except for the first
iteration, each iteration of the ‘ while’ loop reduces the degree of p by one. At the
end of the third iteration, the function deg(p) returns 0, which indicates the end of
the ‘while’ loop.
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Iteration 2:
α = p22 p4 = 0 g2 = p2 b3 = 0
β = g3 · p2 p3 = 0 g1 = p1 b2 = β · b1
γ = g2 · p2 + g3 · p1 p2 = 0 g0 = p0 b1 = β · b0 + γ · b1
p1 = α · g1 + β.p0 + γ · p1 c1 = b1 b0 = α + γ · b0
p0 = α · g0 + γ · p0 c0 = b0
(4.11)
Iteration 3:
α = p21 p4 = 0 b3 = β · b2
β = g2 · p1 p3 = 0 b2 = β · b1 + γ · b2
γ = p1 · g1 + g2 · p0 p2 = 0 b1 = α · c+β · b0 + γ · b1
p1 = 0 b0 = α · c0 + γ · b0
p0 = α · p0 + γ · g0
(4.12)
Following the three iterations of the ‘while’ loop, finally step 16 computes:
ci = p
−1
0 · bi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (4.13)
Note that to speed up this GF (24m) inversion computation, in the derivation of equa-
tions 4.9,4.10,4.11,4.12 and 4.13 the degree of the input polynomial a(t) is assumed
to be 3. In the case where a3 = 0, i.e. the assumption is untrue, the iterations above
will be different and the operation flow of such inversions must be re-derived. In
practical cryptosystems, the probability that this occasion happens is 1
2m
for field
size m. This value is sufficiently low that the benefit of the assumption far outweighs
its cost. When this inverter structure is used in the Tate pairing architecture, it is
possible to have the Tate pairing architecture check that the term a3 of input a(t)
equals to 0 ∈ GF (2m). If a3 = 0, then that particular Tate pairing computation can
be discarded. An alternative way is to apply detection mechanism in the division
structure. In the case of a3 = 0, input a(t) can be multiplied by t, i.e. left shift by
one digit. After the division algorithm, the result is then divided by t, i.e. right shift
by one digit.
From equations 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12 and 4.13, it can be seen that the GF (24m)
inversion is very time consuming. A total number of 16A+4S+34M+1I are required.
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Tab. 4.1: Successive squaring over GF (24m)
4.2.4 GF (24m) Frobenius Map
When implementing the Tate pairing, there is a final exponentiation which requires
raising an extension field element c(t) to the power of q = 2m, i.e. calculating c(t)2
m
.
This operation is known as the Frobenius map. It is equivalent to m successive
squarings. There are dedicated operations for efficiently computing this Frobenius
map.
In extension fields, successive squarings which raise GF (24m) elements to the
power of 2i can be optimized. Table 4.1 illustrates the results of successively squaring
a GF (24m) element c = c(t) =
∑3
i=0 cit
i, where ci ∈ GF (2m). It is noted that the
coefficients of the calculation results are equivalent for the case of c2
0
and c2
4
, likewise
for c2
1
and c2
5
, i.e. the coefficients of c(t) raised to power of 2k and 2k+4 are the
same. Thus, for all the cases considered here, the exponentiation coefficients result
in 4 cases. The coefficients of c2
k
depends on the value of k mod 4. Consider the
property for elements over binary fields a2
m
= a for field GF (2m), when k = m, the
terms c2
k
i are equivalent to ci or sum of ci.
The calculation result of the frobenius map is illustrated in Table 4.2. The results
depend on the field size m mod 4. The field size is always chosen to be a prime for
security reasons (see chapter 2). The results of field sizes modulo 4 are respectively:
3, 3, 1 and 3 for the chosen field sizes 163, 233, 283 and 571 in this work. From
Table 4.2 it can be seen that this mapping operation requires only 2 additions over
GF (2m). From the hardware point of view, this operation requires only 2 ∗m XOR
gates. This is a very efficient method to raise an element over GF (24m) to the power
of 2m.
Consider the final exponentiation operation C(t)← C(t)22m−1 in step 8 of Algo-
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c = a2
m m mod 4
0 1 2 3
C3 a3 a3 a3 a3
C2 a2 a1 + a3 a2 + a3 a1
C1 a1 a2 a1 + a3 a2 + a3
C0 a0 a0 + a2 a0 + a1 + a2 + a3 a0 + a1
Tab. 4.2: Computing c = a2
m
over GF (24m)
rithm 2.2. This operation can be expanded into:
C2
2m−1 = C(2
m+1)(2m−1)
= (C(2
m+1))(2
m−1)
= (C2
m × C)(2m−1)
= ((C
2m×C))2m
((C2m×C))
(4.14)
Equation 4.14 uses C to represent C(t) for simplicity. The result of equation 4.14
shows that making use of the Frobenius map, the final exponentiation step can be
simplified to severalGF (24m) operations: a frobenius map , aGF (24m) multiplication
followed by aGF (24m) division. Here theGF (24m) division can be calculated through
a GF (24m) inversion followed by a GF (24m) multiplication, introduced in section
4.2.3 and 4.2.1 respectively. Expanding them into GF (2m) operations, this final
exponentiation operation requires 64A, 4S, 52M and 1I.
4.3 Implementing the ηT algorithm for calculating Tate pairing
Implementing the Tate pairing amounts to properly managing the operation blocks
and the operation flow of the design to complete the calculation of the ηT algorithm,
as introduced in section 2.5.2. Here the implementation of the ηT algorithm is
introduced.
4.3.1 Top level architecture design of ηT algorithm
As shown in Algorithm 2.2, the ‘for’ loop in steps 3-7, which will be executed m times
in each ηT pairing calculation, consists of 24A, 8S and 7M in GF (2
m). To perform
the operations in the ‘for’ loop, the operation blocks must be reused in each iteration.
Apart from the ‘for’ loop, there are other operations over GF (2m). The pre-‘for’
operations in step 2 require 1A, 6S and 1M. The final exponentiation operation in
step 8 requires 64A, 4S, 52M and 1I. The total number of GF (2m) operations for
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Fig. 4.3: Top-level architecture of Shu’s design [7]
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Fig. 4.4: Top-level archigtecture of Ghosh’s design [10]
the ηT algorithm calculation is (24m+65)A, (8m+10)S, (7m+53)M and 1I. Many
accelerators of ηT algorithm over GF (2
m) have been designed [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
Review of other ηT Pairing Architectures
Shu et al in [7] and Li et al in [8] proposed an ALU for the operations of the ‘for’ loop
in step 3-7 and the final exponentiation in step 8, as shown in Fig. 4.3. In this design,
all the addition and squaring operations are expanded in the combinational logic.
This requires a large amount of hardware resources, but computes all operations,
other than multiplications, in a short time. 7 digit serial multipliers are used in
this design where all the multipliers are reused by the ‘for’ loop operation in step
3-7 and the final exponentiation operation in step 8. A controller, which mainly
consists of a finite state machine (FSM) and several selector signals, controls the
interconnection networks to choose the right inputs from the register bank, input
them into the operation blocks and output the results back into the register bank
for the next iteration.
Ghosh et al in [10] and Beuchat et al in [11] proposed another type of imple-
mentation of the Tate pairing using the Karatsuba multiplier, as shown in Fig. 4.4.
Similar to Shu’s design, Ghosh and Beuchat expand the operations and used ded-
icated combinational logic to calculate the ‘for’ loop and the final exponentiation.
The difference is that Ghosh’s work uses a Karatsuba multiplier which consumes
large area but is very time efficient. Thus, only 1 multiplier is used in Ghosh’s
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Fig. 4.5: Top-level archigtecture of Keller’s design [12]
design. This multiplier is reused by both the ‘for’ loop logic and the final exponenti-
ation logic. Selectors are used to choose the inputs of the multiplier from the register
bank. This structure considers only the fastest implementation method and requires
significantly large area. In this work, more reconfigurable and flexible methods to
implement the Tate pairing algorithm will be considered.
In [12], Keller et al designed a bus type architecture, as shown in Fig. 4.5. In
this design, all the calculations are broken down into basic operations over GF (2m).
As can be seen from Fig. 4.5, only an adder, a squarer, a multiplier and an inverter
can be found in the top-level architecture. All these blocks calculate the very basic
operations over GF (2m). A data bus connects all these blocks and the register
bank. This structure requires less hardware resources than the combinational logic
structure. In the mean time, the controller plays a major role. The operation flow is
stored in the ROM which connects to all the GF (2m) operation blocks through the
control bus. The control bus decides which block is activated, assigns the inputs of
the GF (2m) operation blocks and reads the results back when the operations finish.
In this way, all the operation blocks are reused throughout the pairing calculation.
The price of saving hardware resources is that more clock cycles are required. Since
the data bus cannot assign the inputs to two blocks at the same time, this results in
the calculation of the pairing in a serial manner. The additions and squarings each
require two clock cycles, one for the assignment and the other for reading back the
result to the register bank.
The earlier Tate pairing implementations used different top-level architectures
and different components. However, the basic components of these designs are the
same.
• Data access mechanism: A design can use register banks or block RAMs to
save the data. Register banks require extra slice flip-flops, i.e. extra hardware
resources. Block RAMs does not take up extra slice flip-flops, but only two
variables stored in the block RAM can be read at a time. Thus, the Block RAM
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suits the bus type structure better than the combinational logic structure.
• Controller: A controller usually consists of an FSM and a control bus or some
control signals. In Keller’s work [12], a ROM is used to control the Control bus
with pre-stored instructions. This helps reduce the complexity of the FSM.
• Selector: In combinational logic designs, all the registers are connected to
the corresponding operation logic. Multiplexors and enable signals (namely
interconnection networks in Fig. 4.4 and 4.3), together with the control bus,
control the operation flow of the design. In bus type designs, a Data bus
connects all the operation blocks with the block RAM. A selector controlled
by the controller chooses which operation block is to be enabled.
• Operation logic: The combinational logic structure expands all operations re-
quired in parallel. If some logic in the structure can be reused by two or more
operations, a multiplexor is usually used to select the current inputs of the
logic. This structure is fast, but results in large area. The bus type structure
uses operation blocks for each independent function. Such blocks are connected
with the block RAM through a data bus. When the block RAM presents differ-
ent data on the bus, the inputs of the blocks are chosen. Thus, the operation
blocks in the bus type structure can be reused by any input. However, the
block RAM can only present two variables on the Data bus. This increases the
calculation time of the bus type structure designs.
Top level architecture of Bus type
Fig. 4.6 shows the top level architecture for implementing the Tate pairing using the
ηT algorithm. As can be seen from the figure, the bus type top-level architecture
applied in this work is similar to Keller’s architecture in Fig. 4.5. The architecture
is based on the GF (2m) modules. A block RAM is used to store the inputs and in-
termediate variables required in the algorithm. The GF (2m) blocks and memory are
controlled by a FSM controller, which iterates through an instruction set, pre-stored
in ROM. No GF (24m) modules can be seen on the top level because the GF (2m)
function blocks are reused for each of the GF (24m) operations. The instructions for
the GF (24m) operations are stored in the ROM and all the operations have access
to all the GF (2m) blocks so that the design will reach a high utilization of all its
hardware.
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Fig. 4.6: FPGA architecture of Tate pairing
In contrast with Keller’s bus type top-level architecture, there can be more than
one GF (2m) Multiplier block in the architecture of this work. Using the parallel
method introduced in section 2.7.3, the GF (2m) Multipliers can operate at the same
time. In each clock cycle, the data bus can only arrange the inputs to one operation
block, thus having one more parallel multiplier in the architecture saves n− 1 clock
cycles, at the cost of one more GF (2m) Multiplier and one more m-bit selector
array. By the same method, there can be more than one Adder, Squarer or Inverter.
The GF (2m) addition and squaring operation both require only 2 clock cycles for
their calculation in the bus-type architecture. Thus, even if the designer increases
the number of GF (2m) Adder or GF (2m) Squarer block, the data bus does not have
spare clock cycles to write to and read from the additional GF (2m) Adder or GF (2m)
Squarer block. Thus, there is only one GF (2m) Adder and one GF (2m) Squarer block
in the bus type architecture of this work. For the Inverter block, because there is
only one GF (2m) Inversion operation in the whole ηT algorithm calculation, it is not
necessary to put mores GF (2m) Inverter block in the architecture.
4.3.2 Reconfiguration of the multiplications in Bus type design
In the bus type architecture applied in this work, the steps in Algorithm 2.2 are
calculated serially. Operations in steps 1, 2 and 8 in the algorithm are executed
only once in the ηT pairing calculation, while operations in the ‘for’ loop in steps 3-7
are executed m times and dominate the calculation time of the whole design. The
arrangement of the operations in the ‘for’ loop affects the calculation time of the ηT
algorithm.
Note that in step 4 of Algorithm 2.2, the intermediate variable GF (24m) element
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A(t) contains only 3 terms, i.e. the coefficient a3 of the degree 4 term a3t
3 equals
0. This makes it possible to optimize the GF (24m) Multiplication, the operation of
C(t)← C(t)2 × A(t) in step 5 of Algorithm 2.2.
The calculation of C(t) ← C(t)2 × A(t) consists of two parts, the GF (24m)
squaring part and the GF (24m) multiplication part. Expanding the operations and
rewriting step 5 of Algorithm 2.2 results in equation 4.15:
C(t)← C(i)(t)2
C(i+1)(t)← C(t)× A(t)
(4.15)
In equation 4.15, C(i)(t) represents the variable value for the current iteration, de-
rived from previous iteration. C(t) is an intermediate variable and C(i+1)(t) is the
calculated value of this iteration, ready for the calculation in the next iteration. The
squaring calculation in equation 4.15 can be calculated in 4 S and 2 A, as introduced
in section 4.2.2. Here the calculation of C(i+1)(t)← C(t)× A(t) is discussed. Let
A(t) = a0 + a1t+ a2t
2,
where a0 = γ + u + β, a1 = α + v, a2 = a1 + 1. C(t) and C(i+1)(t) can be written as
follows:
C(t) = c0 + c1t+ c2t
2 + c3t
3,where ci ∈ GF (2m)
C(i+1)(t) = c0(i+1) + c1(i+1)t+ c2(i+1)t
2 + c3(i+1)t
3,where cj(i+1) ∈ GF (2m).
Expand the calculation C(i+1)(t)← C(t)× A(t), yields
c0(i+1) + c1(i+1)t+ c2(i+1)t
2 + c3(i+1)t
3
= (c0 + c1t+ c2t
2 + c3t
3)× (a0 + a1t+ a2t2)
(4.16)
where
c0(i+1) = c0a0 + (c2 + c3)a2 + c3,
c1(i+1) = c0a0 + (c1 + c2 + c3)a0 + (c0 + c2 + c3)(a0 + a2) + c3a2 + c0 + c3,
c2(i+1) = c0a0 + (c1 + c2 + c3)a0 + (c0 + c2 + c3)(a0 + a2) + (c1 + c2)(a0 + a2) + c1,
c3(i+1) = (c1 + c2 + c3)a0 + (c1 + c2)(a0 + a2) + c2.
The expressions above show the calculation of equation 4.15 in detail. In each
iteration of the ‘for’ loop in steps 3-7 of Algorithm 2.2, 6A+4S+1M operations are
required to update A(t). Also, to update C(t) in each iteration, 18A + 4S + 6M are
required. In the bus type top-level architecture, if there is more than one multiplier,
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Fig. 4.7: Schedules for different numbers of Multipliers
calculation of the 7 multiplications in A(t) and C(t) can be carried out at the same
time. By using different numbers of multipliers, there can be different schedules for
computing the multiplications in steps 3-7 in Algorithm 2.2, as shown in Fig. 4.7.
In Fig. 4.7, blocks ‘PRE’ and ‘POST’ represent the pre- and post-computations
of the 7M. The pre-computations consist of 11A + 8S and require 38 clock cycles.
The post-computations consist of 13A, some RAM writing operations and some
finite state machine operations, requiring 47 clock cycles. The detail of operation
flows inside the ‘PRE’ and ‘POST’ blocks in Fig. 4.7 can be found in Fig. A.1 and
A.2 in Appendix A. The operation of a single M requires n = dm
d
e clock cycles for
the DSM, with one additional clock cycle reading the product from the output into
memory. In this work, the processor will always spend 85 clock cycles on the ‘PRE’
and ‘POST’ operations, which are performed in serial. In this case, only 1 Adder
and 1 Squarer are needed in the architecture.
With different number #Mult of multipliers, the design can deal with at most
#Mult multiplications at the same time. Numbers #Mult=1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 are
used in this work. Using 5 and 6 multipliers does not help reduce the calculation
of the 7 multiplications. Since only 7 multiplications are needed in each iteration,
putting more multipliers in the design will not speed up the operation time. As can
be seen in Fig. 4.7, adding multipliers linearly reduces the required number of clock
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cycles. Using only one DSM, which gives a minimum area design, referred to as a
minimum DSM design in later discussions, takes 7n + 99 clock cycles. While using
7 DSMs, which requires the largest area, referred to as a maximum DSM design in
later discussions, calculates the operations in the shortest time of n+93 clock cycles.
The details of the operation flow using different #Mult can be found in Fig. A.3,
A.4, A.5, A.6 and A.7 in Appendix A.
4.3.3 Implementation results of Bus type top-level architecture
In this implementation, the Tate pairing processor is written in VHDL language. The
design is simulated using ModelSim XE III 6.3c and the target FPGA technology
is Xilinx Virtex-V. The designs presented in this section use a bus type top-level
architecture. Different numbers of DSMs (#Mult = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7) of different
digit sizes (d = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 32) are used to implement the target algorithm
at the field size of m = 163, 233, 283 and 571. The Karatsuba multipliers, with
and without registers inserted, are also applied in the designs because they calculate
GF (2m) multiplications in very few clock cycles. Due to the large area required, each
Karatsuba design contains only one Karatsuba multiplier. For different parameters
the hardware designs require different area and result in different maximum clock
frequency. The implementation results are for m=571 are given in Table 4.3. For
convenience implementation results for field sizes m=163, 233 and 283 are listed in
Appendix B, Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3.
Because there are 4 registers and 4 LUTs in each slice of the Xilinx Virtex-V
xc5vlx50 FPGA and in the designs, the number of registers never exceeds that of
LUTs, the number of the LUTs represents the amount of hardware resources used. As
can be seen from the tables, the area and time required varies when using different
values of the digit size d and different numbers of multipliers. In this work the
hardware resources required (Area), the calculation time of each design (Time) and
Area*Time (A*T) product are taken as the parameters to judge the performance of
different designs. The A*T product represents the total resources used to perform
a Tate pairing algorithm. Here a lower A*T product means that less hardware and
timing resources are used.
In the design over GF (2571), because a Karatsuba multiplier of 571 bits exceeds
the area resources available, a 2nd-level Karatsuba multiplier is applied. i.e. making
use of equation 3.9, in calculating the 571-bit multiplication, 3 sub-multiplications,
each of 286 bits, are used. As introduced in section 3.5.3, each 286-bit Karatsuba
multiplier contains 80 18 × 18 sub-multiplier blocks and one 16 × 16 sub-multiplier
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Parameters Results
#Mult d n Regs LUTs
Freq. Time A*T
(MHz) (µs) (LUT*s)
1× DSM
1 571 7504 7598 232.4 10182.6 77.37
2 286 7504 8162 232.4 5215.9 42.57
4 143 7503 8745 232.4 2723.9 23.82
8 72 7506 9886 232.4 1486.6 14.70
16 36 7504 12748 232.4 859.2 10.95
32 18 7513 16441 230.0 551.2 9.06
2× DSM
1 571 9231 8766 226.9 6063.2 53.15
2 286 9233 9905 226.9 3155.4 31.25
4 143 9228 11060 226.9 1696.4 18.76
8 72 9236 13339 226.9 972.0 12.97
16 36 9233 19071 226.9 604.7 11.53
32 18 9240 25581 226.9 421.1 10.77
3× DSM
1 571 10959 11658 226.5 4609.2 53.73
2 286 10959 13365 226.5 2427.4 32.44
4 143 10955 15099 226.5 1332.6 20.12
8 72 10964 18493 226.5 789.1 14.59
16 36 10960 25400 226.5 513.5 13.04
32 18 10965 35353 226.9 375.0 13.26
4× DSM
1 571 12685 16816 214.1 3348.0 56.30
2 286 12685 17380 212.4 1817.0 31.58
4 143 12680 21402 214.1 1027.1 21.98
8 72 12692 25935 214.1 642.1 16.65
16 36 12689 37365 214.1 446.9 16.70
32 18 12692 49512 215.6 346.8 17.17
7× DSM
1 571 17864 17464 212.4 1829.0 31.94
2 286 17863 21447 213.4 1037.8 22.26
4 143 17865 28360 212.4 648.2 18.38
8 72 17876 38361 212.4 452.3 17.35
16 36 17870 52695 213.1 351.8 18.54
32 18 17867 69990 209.1 308.1 21.56
Kara. no Reg 5 8649 24808 176.6 419.7 10.41
Kara. with Reg 7 16133 25119 252.9 325.1 8.17
Tab. 4.3: Implementation results of Tate pairing, bus type, Xilinx Virtex-V, m=571
block. In this case, a 286-bit Karatsuba multiplier plus 5 clock cycles, rather than a
571-bit Karatsuba multiplier plus 1 clock cycle, are required. When the registers for
reducing the critical path are inserted, 7 clock cycles are required for this multipli-
cation. The two additional clock cycles, in this case, are required for the signals to
go through the inserted registers in the multiplier. This 2nd-level structure requires
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Fig. 4.8: Mixed type architecture of Tate pairing
more operating time than using original Karatsuba multipliers, as in designs for m
=163, 233 and 283. In the designs for m=571, the Karatsuba multiplier does not
result in a much faster calculation speed than the fastest DSM designs. However, as
a medium size, but fast multiplier, the 2nd-level Karatsuba multiplier provides the
best A*T product amongst the designs over GF (2571).
4.3.4 Implementation results of mixed type top-level architecture
For the m=163, #mult=7, d=16 and d=32 designs, the calculation time of the
multiplications halves when d increases from 16 to 32. However, the calculation
time of the whole Tate pairing does not decrease significantly. This is because the
‘small’ operations, including additions and squarings, dominate the calculation time
when the calculation times of the multiplications are reduced. The two clock cycles
required for addition and squaring in the bus type structure become the speed bottle
neck.
In Algorithm 2.2, steps 1, 2 and 8 operate only once. The addition and squaring
operations in these steps require some time, but not a significant amount. The bus-
type design with instructions pre-stored in the ROM reduces the hardware resources
requirement. In contrast, the addition and squaring operations in steps 3-7, i.e. the
85 clock cycles for addition and squaring operations in the ‘for’ loop as illustrated
in Fig. 4.7, are operated m times in the Tate pairing calculation. One may think of
reducing this calculation time of 85*m clock cycles by implementing the operations
in parallel, i.e. in the form of combinational logic, using the same structure as used
in the designs illustrated in Figs. 4.3 and 4.4.
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Parameters Results
m Type n Regs LUTs
Freq. Time A*T
(MHz) (µs) (LUT*s)
163
no Reg 1 10781 16243 153.1 13.4 0.22
with Reg 1 14003 16395 240.1 9.9 0.16
233
no Reg 1 15251 24698 153.1 18.4 0.45
with Reg 1 19916 24587 240.4 13.7 0.34
283
no Reg 1 18586 32604 146.1 23.1 0.75
with Reg 1 24256 32345 238.5 16.5 0.53
571
no Reg 5 41341 49321 176.7 128.7 6.35
with Reg 7 47094 49666 240.1 128.4 6.38
Tab. 4.4: Implementation results of Tate pairing, mixed type architecture, Xilinx Virtex-V
In the architecture illustrated in Fig. 4.8, the addition and squaring operations
in steps 3-7 are parallel implemented in the ‘for loop logic’ block. These operations
can be calculated in only one clock cycle. Since the ‘for loop logic’ block operates
on all intermediate variables in the same clock cycle, such variables are stored in
the ‘Reg Bank’ of the ‘for loop logic’ block and written back into RAM after
the ‘for’ loop calculation ends. Operations in steps 1, 2 and 8 are the same as in
the bus-type design, i.e. an adder, a squarer and a divider connected to the data
bus calculate the operations in steps 1, 2 and 8 in serial form, with instructions
pre-stored in the ROM in the controller. In controlling the multiplier, a ‘sel’ signal
selects the controller of the Karatsuba multiplier. In steps 1, 2 and 8, the inputs of
the Karatsuba multiplier can be arranged by the data bus, controlled by the ROM. In
steps 3-7, i.e. the ‘for’ loop, the inputs of the Karatsuba multiplier can be arranged
by the for loop logic block. This architecture significantly reduces the calculation
times of the designs with fast implementation such as when the Karatsuba multiplier
is used. The implementation results are shown in Table 4.4.
In Table 4.4, the Karatsuba multipliers with and without registers inserted, are
used. Similar to using DSMs, the parameter n in this table indicates the number of
clock cycles required to calculate a multiplication. In the case without registers in-
serted, for designs with m=163, 233 and 283, the 7 multiplications are input into the
Karatsuba multiplier serially and read out one clock cycle after the input serially as
well. For example, in clock cycles {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} the inputs of the 7 multiplications
are read from registers in the ‘for loop logic’ block and sent into the multiplier.
After one clock cycle, i.e. in clock cycles {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, the calculation results
are read and written back to the corresponding registers respectively. The number
of clock cycles required for each iteration of the ‘for’ loop is 9.
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In the case with registers inserted, a single Karatsuba multiplier requires 3 clock
cycles for the calculation. However, according to its structure as illustrated in Fig.
3.4, for designs with m=163, 233 and 283, the multiplications can be pipelined in
the Karatsuba multiplier. For example, in clock cycles {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} the inputs
of the 7 multiplications are serially sent to the multiplier. After three clock cycles,
i.e. in clock cycle 4, the result of the first multiplication can be read from the output
register of the Karatsuba multiplier. In clock cycles {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}, the results
of the rest 6 multiplications are read from the output and written back to their
corresponding registers respectively. Thus, the number of clock cycles required for
each iteration of the ‘for’ loop is 11.
Because the m=571 design uses a 2nd-level Karatsuba multiplier, in which the
286-bit multiplier is reused 3 times, the schedule for the design with m=163, 233 and
283 cannot be applied to the m=571 design. In the mixed type m=571 designs, it
requires 5 and 7 clock cycles for the Karatsuba multipliers without and with registers,
respectively.
It must be noted that the hardware resources required for designs with field size
m=283 and 571 have exceeded the constraint of Virtex-V xc5vlx50 FPGA in this
work (28800 Regs, 28800 LUTs). The area requirements of these designs are only
theoretical values after synthesis. These designs can only be implemented in larger
FPGA technologies.
4.4 Analysis of implementation result
The results of implementations using different top-level architectures and different
parameters show different performances. For each m, when the parameters (#Mult
and d) change, the trends of how the implementation results change are similar. Here
implementation results of designs over GF (2571) are discussed.
4.4.1 Time analysis
Consider now the calculation time requirement shown in Fig. 4.9. As the calculation
time varies when different multiplier schedules are applied, the slowest design requires
over 100 times the calculation time of the fastest one to complete the calculation,
the figures showing calculation time use a logarithmic scale. Fig. 4.9 shows the
calculation time required for designs using different numbers of multipliers (#Mult)
and using different digit sizes d. In this figure, each line shows a multiplier schedule
used in the designs, i.e. using #Mult ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 7} DSMs, or using one Karatsuba
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Fig. 4.9: Calculation time of ηT algorithm implementations, m=571
multiplier. In designs using DSMs, when using the same number of multipliers,an
increase in digit size d leads to a decrease in the number n of clock cycles required
for each digit serial multiplication and, thus, decreases the calculation time required.
It can be clearly seen from Fig. 4.9 that for the same #Mult, when the digit size
d increases, the calculation time decreases. The decrease rate, i.e. the slope, of
#Mult = 7 is smaller than those of the others. This is because the calculation
times of the multiplications in the Tate pairing are already improved by increasing
the number of DSMs. Increasing the digit size d is more effective in designs with
fewer multipliers. For field GF (2571), the calculation times of designs using the
Karatsuba multiplier are also illustrated in Fig. 4.9, shown as the triangle line at
the bottom, each with their specifications by their side. The bus type Karatsuba
multiplier designs run as fast as the fastest DSM design. The mixed type designs
calculate the Tate pairing in even a shorter time.
Fig. 4.10 shows the calculation time comparison between designs of different
field size m. In this figure the minimum DSM design (#Mult = 1, d=1) and the
maximum DSM design (#Mult = 7, d=16) are presented along with the Karatsuba
designs. It can be clearly seen from Fig 4.10 that for all m, the minimum DSM design
is much slower than other designs, while the maximum DSM design has almost the
same speed level as the bus type Karatsuba designs. The mixed type Karatsuba
designs show the best performance and a significant improvement when compared to
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Fig. 4.10: Calculation time of ηT algorithm implementations for different field size m
that of using bus-type architecture. Since the multiplications are calculated in fixed
time, rather than linear to field size m as the DSMs, the calculation times of the Tate
pairings over different field size m are now decided by the number of iterations in
the ‘for’ loop. i.e. the calculation times of the mixed type architecture designs grow
at a linear rate with the field size m. Among the mixed type designs, the designs
using Karatsuba multipliers with registers inserted give the best calculation speed
for field size m=163, 233 and 283. For field size m=571, the design uses a 2nd level
Karatsuba multiplier, i.e. calculating 3 286-bit Karatsuba multiplications to form a
571-bit multiplication. The two additional clock cycles from the inserted registers in
each 286-bit sub multiplication lead to 6 clock cycles in the 571-bit multiplication.
Since the mixed type top-level architecture minimizes the calculation time of the
‘small’ operations in the ‘for’ loop, these 6 clock cycles result in a significant speed
penalty, which cannot be compensated for by the increased operation frequency.
Thus, the calculation time of the design using Karatsuba multipliers with registers
inserted for field size m=571 is longer than that without registers inserted.
4.4.2 Area analysis
The areas required for designs over GF (2571) are shown in Fig. 4.11. As the area
required does not vary as much as the calculation time does, Fig. 4.11 uses linear
scale. As can be clearly seen in Fig. 4.11, in designs using DSMs, the more multipliers
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Fig. 4.11: Area of ηT algorithm implementations, m=571
Fig. 4.12: Area of ηT algorithm implementations across different field size m
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there are in the design, the more hardware resources are required. When using same
#Mult, using a larger digit size d leads to a larger area. Similar to the timing results,
the area of the Karatsuba designs are presented in Fig. 4.11. Using Karatsuba in the
designs requires more area than most of the DSM designs do. Among the Karatsuba
designs, the mixed type designs are the biggest, almost as large as the maximum
DSM design and twice as larger as the bus type Karatsuba designs.
Fig. 4.12 shows the comparison between designs of the same parameters over
different fields. Larger field size always requires more hardware resources to imple-
ment the operations. As in the calculation time discussion, the area requirements of
the minimum and maximum DSM designs, together with all the Karatsuba designs,
are illustrated here. As shown in Fig. 4.12, the area requirements of implementing
DSM designs are almost linear with the field size. This is because the sizes of all the
components in the DSM designs, including the adder, squarer, DSM and divider are
linearly proportional to the field size. The area requirement of the Karatsuba designs
show an exponential increase with increasing field size m. This is because the area
required for a Karatsuba multiplier is proportional to n2×3log2 mn , where n represents
the digit size of the sub-multiplier block in the Karatsuba multiplier, as introduced
in chapter 3. In the m=571 case, rather than the original Karatsuba multiplier, a
2nd level Karatsuba multiplier is applied. This makes the bus type Karatsuba de-
signs over field GF (2571) only only slightly larger than those over the field GF (2283).
This additional area requirement comes from the 571-bit adder, squarer and divider.
Fig. 4.12 also shows that the Karatsuba designs, with and without registers inserted,
require almost the same number of LUTs.
4.4.3 A*T product analysis
The A*T trade-off performance of designs over GF (2571) is shown in Fig. 4.13.
As the product of two types of resources used in the implementations, a lower A*T
product represents a higher hardware efficiency and a better trade-off between area
and time.
For DSM designs, when the digit size d increases, the A*T products of the designs
do not show a linear trend. The trends of A*T products for different #Mult values
are not the same. For #Mult=1 and 2 when d increases, the A*T product decreases.
However, the slope decreases along with the increase of #Mult. In the design using
#Mult=3, the A*T products for digit sizes d=16 and 32 are almost the same. For
designs with #Mult=4 and 7, the A*T products decrease to a minimum at d=8 and
increase once again as d increases. i.e. in DSM designs, when #Mult increases, the
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Fig. 4.13: Area*time (A*T) product of ηT algorithm implementations, m=571
effectiveness of improving the A*T product by increasing the digit size d decreases.
Fig. 4.13 also shows that all of the 4 designs using Karatsuba multipliers provide
a good A*T product, being the same or better than the best A*T performance
of DSM designs. Among all the Tate pairing implementations over GF (2571), the
‘Kara, mix, no reg’ design, i.e. the mixed type design using the Karatsuba multiplier
without registers inserted, shows the lowest A*T product, i.e. the best trade-off
between area and time.
4.4.4 Comparison with earlier work
Table 4.5 compares the implementation results of the designs described in this chap-
ter with earlier hardware based pairing accelerators. Note that in the table, the
areas of Beuchat’s work [11] are approximate values because the original area re-
quirements were calculated in slice unit. The differences between Virtex 2, 4, 5 and
6 [82, 83, 84, 85] can be found Table C.1 in Appendix C. All works in Table 4.5 were
implemented over GF (2m). The minimum DSM designs, maximum DSM designs
and the mixed type Karatsuba designs, for each similar field size, are shown in the
table.
The implementations designed by Shu et al [7] and Li et al [8] used the same
algorithm as this work, i.e. the ηT algorithm. Both designs used a combinational
logic top-level architecture and DSMs as the multiplier. Both works have their
multi-DSMs pipelined, aiming to obtain a high calculation speed. Among them Shu
acquired a better speed, faster than the maximum DSM designs in this work, but
slower than the mixed type design using Karatsuba multiplier.
The work done by Keller [143] is an implementation of the BKLS/GHS algorithm.
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Ref.
Field
Mult type
VIRTEX Area Time A*T
m Plaform (LUTs) (µs) (LUT*s)
Shu [7] 239 10×DSM, d=32 4 59971 43 2.58
Beuchat [11] 239 Kara. with reg 4 32406 3.46 0.112
This work 233 1×DSM, d=1 5 3200 1717.0 5.49
This work 233 7×DSM, d=32 5 33654 107.9 3.63
This work 233 Kara. with reg 5 24587 13.7 0.34
Keller [143] 271 1×DSM, d=1 2 3716 13500 50.2
Keller [143] 271 11×DSM, d=16 2 57032 839.7 47.9
Shu [7] 283 10×DSM, d=32 4 72961 61 4.45
Li [8] 283 12×DSM, d=32 4 104860 590 61.9
This work 283 1×DSM, d=1 5 3860 2658.5 10.26
This work 283 7×DSM, d=32 5 36312 141.0 5.12
This work 283 Kara. with reg 5 32345 16.5 0.53
Keller [143] 457 1×DSM, d=16 2 12406 4769 59.2
Keller [143] 457 11×DSM, d=6 2 47749 3389 161.8
Shu [7] 557 10×DSM, d=8 4 75862 675.5 51.2
Beuchat [11] 557 Kara. with reg 4 110312 13.2 1.46
This work 571 1×DSM, d=1 5 7598 10182.6 77.37
This work 571 1×DSM, d=16 5 12748 859.2 10.95
This work 571 7×DSM, d=32 5 69990 308.1 21.56
This work 571 Kara. no reg 5 49321 128.7 6.35
Ghosh [129] 1223 Kara. no reg 6 54681 190 10.4
Tab. 4.5: Comparison with other implementations of Tate Pairing
The calculation time of Keller’s work is much longer than the maximum DSM design
in this work. This is because the implementation uses an early technology (Virtex-2)
which operate at a lower speed. In addition, the BKLS/GHS algorithm is not as
efficient as the ηT algorithm in calculating the Miller’s loop. However, the bus type
top-level architecture of Keller’s work is reconfigurable. By applying this architec-
ture, the minimum DSM designs are implemented for all fields. For designs with
strictly restricted hardware resource, such designs can accomplish the Tate pairing
calculation using minimum area, at the cost of a long calculation time.
Designs by Beuchat et al in [11] and by Ghosh et al in [129] use the reduced ηT
algorithm, which halves the ‘for’ loop in the original ηT algorithm, but introduces
some more operations in the final exponentiation step. The reduced ηT algorithm
is about 75% of the calculation time of the original ηT algorithm. Both designs in
[11] and [129] also use combinational logic top-level architectures. In contrast with
Shu’s and Li’s designs, the multiplier used in the works of Beuchat and Ghosh is
the Karatsuba multiplier. This fully parallel structure provides a very short calcu-
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lation time for the GF (2m) multiplication. Together with the fully combinational
architecture, these two designs achieved a very fast calculation speed. Although the
hardware resources required for the combinational logic top-level architectures and
the Karatsuba multiplier are very large, the fast speed of these designs still makes
the A*T products of such designs outperform the other designs. Note that the de-
sign by Ghosh et al in [129] is over the field GF (21223). This design is based on a
very large finite field and provides a very high security level (128-bit security). In
his design, because the original Karatsuba multiplier is much too big, a 3rd-level
Karatsuba multiplier is applied. Similar to the 2nd-level Karatsuba structure, Ghosh
used a 306-bit Karatsuba. By calculating 9 306-bit multiplications, plus the pre-
and post- multiplication calculations, each 1223-bit multiplication requires 11 clock
cycles to calculate.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter showed the relevant operations over extension field GF (24m), includ-
ing squaring, multiplication and inversion. How these extension operations can be
performed using basic operations over field GF (2m) was presented. The GF (2m) op-
erations required are (4A+2S), (34M+16A+4S+1I) and (9M+22A), respectively.
The ηT algorithm is implemented using different top-level architectures: the bus
type and the mixed type architectures. In bus type architecture designs, both DSMs
and Karatsuba multipliers are applied, while in mixed type architecture designs,
only the Karatsuba multiplier is used for the pursuit of a fast calculation speed.
In bus type designs, different numbers of DSMs were used along with designs of
different digit size d = 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 32. As the Karatsuba multiplier is a
fully parallel architecture and consumes large area, in both bus type and mixed type
architecture designs, only one such multiplier is used. The implementation results
are listed and the comparisons detween different parameters are discussed. The bus
type architecture designs are of high flexibility and reduce the area of the design
significantly. The reconfigurable designs using the bus type architecture provide
the designer with different choices in resources constrained environments. In the
mixed type designs, the operations in the ‘for’ loop are optimized for a faster speed.
Although the area required for the mixed type designs is much larger than that of
bus type designs, the calculation time of mixed type designs is much faster, even
outweighs the area cost and gives the mixed type designs of the lowest A*T product,
i.e. the best hardware efficiency.
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The comparisons between different designs and with earlier works were presented.
Among designs of different architectures, the combinational logic architecture pro-
vides the best hardware efficiency. The bus type architecture provides good flexibility
in trade-offs between area and time rather than a fast calculation speed or a high
hardware efficiency. In the choice of multipliers, DSMs can be reconfigurable and are
suitable for design of different size. However, at the cost of a large area, Karatsuba
multipliers are preferred when pursuing high speed designs.
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5. SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS AGAINST IMPLEMENTATIONS
OF TATE PAIRING ALGORITHMS
5.1 Introduction
Attacks on hardware implementations of cryptosystems mainly focus on the math-
ematical analysis of leaked side channel information. Side Channel Analysis (SCA)
attackers exploit leaked information in order to derive secret information. Whelan et
al. [144] and Kim et al. [145] investigated the possibility of SCA attacks, including
simple, differential and correlation power analysis, respectively SPA, DPA and CPA,
against practical pairing algorithms. Former attacks making use of side channel in-
formation are introduced in Chapter 2. This work mainly focuses on practical CPA
attacks against FPGA implementations.
Section 5.2 introduces an overview of SCA attacks. The theory of CPA attacks
is specified and is used as the practical attack applied in this work. The power
consumption model applied in this work is also analyzed here. Section 5.3 analyzes
the weakness of the proposed ηT pairing algorithm. Making use of the ciphertext
exposed in the insecure channel, both in the public key protocol and in the algorith-
mic calculations, is discussed. In section 5.4, practical CPA attacks are applied on
the suspectable operation blocks, including the GF (2m) Adder block and the two
multiplier blocks. The power traces collected from the attacks performed are shown.
5.2 Side Channel Analysis Attacks
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks are based on the observation that the side
channel information leaked from the cryptosystem is related to the instruction being
executed. Among side channel attacks, power analysis attacks utilize the relationship
between the data being manipulated and the power consumption leaked from the
actual cryptographic devices, such as FPGAs and ASICs [13, 89]. Power analysis
attacks typically consist of two steps. The first step is the collection phase, where the
power consumption traces of the device are recorded. The second step is the analysis
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phase, where the power consumption traces acquired from the devices are analyzed to
reveal secret information. The analysis method varies for different types of attacks.
Successful analysis methods include simple power analysis (SPA), differential power
analysis (DPA) [13] and correlation power analysis (CPA) [96]. SPA focuses mainly
on deducing the operation being executed in the devices from the shape of the power
consumption traces. In contrast, DPA focuses on the data being manipulated, using
statistical methods to form a correlation between a number of power traces and
the secret information. CPA is a more accurate variant of DPA that estimates a
hypothetical power consumption for each possible value of the secret information and
compares them to the actual power consumption traces using a correlation test, such
as Pearson’s correlation coefficient [146]. An actual cryptosystem always includes
many components and the inherent noise of the components may hide the information
the attacker is looking for. By taking more traces and averaging out the noise, an
attacker can eliminate or reduce such effects. In SPA, an average of 1-50 traces may
reveal the secret information because it considers only the profile of the traces [13].
While in a DPA and CPA attacks, the number of measured power traces typically
varies from 500 to 10000 [13, 147, 148]. When choosing the number of power traces,
using more power traces averages out the effect of noise and helps identify the highest
correlation peak which indicates the correct hypothetical value.
5.2.1 Correlation Power Analysis Attacks
Based on the Hamming-Distance model, correlation power analysis (CPA) is a form
of SCA attack that exploits the correlation between hardware power consumption
and the intermediate values of the cryptographic algorithm in order to recover the
secret information. With recorded power traces of the Tate pairing operation, such
a power analysis attack can be successfully applied against the multiplier and adder
units.
The Hamming-Distance model is based on the Hamming-Weight model [103].
In a hardware implementation of a cryptosystem, an m-bit register state at time
t is represented as an m-bit binary data word Dt = Σ
m−1
j=0 dj2
j, where dj ∈ {0, 1}.
The Hamming-Weight of the register is the number of elements that are equal to 1,
i.e. H(Dt) = Σ
m−1
j=0 dj. The Hamming-Weight model is used as the basis for many
power analysis attacks on software implementations [149]. Since H is an integer
satisfying 0 ≤ H ≤ m, if the data words Dt are independent, Dt has an average
Hamming-Weight µH = m/2 and a variance σ
2
H = m/4.
The Hamming-Distance model [96] assumes that the side channel information
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leaked from a system depends on the number of bits switching from one state to the
other and is more appropriate for hardware implementations. The basic Hamming-
Distance model is:
W = aH(Dt ⊕Dt+1) + noise, (5.1)
where noise encapsulates switching and electrical noise. Dt is the current state of a
register and Dt+1 is next state The scalar a is the gain between W the power con-
sumption measured from actual cryptographic devices and H the Hamming-Weight
of (Dt ⊕Dt+1) which represents the number of bits switched between register states
Dt and Dt+1. This is called the Hamming-distance between Dt and Dt+1. In this
model, Dt is usually a state in the register targeted by the attacker.
5.2.2 Relationship between intermediate variables and power consumption
The basic principle of CPA [96] is that there exists a relationship between the
Hamming Distance of two register states and the measurable power consumption
[105, 150]. The correlation factor between the Hamming Distance and the consumed
power, named ρ(W,H), is used to tell whether the Hamming Distance model fits the
real power consumption or not [148]. It is the covariance between the two variables H
and W , normalized by the product of their standard deviations. With the Hamming
Distance model, there exists:
ρ(W,H) =
cov(W,H)
σWσH
=
aσH
σW
=
aσH√
a2σ2H + σ
2
noise
=
a
√
m√
ma2 + 4σ2noise
[96] (5.2)
In equation 5.2, cov(W,H) represents the covariance between H and W , σH and
σW represent the standard deviation of H and W , σ
2
noise represents the variance of
the noise. Let E be the mean of an array, the standard deviation of array H can be
calculated as per equation 5.3:
σH =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(Hi − E(H))2 (5.3)
And the covariance between H and W can be calculates as per equations 5.4.
cov(H,W ) = (
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
(E[(Hi − E[H])(Wj − E[W ])])) (5.4)
Assuming the noise has a Gaussian distribution, the variance of the noise σ2noise tends
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to a finite constant. In practical power consumption, this finite constant is very small
and tends to zero [96]. By applying a low pass filter or simply averaging a number
of traces, the spikes of noise can be reduced and thus, the affects of the variance
σ2noise can be minimized. In this work, each of the power traces used in attacking the
multipiler modules are averaged from 20 raw power traces, while the power traces
used in attacking the adder are filtered by a low pass filter with a cutoff frequency
of 200MHz.
The relationship in equation 5.2 shows that ρ(W,H) can be used to determine the
next state Dt+1. If the hypothetical value of Dt+1 is correct, the value ρ(W,H) tends to
±1 at the correlated point. In this work, the coefficient a is positive. Thus, ρ(W,H) in
equation 5.2 tends to 1 in this case. In experiments, if an attacker knows the current
state Dt and predicts the correct next state Dt+1 of the target register at time t,
there will be a high correlation value at the related point, otherwise the correlation
values tend to 0, or other values, rather than 1.
If the model applies only to l independent bits amongst L, a partial correlation
still exists:
ρ(W,H)l/L =
a
√
l
ma2 + 4σ2noise
= ρ(W,H)
√
l
L
(5.5)
This equation indicates that in the CPA attacks, the number of register bits being
targeted affects the value of the correlation factor ρ. The more bits being targeted at
a time, the larger the value of ρ the attacker gets. Theoretically, even if the ρ values
are small, according to equation 5.2, the correct one also can be recognized from the
incorrect ones, as long as the linear relationship between the power consumption and
the hamming distance exists. However, since the ρ value is small and near the noise
level, the attacker has to take more power traces and to average out the affect of the
noise. Thus, in applying CPA attacks on the hardware implemented Tate pairing
algorithm, the fewer bits being target at a time, the more power traces need to be
taken.
5.2.3 CPA attack setup
The practical setup for the CPA attack experiment is shown in Fig. 5.1. The
structure of the CPA attack setup in this work was illustrated in Fig. 2.10. In the
experiment, the Tate pairing algorithm described in Algorithm 2.2 is implemented
on a Xilinx Virtex-V xc5vlx50 technology [84] FPGA on the Sasebo-GII evaluation
board [151]. There is a shunt resistor of 1Ω inserted on the core Vdd line of the
cryptographic FPGA for measuring power traces. An oscilloscope is used to collect
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Fig. 5.1: CPA attack setup
and store traces of the voltage across this resistor. The voltage across this resistor
linearly correlates with the current through the resistor, thus, it is also linearly
correlated with the power consumption of the FPGA.
To minimise noise during thee capture of the power traces it is suggested that
the following are used:
• differential probe
• stable power supply
• room with stable temperature
• control FPGA to clock the inputs to the crypto FPGA.
During the data acquisition stage when the voltage traces are recorded, Matlab
[152] is used to communicate with the FPGA and the oscilloscope. Input points
to the pairing algorithm are sent from the PC, through the control FPGA and
then to the crypto FPGA. Following the transmission of the input information, the
crypto FPGA calculates the Pairing and the oscilloscope measures and records the
corresponding voltage traces which will be used in the CPA attack. Through Matlab,
the power traces measured by the oscilloscope can be read back to and stored in the
PC for analysis.
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Fig. 5.2: Pairing based IBE scheme encounters eavesdropper
5.3 Side-channel security analysis of the ηT Pairings
5.3.1 Weakness of ηT pairing based IBE scheme
In the IBE system described in Fig. 2.7 and the ABE system described in Fig.
2.8, assume there is an eavesdropper and attacker Eva. Eva can record and tamper
with the information in the insecure channel and can get the power consumption
information leaked from the decryption operation of Bob. As was introduced in
Chapter 2, when the information pair {U, V } sent from Alice to Bob is exposed
to the insecure channel, there can be unexpected weaknesses in the security of the
system. In this section the information pair {U, V } and the weaknesses are addressed
for IBE and ABE schemes.
In an IBE scheme, the information pair {U, V } consists of Alice’s symbol Pr and
cypher text c, i.e. {U, V } = {Pr, c}. Eva would keep cypher text c and tamper
with element Pr to produce P
′
r = PEva for the attack, as shown in Fig. 5.2. On
receiving the cypher text {PEva, c}, Bob calculates e(PEva;KBob) as the first step in
the decryption calculation. Eva monitors the power consumption information leaked
from Bob’s decryption and tries to get information about Bob’s private key KBob.
Recall the ABE system described in Fig. 2.8, there are multiple recievers. Alice
publishes cypher text E ′ and public key set {E1, E3, E4}. Except for the cypher
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Fig. 5.3: Pairing based ABE scheme
text E ′, receiver Bob with attributes {A1, A3} requires {E1, E3} for decryption and
Bill with attributes {A1, A4} requires {E1, E4} for decryption. In this work, Bob is
taken as an example and Alice sends the information pair {(E1, E3), E ′} to Bob, i.e.
{U, V } = {(E1, E3), E ′}. Eva would keep cypher text Ei = {E1, E3} and tamper
with it to produce EEvai = {EEva1 , EEva3 } for the attack, as shown in Fig. 5.3. On
receiving the information pair {(EEva1 , EEva1 ), E ′}, Bob calculates e(EEva1 ;DBob1 ) and
e(EEva3 ;D
Bob
3 ) as the first step in the decryption calculation. Eva monitors the power
consumption information leaked from Bob’s decryption and tries to get information
about Bob’s private key DBob1 and D
Bob
3 .
Based on pairing algorithms, both IBE and ABE schemes can be insecure. For
simplicity, the elements associated with the ηT pairing calculation and the attack are
extracted from the IBE and ABE systems and listed as below:
1. An attacker can acquire and tamper with the information of P .
2. The attacker sends P to the hardware computing e(P ;Q).
3. The attacker observes the power consumption of the calculation e(P ;Q).
4. The attacker is trying to discover point Q.
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P and Q are two points over the Elliptic Curve E(GF (2m)), fully represented as
P (α, β) and Q(x, y). Since the elliptic curve E(GF (2m)) restricts the two coordinates
of a point Q(x, y), knowing one coordinate leads to the other. Thus, when attacking
the ηT pairing, an attacker only needs to focus on the x coordinate of the secret
input Q(x, y). In the ηT pairing described in Algorithm 2.2, there are several weak
points vulnerable to a power analysis attack.
5.3.2 Weakness in addition
Recall the ηT algorithm for calculating the Tate pairing described in Algorithm 2.2
of Chapter 2, step 4 of Algorithm 2.2 is rewriten here as equation 5.6:
step 4 : A(t)← γ + u+ β + (α + v)t+ (α + v + 1)t2 (5.6)
To indicate the difference, in this section αorig is used to represent the original coor-
dinate of input point P and α is used to represent the updated intermediate variable
α in the ‘for’ loop. In the step shown in equation 5.6, the addition operation (α+ v)
contains the intermediate variable α from point P and v which is closely related
with point Q. Assume the attacker is trying to attack operation (α + v) of the first
iteration of the ‘for’ loop. It is assumed in this attack that one of these two elements
can be controlled and known by the attacker. Two conditions may occur.
1. When point P is sent through the insecure channel as a public input, coordinate
α of point P is known by the attacker. In this case, the attacker wants to reveal
the information contained in coordinate x of point Q(x, y), i.e. reveal the value
of intermediate variable v because x =
√
v − 1.
2. When point Q is taken as the insecure input to the algorithm, value v is known
by the attacker by calculating v = x2 + 1. In this case, discovering α is the
attacker’s goal. Once the attacker acquires α, she can compute the information
of input P via αorig = 4
√
α.
Note that square root operations [153] are required to reveal the secret information. If
the attacker can break the GF (2m) Adder shown in Fig. 3.1 which calculates (α+v),
she can reveal information about the private point with the intercepted public input
information. The detail of how the private point information is revealed through the
attack on the addition operation is introduced in Section 5.4.1.
In the bus type top-level architecture designs [143] illustrated in Fig. 4.5, inputs
α and v to this addition operation are stored in the block RAM. When this addition
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is performed, the data bus presents these two values to the GF (2m) Adder. After
one clock cycle, the result array (α + v) is read from the GF (2m) Adder block and
written into the block RAM. In the combinational logic top-level architecture designs
[7, 11, 8, 129] illustrated in Fig. 4.3 and 4.4, inputs α and v and output (α + v),
are stored in three register arrays, each of m bits. In each iteration, the values of
α and v are updated. Following the update of the inputs, the GF (2m) addition is
calculated in the next clock cycle. i.e. after one clock cycle, the output (α + v)
is updated. Thus, the weakness in the addition operation does not depend on the
hardware architecture the designer chooses.
5.3.3 Weakness in multiplication
Recall step 2 and step 6 of Algorithm 2.2, rewriten here as equation 5.7 and equation
5.8 respectively:
step 2 : u← x2 + y2 + g + m− 1
2
, v ← x2 + 1, α← α4, β ← β4, γ ← αv (5.7)
step 6 : u← u+ v, v ← v + 1, α← α4, β ← β4, γ ← αv (5.8)
In these steps, the multiplication γ ← αv contains the coordinate elements v and
α. Since the multiplications in the ‘for’ loop can be distributed in a multi-multiplier
design, as described in Fig. 4.7 in Chapter 4, γ ← αv in step 6 is a more complicated
condition and is chosen for attack in this work. The attacker can always generate the
value of α in any iteration using the information of input P or alternatively generate
the value of v in any iteration using the information of input Q. Thus, in this work,
it is assumed that the attacker tries to reveal the secret information through CPA
attacks on multiplication γ ← αv in step 6 of the first iteration of the ‘for’ loop.
Similar to the addition calculation, two conditions occur here.
1. An attacker who controls point P (α, β) wants to reveal the value of v in this
multiplication. Having acquired v in step 6, the attacker reveals the informa-
tion of the secret input Q by calculating x =
√
v.
2. An attacker who controls point Q(x, y) would calculate v first and wants to
acquire information about α in this multiplication. Having obtained α in step
6 of the first iteration, the attacker reveals the information of the secret input
P by calculating αorig = 8
√
α.
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If the attacker can break the GF (2m) multiplication which calculates γ ← αv, he
can get the secret information of the private input. The detail of how the coordinate
x of Q(x, y) is revealed through the attack on the multiplication is introduced in
Section 5.4.3.
Similar to the weak GF (2m) addition, the multiplication γ ← αv exists indepen-
dently of the hardware architecture of the ηT pairing design. In bus type top-level
architecture designs [143], inputs α and v are stored in the block RAM and are ready
for reading by the data bus when the multiplication is underway. In combinational
logic top-level architecture designs [7, 11, 8, 129], inputs α and v are stored in the
register arrays and updated during each iteration. The register arrays are connected
to the multiplier together with some other inputs. Multiplexors select which inputs
are active for the current multiplication. When multiplication γ ← αv is performed,
values α and v will be presented to the inputs of the GF (2m) Multiplier.
5.4 CPA attack against the GF (2m) operations
Because of the weaknesses of the algorithm, some attacks are proposed against the
operation blocks applied in the FPGA implementation of the ηT pairing design. In
the proposed attacks, since each element of the algorithms are of m bits, there are
#E : #E(GF (2m)) = 2m + 1 − Tr possible values for each of the elements. It is
not possible for a hardware attacker to generate the correlation factor of all the #E
possible values. A practical way is that the attacker tries to deal with a section of
the secret information and deal with the rest in the same way if the attack works.
In this condition, an attacker does not care about how big the field size is. He is
always choosing a few bits, or even only one bit at a time, if the target element is of
163-bit size or 571-bit size.
5.4.1 CPA against addition: Condition 1) P (α, β) public, attacking Q(x, y)
As mentioned in Section 5.3.3, in step 4 of Algorithm 2.2, the operation γ ← α+v can
be attacked to reveal information about the coordinate of the private point. Firstly,
assume the input point P (α, β) is taken as the public input, known and controlled
by the attacker. In this case, coordinate x and, thus, v is the secret information the
attacker wants to reveal. The architecture of the adder is shown in Fig. 3.1 and the
recorded power trace sample of an addition in the implementation is shown in Fig.
5.4. It takes 1 clock cycle to operate the addition. In this design, the Block-RAM
structure is used. Thus, it will take another clock cycle to write the result back to
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Fig. 5.4: Measured power trace sample of an addition operation in the Tate pairing
the memory. The chosen field for this attack is GF (2571), with 7 DSMs each of digit
size d=4. This is the largest design that can be mounted on the Virtex-V xc5vlx50
technology used in this work. To apply larger digit size over GF (2571), the number
of DSMs in the design must be reduced so that there are enough hardware resources
for the implementation. Theoretically, according to equation 5.5, attacks on designs
of larger area will be more difficult. Quadrupling the area of the whole design halves
the expected correlation factor’s value. However, according to equation 5.2, this
effect can be compensated for by taking more power traces which reduces the effect
of the noise.
In the ηT pairing implementation over GF (2
m), the adder contains an m-bit
XOR gate array and an m-bit register which stores the result after 1 clock cycle.
Two values, α and v, are input to the XOR gates and the value in the output
register is updated on the next clock cycle. Since an addition operation takes only
1 clock cycle, all information must be extracted during the single clock execution.
With knowledge of α, an attacker can easily generate the hypothetical value of the
secret input v. Thus, the attacker can choose how many bits of v to attack at a time.
Attacking j bits at a time implies 2j hypothetical values. In the attacks studied here,
only 1 bit is processed at a time.
Let the ith bit of the target variable v be v(i) and let α(i) represent the ith bit of
variable α. The hypothetical values of v(i) are ‘0’ and ‘1’. To reveal v(i), for each
public input α, the following calculation are performed:
1. For each addition operation, the current state Dt of the register is ‘0’.
2. Always assume the target v(i) is ‘1’.
3. For each α and v, calculate the hypothetical value of the next state of the
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Fig. 5.5: Correlation with the v(571) and v(570) of the secret v
target bit of register Dt+1 = α(i)⊕ v(i) = α(i)⊕ 1.
4. Calculate the hypothetical Hamming Distance values H between the current
state (’0’) and next state, namely H = H(Dt ⊕Dt+1) = Dt+1.
5. Calculate the correlations between the hypothetical Hamming Distance values
H and the measured power traces W , namely ρ(W,H) =
cov(W,H)
σW σH
.
Since the correlation results by guessing ‘1’ and guessing ‘0’ for the same target
bit are exactly opposite to each other, it is only necessary to generate hypothetical
values by guessing ‘1’ or ‘0’.
When attacking the adder, the attacker is generating the hypothetical value of
only 1 bit of the target m-bit ‘(α + v) Register’. According to equation 5.5, the
correct correlation value of attacking an adder tends to a very small value, which
is quite near the noise level. Thus, a large amount of power traces are taken for
the correlation calculation. In attacking the adder in this design, N=50000 public
inputs are sent to the FPGA as point P (α, β) to get a good correlation value which
helps the attacker identify the correct hypothesis.
The correlation result of v(571) and v(570) are shown in Fig. 5.5. In the figure,
the XOR operation happens between 160 ns and 200 ns. Since there are only 2
possible values for the target bit, one correct and the other incorrect, the correct
correlation value is positive while the incorrect correlation value is negative. In Fig.
5.5(a), v(571) is targeted. There is a drop in correlation at the operation period,
which shows that the hypothetical value ‘1’ of this point is incorrect, i.e. this bit
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Fig. 5.6: Performance of Correlation factor ρ when more power traces are taken into con-
sideration. Take v(571) and v(570) of the secret v as an example.
should be a ‘0’. Correspondingly, the correlation trace in Fig. 5.5(b) rises at the
operation period, which shows the hypothetical value ‘1’ of bit v(570) is correct.
According to the CPA attack theory of equations 5.1 and 5.2 in section 5.3, by
taking more power traces, the calculated correlation factor ρ tends to a constant
value. This means that more power traces help distinguish the correct correlation
value from the incorrect values. Fig. 5.6 shows the practical trends of the correlation
factor ρ when the number of power traces taken into consideration increases.
In Fig. 5.6, the x-axis is the number of power traces taken into consideration
whilst the y-axis represents the calculated value of Correlation factor ρ. As can be
seen, in this attack, 50,000 power traces are used in the calculation of the correlation
factor ρ. When the number of power traces taken is small, the correlation factor is
very unstable. One cannot clearly recognize the correct correlation factor from the
incorrect one. However, by taking more and more power traces into the calculation
(more than 15,000 power traces in this attack), the correct correlation factor ρ (red)
tends to a steady value which is obviously different from the incorrect one (blue).
The targeted hardware design of this attack contains 17,865 registers. According
to equation 5.5, applying CPA attacks on only a 1-bit register against the noise of
the whole FPGA design leads to a small correlation factor ρ: ρ tends to a value√
l
L
=
√
1
17,865
= 0.0075. This value is not very accurate because I/O pads and
other devices on the board might affect the power traces measured, but it shows the
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trend. This indicates that the correlation factor ρ tends to a very small value. Thus,
the large quantity of power traces is necessary to help average out the affect of the
noise. The correlation result shown in Fig. 5.6 shows that at least 15,000 power
traces are necessary to attack a 1-bit register. In this attack, 50,000 power traces
are taken to make sure that the correct correlation value can be clearly recognized
from the incorrect one.
In this attack, the mathematical analysis is calculated in Matlab. The 50,000
power traces used to attack v(571) and v(570) can also be used to attack the re-
maining bits v(569 ∼ 1). By repeating the same analysis steps mentioned 571 times
using the same set of power traces, the attacker is able to get value of v in step
4, described as in equation 5.6 and then calculate the secret information of point
Q(x, y), as described in section 5.3.2.
5.4.2 CPA against addition: Condition 2) Q(x, y) public, attacking P (α, β)
Because of the bilinearity property of the pairing algorithms (as introduced in Chap-
ter 2), the result of the calculation e(P ;Q) is equal to that of e(Q;P ). This means
that no matter which of the input points P and Q is being transferred in the insecure
channel, the designer can switch the coordinates (x, y) and (α, β). In this case, the
inputs of the operation blocks switch too.
Under this assumption, the point P is the private input and Q(x, y) is the public
input controlled by the attacker. The coordinate α of the (α + v) operation is the
target to be revealed and v can be calculated using the public input x (v ← x2 + 1).
In this case the above attack still works. The only difference is that the attacker
now holds the information of coordinate v(i), generates the hypothetical value and
calculates the correlation factor ρ of α on a bit-by-bit basis. Having acquired α, the
attacker can calculate the original coordinate αorig of point P , as described in section
5.3.2.
5.4.3 CPA against digit-serial multiplier(DSM): Condition 1) P (α, β) public,
attacking Q(x, y)
The multiplier used to implement the multiplication operation in GF (2m) is also
susceptible to power analysis attacks. Consider the first condition in which point
P (α, β) is taken as a public input and the attacker wants to reveal the value of v.
To attack the multiplication operation in the Tate pairing, pick the multiplication
γ ← αv in step 6 of Algorithm 2.2, as analyzed in section 5.3.3.
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A DSM is used in the Tate pairing architecture, as illustrated in Fig. 4.6. The
structure of the multiplier is shown in Fig. 3.2. With two inputs a and b, the
multiplier calculates the product of a and d bits of b during every iteration. Take
d = 4 as an example, in this work the d = 4 bits of input b are referred to as a 4-bit
word of b. The target register, ‘z Register’ in Fig. 3.2, stores the product of a and a
4-bit word of b and is updated during every iteration. The multiplication c← a× b
finishes in n = dm
d
e clock cycles. In this section it is always assumed that the input
α is bound to input a of the DSM and v to input b. In Condition 1), P (α, β) is
public, i.e. input a of the DSM is public. The alternative condition, in which Q(x, y)
is public, i.e. a private and b public, will be discussed in Condition 2).
As can be seen from Fig. 3.2, in the DSM calculation, the input signal goes
through the multiplication block (the ⊗ block), ‘reduction block a’, ‘xor’ block,
‘shifted z’ block and ‘reduction block b’ and finally arrives at the ‘z Register’. To
generate the content in the ‘z Register’ using information about input a and b, the
attacker has to generate the values of signals in each step of the DSM calculation.
i.e. the attacker must generate the m+d−1 bit array after the multiplication blocks
and then the m bit array generated by ‘reduction block a’ and so on until the m
bit content in the ‘z Register’ is determined. To make sure the generation of the
hypothetical values works correctly for each of the intermediate signals, this work
applies CPA attack on a small DSM as the first experiment. If the attack works well
for the small DSM, it will be applied on Tate pairing implementations with different
DSM parameters and for different field sizes m.
An experiment on a 32-bit DSM of digit size d = 4
To apply a CPA attack on a DSM, initially consider a 32-bit DSM of digit size d = 4
(32/4 DSM). The 32/4 DSM is implemented on the Sasebo-GII board. A sample of
the collected power traces of the DSM in operation is shown in Fig. 5.7(a). As can
be seen, between the input and output operation which generate substantial noise,
there are 8 peaks corresponding to the 8 clock cycles of the 32/4 DSM operation.
For the structure of a DSM introduced in Fig. 3.2, during each iteration of the 32/4
DSM calculation, the 32 bit input a is known by the attacker. The other input,
the 4-bit word of b, is unknown. As was introduced in section 5.3, if the Hamming
Distance of the ‘z Register’ is correctly generated by the attacker, it will match the
collected power traces and, thus, results in a high correlation factor ρ value that can
be recognized from the noise level during the targeted clock cycle.
Thus, when attacking the 32/4 DSM, on keeping the same input b, N=1000
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public inputs are sent to the a side of the DSM and, consequently, 1000 power traces
are recorded. This number is picked based on former CPA experiments [13]. In the
multiplication the most significant bits (MSBs) are first dealt with.
When attacking the first clock cycle of the multiplication, the following steps are
taken:
1. For each of the N = 1000 public inputs, generate 24 hypothetical values of the
4 bits of input b by enumerating all possible values from ‘0000’ to ‘1111’.
2. Current state D0 of the ‘z Register’ is initialized as all ‘0’.
3. For each of the 24 hypothetical values of b, generate hypothetical values of the
35 bit array after the ‘multiplication block’ and then the 32 bits array after the
‘reduction block a’ and so on until the 32 bit array in the targeted ‘z Register’,
named as D1.
4. Calculate the hypothetical Hamming Distance of the value in ‘z Register’ be-
tween current state D0 and next states D1 for each hypothetical value of the
‘z Register’ state, namely H = H(D0 ⊕D1).
5. Calculate the correlations between the hypothetical Hamming Distance values
H and the measured power traces W , namely ρ(W,H) =
cov(W,H)
σW σH
.
As all the bits in the ‘z Register’ are set to ‘0’ before the multiplication starts, there
is no need to generate the values of the ‘z Register’. The hamming distance between
current state Dt and next state Dt+1 is equal to the hamming weight of the next
state Dt+1.
The correct correlation result of the 1st clock cycle is shown in Fig. 5.7(c). A
peak can be clearly seen at the time point where the 1st clock cycle of multiplication
happens. For the incorrect hypothetical values, for example an incorrect correlation
of the 1st clock cycle shown in Fig. 5.7(b), the correlation value is constant. This
makes it easy to distinguish the correct guess from the incorrect ones.
By correctly guessing the first 4-bit word of input b, the attacker now can make
sure the status of the ‘z Register’ at the 1st clock cycle of multiplication, i.e. the
attacker now knows D1. With this knowledge, the attacks on the 2
nd ∼ 8th 4-bit
words of input b can be performed. The attacks on the remaining 4-bit words of
input b are basically the same as attacking the first 4-bit word. The only difference
is the generation of Dt. When attacking the first 4-bit word, the current status Dt
of the ‘z Register’ is all ‘0’. However, when attacking the remaining 4-bit words,
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Fig. 5.7: CPA attack: Correct and incorrect correlation factors Vs. measured power traces
of a simple DSM, m = 32, d = 4, a public, attacking b
the attacker must generate the correct current status Dt according to the successful
attacks on the previous 4-bit words. Fig. 5.7 shows the correct correlation results
using 1000 power traces. As can be seen from Fig. 5.7, when attacking each clock
cycle of the DSM, the correct correlation trace shows a peak at the related timing
point. By repeating the attack described above, the value of b of the 32/4 DSM can
be revealed by the attacker.
The attack above is applied on a small DSM, which has the same structure as
the normal DSMs used. The successful attack showed that attacking a DSM can
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Fig. 5.8: Measured power trace sample of the Tate pairing when 7 digit serial multiplierare
operating in parallel
be divided into attacking the ‘z Register’ n = dm
d
e times. When attacking each
clock cycle of the digit-serial multiplication, knowledge of the previous d-bit word
is necessary. It should be noted that, the power traces used to attack the 1st d-bit
word can be reused when attacking the 2nd d-bit word, i.e. the power traces can be
reused in attacking the whole DSM.
An experiment on an ηT pairing over GF (2
163), with 7×DSM of digit size d = 4
In this experiment, pick a DSM which is used inside an ηT pairing system over
GF (2163). This ηT pairing design uses 7 multipliers with all 7 multiplications per-
formed in parallel, as shown in Fig. 4.7. This makes the design a large area imple-
mentation with a large amount of routing and complex control. Using 7 multipliers
reduces the calculation time but increases the difficulty of a successful attack. In this
case, in equation 5.1, scale a is comparatively small and noise becomes very large.
This is a much harder configuration to attack than a simple 32/4 DSM. A power
trace sample of the multiplication operation is shown in Fig. 5.8.
In the design of the Tate pairing using 7 multipliers, there are 5,187 registers
in total. When attacking the multiplier, the attacker generates the hypothetical
value of all 163 bits of the target 163-bit ‘z Register’ with knowledge of input α
and all possible values of the 4-bit word v. Thus, 24 hypothetical values of the 163-
bit ‘z Register’ are generated while attacking each 4-bit word of v. Among all the
7 multipliers in this design, one is processing the multiplications γ ← αv in step
6 which is under attack, while the remaining 6 are processing the multiplications
in C(t) ← C(t)2 × A(t) in step 5 of Algorithm 2.2. All 7 multipliers and other
logic cells, which consist of the lookup tables, registers and wiring between slices,
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consume power when operating. The power consumption of these components can
be treated as noise, as described in equation 5.1. According to equation 5.5, the
correct correlation value of attacking a multiplier tends to
√
l
L
=
√
163
5,187
= 0.18.
In the attack, N=1000 public inputs are sent to the FPGA as point P (α, β)
and, thus, 1000 power traces are recorded for the correlation calculation. As the
CPA attack using N=1000 power traces reveals the secret information, taking more
power traces is not necessary. The multiplier operates on 4 bits of the input v in all
iterations, except for the first. In the first iteration, since the targeted field size is m
= 163, the multiplier deals with one bit ‘0’ as the most significant bit and then the
first 3 bits of v.
For each clock cycle of the attack, the following steps are taken:
1. For each of the N = 1000 public inputs, generate 24 hypothetical values of the
4 bits of input v by enumerating all possible values from ‘0000’ to ‘1111’.
2. Generate hypothetical values of all 163 bits in the target register ‘z Register’
for the current state Dt and the next state Dt+1.
3. Calculate the hypothetical Hamming Distance of the value in ‘z Register’ be-
tween current state Dt and next states Dt+1 for each hypothetical value of the
‘z Register’ state, namely H = H(Dt ⊕Dt+1).
4. Calculate the correlations between the hypothetical Hamming Distance values
H and the measured power traces W , namely ρ(W,H) =
cov(W,H)
σW σH
.
Fig. 5.9 shows the CPA attack against one of the 7 multipliers of the Tate pairing
algorithm design over field GF (2163). It can be clearly seen from the figure that the
correlation factor of the correct hypothetical value of the 4-bit word tends to 0.18 as
calculated above, while all the incorrect ones are much smaller and tend to zero.
For better analysis of the the attack, take the real values in the CPA attack as
an exmaple here. In this attack, the four most significant 4-bit words are ‘(0)101
0111 1000 1001’. Assuming the three most significant 4-bit words of v ‘(0)101 0111
1000’ are correctly guessed, the hypothetical value of the next 4-bit word is one
of ‘0000’, ‘0001’, ... , ‘1111’. The attacker generates the correlation values of the
next multiplication state according to the hypothetical values. Fig. 5.9 shows the
correlation of all 24 predictions of the next state. The correct prediction of ‘1001’ of
the 4-bit word results in a correlation value much higher than other incorrect guesses.
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Fig. 5.10: CPA attack: Correct and incorrect correlation factors Vs. measured power
traces of Tate pairing, m=163, 7×DSM design, d=4, α public, attacking v
For better analysis, an attacker may want to see how the correlation analysis
works with other time points in the power traces. Here the traces of all time points
rather than the target state only are presented. Fig. 5.10 shows the correct correla-
tion and an incorrect correlation. In the correct correlation trace, there is a peak at
the target state, while the incorrect correlation trace corresponds to noise. The cor-
rect correlation peak doesn’t drop instantly after the clock’s rising edge but decays
in the next one to two clock cycles because of the discharge of the transistors in the
FPGA takes time. A successful CPA attack shown in Fig. 5.9 determines 4 bits of
the secret text each time. By doing the same attack n times, n = dm
d
e = d163
4
e = 41,
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Fig. 5.11: CPA attack: Correct and incorrect correlation factors Vs. # of power traces of
Tate pairing, m=571, 4×DSM design, d=8, α public, attacking v
using the same set of collected power traces, the secret text v can be recovered and,
thus, the secret input Q(x, y) can be revealed.
An experiment on a ηT pairing over GF (2
571), with 4×DSM of digit size d = 8
A more complicated pairing system is proposed here for further discussion: a pairing
over field GF (2571), with a multiplier of digit size d = 8. In this case, the input
becomes 8 bits and, consequently the number of possible values of the input digits
is 28 = 256. The same steps as the previous attack were taken and the correlation
results are shown in Fig. 5.11. As can be expected from the above attacks, increas-
ing the digit size increases the number of hypothetical values of the input digits.
The computational complexity of attacking the digit-serial multiplier is therefore in-
creased. It can be predicted that when digit size d increases to a very large value, it
can be infeasible to solve the DSM using the attack proposed in this section. How-
ever, calculating more hypothetical values of the input digits does not require more
power traces. As long as d < m, this digit-serial structure substantially decreases
the security level of the pairing computations.
5.4.4 CPA against digit-serial multiplier(DSM): Condition 2) Q(x, y) public,
attacking P (α, β)
As mentioned in section 5.4.2, in the alternative condition, the inputs alter.
Consider the multiplication γ ← αv in step 2 of Algorithm 2.2 over the field
GF (2m) once again. The attacker holds the information of v and tries to reveal α.
As introduced in the DSM structure, input v is stored in a shift-register. In each
122
5.4. CPA attack against the GF (2m) operations
200 400 600 800 1000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
# of traces
co
rr
e
la
tio
n 
fa
ct
or
  ρ
Fig. 5.12: CPA attack: Correct and incorrect correlation factors Vs. # of power traces of
Tate pairing, m=163, 7×DSM design, d=4, v public, attacking α
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Fig. 5.13: CPA attack: Correct and incorrect correlation factors vs. real time plot of Tate
pairing, m=163, 7×DSM design, d=4, v public, attacking α
clock cycle the most significant 4 bits of v are sent to the multiplier and are multiplied
with all of the 163 bits of α. Note that here the attacker controls the information of
all 163 bits of element v. However, in the first condition, the attacker can generate
the hypothetical values of the ‘z Register’ for all possible secret inputs (24) in each
clock cycle. In the second condition the secret input is sent to the multiplier once as
m bits. It is not possible to generate all the hypothetical values of the ‘z Register’.
In a CPA attack under this condition, the least significant 4 bits of input α are
targeted. The 24 = 16 distinct values of these 4 bits are generated. All the other
123
5.4. CPA attack against the GF (2m) operations
bits of α are assumed to be ‘0’ because of the lack of information about the other
bits of the private input α. Then, 16 hypothetical states for the next state of the
‘z Register’ are generated. In this condition, the CPA attacker can only treat the
affect of all other bits of α as noise. If this assumption is true, the effect of the other
bits average out and the previous CPA attack still works under this condition.
When attacking the least significant 4 bits of input α, the following steps are
taken:
1. For each of the N = 1000 public inputs, generate 24 hypothetical values of the
least significant 4 bits of input α by enumerating all possible values from ‘0000’
to ‘1111’. Assume all other bits of α are ‘0’.
2. Make use of the first and second 4-bit word of the public input v, i.e. v(163 ∼
160) and v(159 ∼ 156) , generate hypothetical values of all 163 bits in the
target register ‘z Register’ for the state of the first clock cycle D1 and the
second clock cycle D2.
3. Calculate the hypothetical Hamming Distance of the value in ‘z Register’ be-
tween first state D1 and second states D2 for each hypothetical value of the ‘z
Register’ state, namely H = H(D1 ⊕D2).
4. Calculate the correlations between the hypothetical Hamming Distance values
H and the measured power traces W , namely ρ(W,H) =
cov(W,H)
σW σH
.
The 16 resulting correlation traces are shown in Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.13.
Fig. 5.12 shows the correlation values at the target time point. In contrast with
the previous attack shown in Figs. 5.7, 5.9 and 5.11, all correlation values at the
time point tend to a high value rather than only the correct correlation value being
high and incorrect correlation values being low. Also, Fig. 5.13 shows that not
only the correct, but also the incorrect correlation traces, show a peak at the target
state. This is because the hypothetical values the attacker generates in this case
not only correlate with the lowest 4 bits of private input α, but also correlate with
other bits of α. For example, if the least significant 8 bits of α are ‘0110 1011’, the
power traces measured will result in a high correlation value with the hypothetical
value generated by 4 bits of ‘1011’ as well as with ‘0110’ and ‘1101’ etc. Therefore
an attacker cannot distinguish between the correlation results of the correct and
incorrect predicted values of any 4 bits of input α. The unsuccessful attack shows
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that by carefully choosing the input to the DSM, the secret information in the
multiplication of the ηT pairing algorithm can be protected from CPA attack.
5.4.5 CPA against Karatsuba multiplier
A Karatsuba multiplier can also be used to implement the computations overGF (2m)
in the Tate pairing algorithms. The original Karatsuba multiplier is difficult to at-
tack successfully. However, a variant of the Karatsuba multiplier, mentioned in [9]
and discussed in section 3.5.3, which improves the critical path by inserting regis-
ters makes the Karatsuba multiplier insecure. Here a correlation attack against the
Karatsuba multiplier with registers inserted is proposed.
As discussed in section 3.5.3, the Tate pairing designs over different field sizes
uses different schemes of sub-multiplier blocks, as listed in Table 3.4. In this attack,
an implementation of the ηT pairing over GF (2
283) is targeted. It uses a 283-bit
short-critical-path Karatsuba multiplier with n = 18 bits sub-multiplier blocks, as
described in section 3.5.3. A total of 81 sub-multiplier blocks are needed, as shown
in Fig. 3.4. Among these 81 blocks, 16 blocks are directly related to the two 283-bit
input arrays. Knowing the inputs of these 16 blocks leads to knowing the information
of the input arrays to the Karatsuba multiplier. As in the previous attacks, here the
multiplication γ ← αv in step 6 of Algorithm 2.2 is once again chosen as a target. In
these sub-multiplier blocks, ‘Sub-m1’ calculates the least significant bits of the two
inputs, i.e. α(17 ∼ 0) and v(17 ∼ 0). This multiplication results in a 35-bit array
γ∗(34 ∼ 0) which is stored in register ‘post1’ and will take part in the addition and
reduction operations in the next clock cycle.
As was the case when attacking the DSMs, here the attacker is assumed to know
one of the inputs into the Karatsuba multiplier, α or v and is trying to reveal the
other. The two conditions (P (α, β) public or Q(x, y) public) are discussed as follows.
5.4.6 CPA against register inserted Karatsuba multiplier: Condition 1) P (α, β)
public, attacking Q(x, y)
In this condition, the attacker is assumed to be controlling the input α from pub-
lic input P (α, β) and is trying to reveal the information in v. When attacking
the Karatsuba multiplier, N=1000 public inputs are sent to the FPGA as point
P (α, β) and 1000 power traces are recorded. In the Karatsuba multiplication,
all sub-multiplications operates synchronously. When attacking the current sub-
multiplication, e.g. when attacking v(17 ∼ 0), the operations in other sub-multiplier
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Fig. 5.14: CPA against Karatsuba multiplier in ηT pairing over GF (2
m)
blocks are treated as noise.
To attack the Karatsuba multiplication, the attacker does the following steps:
1. For each of the N = 1000 public inputs, generate 218 = 262144 hypothetical
values of the 18 bits of input v(17 ∼ 0) by enumerating all possible values.
2. Generate hypothetical values for each of the 35 bits in the target register ‘post1’
for the current state Dt.
3. Load the value of the last state Dt−1 in register ‘post1’, which was stored in
the previous calculation.
4. Calculate the hypothetical Hamming Distance of the value in register ‘post1’
between current state Dt and previous states Dt−1 for each hypothetical value
of the ‘post1’ state, namely H = H(Dt ⊕Dt−1).
5. Calculate the correlations between the hypothetical Hamming Distance values
H and the measured power traces W , namely ρ(W,H) =
cov(W,H)
σW σH
.
6. If the hypothetical value proves to be correct, store the state Dt for the calcu-
lation of the next attack.
It can be clearly seen that the correlation of the correct hypothetical value is
higher than most of the other correlation values. But it must be noted that, in this
attack, because the result γ∗(34 ∼ 0) did not go through a reduction block, if the first
126
5.4. CPA attack against the GF (2m) operations
bit of v(17 ∼ 0) is ‘0’, i.e. if v(17) = 0 and, at the same time, the current state Dt is
all ‘0’, the correlation result of v(17 ∼ 0) will be the same as that of v(17 ∼ 0) << 1,
where << 1 indicates a one bit left shift. The same case happens when v(0) = 0,
the correlation values of v(17 ∼ 0) >> 1 results in the same as that of v(17 ∼ 0),
where >> 1 indicates a one bit right shift. This means that when guessing each
18-bit part of input v, the correlation attack locks the REAL value between several
possible values. Let x represent the possible number of bits the REAL value can
shift, where 1 ≤ x ≤ 17.
For example, in the case where the possible values are:
011111111111111111 and 11111111111111110,
these two values can result in the same Hamming-Distance in the sub-multiplication
and these two values can be seen as at most one bits shift of each other i.e. x = 1.
Similarly in the case where the possible values are:
001111111111111111, 011111111111111110 and 111111111111111100,
these three values can result in the same Hamming-Distance in the sub-multiplication
and x = 2 in this case.
There is a 25% possibility that x = 1 happens, a 12.5% possibility that x = 2
happens and etc. Thus, the mean value of x can be calculated as per equation 5.9.
x¯ =
n−1∑
x=1
1
2x+1
× x ≈ 1 (5.9)
Equation 5.9 is considered as a good approximation for n > 8. As discussed in section
3.5.3, the sub-multiplier blocks are suggested to have bitwidth n of around 20, which
fit equation 5.9. This indicates that in the Karatsuba multiplier, on average, the
Real values shift within one bit. Thus, in attacking each sub-multiplier block, the
REAL value of the secret information can be locked between two possible values.
This means that when attacking an ηT pairing system of field size m, sub-
multiplier block size n, the correlation power analysis attack will lock the REAL
information of the secret input between 2d
m
n
e values. For example, an ηT pairing sys-
tem with m = 283 and n = 18, the CPA attack locks the secret information between
216 values. This greatly decreases the security value of the Karatsuba multiplier.
It can be seen from the above attack that the CPA attacks on the Karatsuba
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multiplier are basically attacks on the sub-multiplier block units in the Karatsuba
multiplier architecture. For different field size m, the bitwidth n and the number of
sub-multiplier blocks can be different. In the first condition when m increases, if the
number of sub-multiplier stays the same, the bitwidth n must increase. The larger
the bitwidth n of the sub-multiplier block, the more hypothetical values (2n values)
the attacker has to generate and, thus, the harder it is to perform CPA attacks. In
the second condition when m increases, if the number of sub-multiplier increases,
the bitwidth n can stay the same or decrease. No matter how n changes, more sub-
multiplier blocks will always lead to a wider lock range of the REAL information
an attacker can acquire. Thus, the same attack can be performed on designs of the
same architecture over different fields. The difficulty of performing such an attack
increases when the field size increases.
5.4.7 CPA against register inserted Karatsuba multiplier: Condition 2) Q(x, y)
public, attacking P (α, β)
As in previous cases, the designer can choose to alter the two input points P and
Q of the Tate pairing design. Here the attacker controls input point Q(x, y), i.e.
v and tries to reveal information about point P (α, β), i.e. α. Coordinate α of the
γ ← αv operation is the target to reveal and v can be calculated using the public
input x (calculate v ← x2). In this case, the above attack still works. Take the
‘Sub-m1’ which calculates the least significant 18 bits of v and α as an example. The
only difference from Condition 1) is that the attacker now holds the information of
coordinate v(17 ∼ 0), generates the hypothetical values and calculates the correlation
factor ρ for all possible values of α(17 ∼ 0). By applying CPA attacks, the attacker
locks the real value of α in a small range. On average, there are 216 possible values
of α. The attacker can calculate the original coordinate αorig of point P through
calculation αorig = 8
√
α, as discussed in section 5.3.3. Unlike the case of DSMs,
altering the inputs does not provide actual protection to the Karatsuba multipliers.
5.5 Conclusions
In the above sections CPA attacks were successfully applied on the insecure steps
of the ηT pairing algorithm. Both the operations of addition, α + v in step 4 and
multiplication γ ← αv in step 6 of Algorithm 2.2, are shown to be insecure.
When attacking the adder, the attacker targets only one bit of the output register
at a time. This results in a small value of ρ. To distinguish this small value from the
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noise level, the attacker has to take 50,000 power traces to perform a successful CPA
attack against the adder. From Fig. 5.6 it can be clearly seen that, by taking 15,000
power traces, the correct correlation factor can be recognized. Also by taking 50,000
power traces, the attacker can be sufficiently certain which hypothetical value is
correctly generated. In the successful attack against the DSMs, the attacker guesses
8 bits of input v, but generates all 571 bits of the ‘z Register’ for each clock cycle.
This gives the attack a good correlation result, a much higher ρ value than in the
attack on the adder. In this attack, 1000 power traces are taken. The correlation
results in Fig. 5.9 and Fig. 5.11 show that, by taking only 300 power traces, the
correct correlation factor can be recognized. This indicates that the number of bits
being targeted in the CPA attack affects the number of power traces required. For
the same design, the more bits being targeted, the less power traces are required.
Finally, consider the attacks on DSMs of different field size m. The design over
GF (2571) requires much more hardware resources and generates more noise in the
operations than over GF (2163). However, when attacking both designs over GF (2571)
and GF (2163), the number of power traces required is almost the same. This is
because the ratio of target registers to total registers, i.e. in equation 5.5 the value
of
√
l
L
, did not change much. This indicates that when applying CPA attacks on
hardware implementations, when the total number of registers in the design increases,
the number register targeted also should increase.
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6. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST CPA ATTACKS
6.1 Introduction
Successful CPA attacks have been demonstrated in Chapter 5. The results of several
attacks against different components in the Tate pairing system showed that it is
necessary to propose useful countermeasures against them. In this chapter, three
countermeasures are considered and their implementation results are given. From
both mathematical and hardware requirement perspectives, the efficiency of these
countermeasures will be analyzsd and the security aspect of these countermeasures
will be discussed.
Section 6.2 summarizes the weakness of the Tate pairing algorithm and gives sev-
eral suggestions to improve the security of its implementation. Section 6.3 introduces
several countermeasures proposed by Page and Vercauteren [16], Scott [17], Coron
[18] and Kim [145] et al, including the bilinearity method, projective coordinate
method and randomizing miller variable method. Section 6.4 discusses the security
aspects of the proposed countermeasures. In sections 6.5 and 6.6 these countermea-
sures are implemented on FPGAs and their costs are listed. Section 6.7 analyzes the
performance of these implementation results.
6.2 Weakness in the ηT pairing
As shown in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3, by taking a number of power traces (N =
1000 − 50000) and applying a correlation power analysis (CPA) attack against the
hardware implementation, the ηT pairing algorithm is shown to be vulnerable to
power analysis attacks. The DSM is weak because when P (α, β) is public and Q(x, y)
is secret, by applying the CPA attack described above, an attacker can always reveal
the intermediate value v which is tightly related to coordinate x of point Q(x, y)
[144]. The security of a Karatsuba multiplier is reduced if pipelining is applied to
improve the multiplier’s performance. The adder is even weaker since if any of the
two operands is related to the inputs known by the attacker then, by applying a
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CPA attack, an attacker can always reveal the other operand input into the adder.
Thus, countermeasures must be applied on the ηT pairing to mask the vulnerable
multiplications and additions.
6.3 Countermeasures to protect the ηT pairing
Some weakness of the operation blocks can be overcome by carefully implementing
the algorithm following some rules. These include the weaknesses in the DSM, the
Karatsuba Multiplier and the adder:
1. RULE1: A designer must make the input a of the DSM private and not
accessible to the attacker.
If DSMs are used in the structure, the input arrangement of the DSMs must
be considered. Recall the DSM structure illustrated in Fig. 3.2, as proved in
Chapter 5, the a input is safe while b might leak information. For example, in
an IBE system, a designer should carefully choose the input to the multiplier
and make sure that the coordinates of the private input point KBob are always
input from the a side of the DSM. This can be achieved by altering the input
points of the pairing system or by altering the input from the DSM’s end.
2. RULE2: In the designs where a Karatsuba multiplier is used, the designer
must not improve the critical path by pipelining.
As discussed in the attack in section 5.4.5, if the designer uses inserted registers
to improve the performance of the Karatsuba multiplier, the cryptosystem can
be vulnerable. Although increasing the bitwidth n of the sub-multipliers in the
Karatsuba multiplier structure or increasing the number of such sub-multipliers
can make the CPA attack more difficult, the existence of inserted registers
always decreases the security of the Karatsuba multiplier.
By following the rules above, a designer can protect the operations in the multi-
plication modules from side channel attacks. However, no matter how the designer
chooses to implement the Tate pairing, the GF (2m) Adder structure is not secure.
Both in combinational logic architecture designs and bus type architecture designs,
secret information can be revealed through the attack presented in section 5.4.1.
From the attacker’s point of view, for the GF (2m) addition operation, both inputs
α and v of the adder shown in Fig. 3.1 should not be accessible to the attacker.
Neither carefully arranging the inputs of the ηT pairing nor by altering the inputs of
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the GF (2m) Adder can prevent the attacker, or the eavesdropper in the public key
system, from revealing one of the inputs. Thus, GF (2m) Adder must be protected.
RULE3: Additional operations must be introduced into the original ηT algo-
rithms to protect the two inputs of the GF (2m) Adder from being discovered by the
attacker.
In this chapter, three algorithms that follow RULE3 and protect the weak
GF (2m) addition operation in the ηT algorithm are proposed. Note that when im-
plementing these countermeasures, RULE1 and RULE2 must be considered too,
i.e. the multiplications still need to be carefully arranged due to the weaknesses in
the DSM and the Karatsuba Multiplier.
6.3.1 Exploiting bilinearity to protect the GF (2m) Adder
Some of the natural properties of pairings can be used in order to protect the pairing
against the attacks in Chapter 5 and the addition attack, in particular. One of the
most important properties is the bilinearity property:
e(Q;P1 + P2) = e(P1 + P2;Q) = e(P1;Q)× e(P2;Q), (6.1)
where ‘×’ represents a multiplication operation over GF (24m) [77]. Several counter-
measures against SCA attacks have been proposed based on this property [16, 17].
Equation 6.1 provides a relationship e(P ;Q) = e(P ;Q + R) ÷ e(P ;R), where ‘÷’
represents a division operation over GF (24m) [154]. This means that an ηT pairing
calculation can be derived by introducing a redundant random point R and applying
another two ηT pairing calculations.
Taking advantage of bilinearity, Page and Vercauteren [16] and Scott [17] pre-
sented a countermeasure which blinds an input point. By using the relationship
e(P ;Q) = e(P ;Q + R) ÷ e(P ;R), an algorithm based on the original pairing algo-
rithm is applied and shown in algorithm 6.1.
This modified algorithm has two inputs: P and Q ∈ E(GF (2m)). A random
point R ∈ E(GF (2m)) is applied in this algorithm. Step 1 adds the two points Q
and R through the point addition operation S = Q + R over E(GF (2m)) and two
independent ηT pairing operations are subsequently applied. Moreover, a division
‘÷’ over GF (24m) is required in step 4.
This countermeasure creates a new point S over the elliptic curve through the
point addition operation over E(GF (2m)). As shown in equation 6.2, a random
number σ ∈ GF (2m) is introduced to this equation to protect the point addition. A
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Algorithm 6.1 Countermeasure using bilinearity
Define: e(P ;Q) is an original ηT pairing algorithm in Algorithm 2.2.
Input : P,Q.
Random Point : R
Output : c = e(P ;Q+R)÷ e(P ;R)
1: S = Q+R 9M+9A+1S+2I
2: c1 = e(P ;S) (7m+53)M+(24m+65)A+(8m+10)S+1I
3: c2 = e(P ;R) (7m+53)M+(24m+65)A+(4m+10)S+1I
4: c = c1 ÷ c2 43M+38A+4S+1I
5: return c
total cost:(14m+158)M+(48m+177)A+(12m+25)S+5I
cost of 9 M, 9 A, 1 S and 2 I is incurred to perform such a secure point addition.
S = Q+R, random number σ ∈ GF (2m)
λ =
σ∗yQ+σ∗yR
σ∗xQ+σ∗xR
x′S = σ ∗ λ2 + σ ∗ λ+ σ + σ ∗ xQ + σ ∗ xR
y′S = (σ ∗ xQ + x′S)λ+ x′S + σ ∗ yQ
yS =
y′S
σ
, xS =
x′S
σ
Cost = 9M + 9A + 1S + 2I
(6.2)
Because point R and the random number σ are generated by a random number
generator and are not dependent on the inputs P or Q, point S is consequently
private. The two independent ηT pairings in step 2 and 3 take public point P and
private points S and R as inputs.
In this countermeasure, the two ηT pairings c1 = e(P, S) and c2 = e(P,R) can be
executed in parallel. The updates of intermediate variables α and β and some of the
RAM update operations are the same and can be combined. Thus, in each iteration
of the ‘for’ loop in steps 3-7 of Algorithm 2.2, which is executed m times and domi-
nates the calculation time, there are additional operations of 24A, 4S and 7M. The
operation c = c1÷c2 in step 4 of Algorithm 6.1 can be calculated through a GF (24m)
inversion (as introduced in section 4.2.3, costing 34M+16A+4S+1I) followed by a
GF (24m) multiplication (as introduced in section 4.2.1, costing 9M+22A), together
costing 43M+38A+4S+1I. The total cost of this countermeasure is (14m+ 158)M,
(48m+ 177)A, (12m+ 25)S and 5I.
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6.3.2 Randomized Miller variable to protect the GF (2m) Adder
The final exponentiation in step 8 of Algorithm 2.2 is calculated by
C(t)2
2m−1 = (C(t)2
m−1)2
m+1 = (
C(t)2
m
C(t)
)2
m+1. (6.3)
In this equation, C(t) = {C0 + C1t + C2t2 + C3t3} and Ci ∈ GF (2m), i = 0, 1, 2, 3.
For the Galois Field GF (24m) of t4 = t + 1 in this work, for m = 163, 283 and 571,
there is: C(t)2
m
= (C2
m
0 +C
2m
1 ) + (C
2m
2 +C
2m
3 )t+C
2m
1 t
2 +C2
m
3 t
3. Since there exists
the basic Galois Field property:
a2
m
= a, (6.4)
where a ∈ GF (2m). For equation 6.3, and with m mod 4 = 3, C(t)22m−1 can be
expressed as
C(t)2
2m−1 = (C(t)2
m−1)2
m+1 = ( (C0+C1)+(C2+C3)t+C1t
2+C3t3
C0+C1t+C2t2+C3t3
)2
m+1. (6.5)
If all elements in C(t) are multiplied by some random number r ∈ GF (2m), the
results of the final exponentiation of r ∗C(t) = r ∗C0 + r ∗C1t, r ∗C2t2, r ∗C3t3 and
of C(t) = C0 + C1t+ C2t
2 + C3t
3 are the same because:
(r ∗ C(t))22m−1
= ( (r∗C0+r∗C1)+(r∗C2+r∗C3)t+r∗C1t
2+r∗C3t3
r∗C0+r∗C1t+r∗C2t2+r∗C3t3 )
2m+1
= ( r∗{(C0+C1)+(C2+C3)t+C1t
2+C3t3}
r∗{C0+C1t+C2t2+C3t3} )
2m+1
= C(t)2
2m−1
(6.6)
For m = 233, the Frobenius map is different (see section 4.2.4), however, the same
result can be derived. This means that in step 4 of Algorithm 2.2, if the intermediate
Miller variable A(t) is simply multiplied by a random constant r ∈ GF (2m), r ∗A(t),
the resulting value of C(t) in step 9 of the ηT pairing will not change. This is a useful
property in the ηT pairing.
Utilizing this property, Scott [17] introduced another countermeasure which ran-
domizes the intermediate variable in the ‘for’ loop in steps 3-7 of Algorithm 2.2 by
introducing a random number r ∈ GF (2m). To resist side channel analysis (SCA)
attacks, all intermediate variables in steps 2 and 4 of Algorithm 2.2 are multiplied
by this random number r. The pairing algorithm is modified accordingly and shown
in Algorithm 6.2.
As can be seen in step 3, all the intermediate variables are multiplied by the
134
6.3. Countermeasures to protect the ηT pairing
Algorithm 6.2 Randomizing Miller variable
Input : P (α, β), Q(x, y)
Random Number : r
Output : c = e(P ;Q)
1: C(t)← 1
2: u← x2 + y2 + g + m−1
2
, v ← x2, α← α4, β ← β4
3: u← ru, δ ← rv, α1 ← rα, β1 ← rβ, γ ← δα
4: for i = 0 : m− 1
5: A(t)← γ + u+ β1 + (α1 + δ)t+ (α1 + δ + r)t2
6: C(t)← C2(t) ∗ A(t)
7: u← u+ δ + r, δ ← δ + r, α← α4, β ← β4, γ ← δα
8: α1 ← rα, β1 ← rβ,
9: end for
10: return C(t)← C(t)22m−1
total cost:(11m+58)M+(26m+65)A+(8m+10)S+1I
random number r ∈ GF (2m). This masks all the input coordinates and protects the
inputs of multiplications and additions from being controlled by the attacker. i.e.
the Miller variable A(t) can be expressed in equation 6.7.
A(t) = γ + u+ β1 + (α1 + δ)t+ (α1 + δ + r)t
2
= r ∗ [γ + u+ β + (α + v)t+ (α + v + 1)t2] (6.7)
This multiplies intermediate variable C(t) by random number r in each iteration.
According to equation 6.6, the affect of introducing r can be eliminated in the final
exponentiation in step 10 of Algorithm 6.2. The calculation result is the same as the
original pairing calculation.
This countermeasure takes 5 more multiplications in the pre-loop operation, 4
multiplications and 2 additions more in each iteration of the ‘for’ loop, (4m + 5)M
and (2m)A more in total as the extra cost to protect the ηT pairing.
6.3.3 Using projective coordinates to protect the GF (2m) Adder
A countermeasure using projective coordinates proposed by Coron [18] was expanded
on by Kim in [145]. This countermeasure takes a random value λ 6= 0 ∈ GF (2m)
and projects an affine point Q(x, y) to standard or homogeneous projective [31]
coordinates (X, Y, Z) ← (λx, λy, λ), where x = X
Z
= X
λ
, y = Y
Z
= Y
λ
. Algorithm 6.3
presents how this method is applied to the original ηT algorithm.
The coordinate projection operation happens in step 3 of Algorithm 6.3, fol-
lowing the first squaring operations of the input coordinates. The initiation of the
135
6.3. Countermeasures to protect the ηT pairing
Algorithm 6.3 Using homogeneous projective coordinates
Input : P (α, β), Q(x, y)
Random Number : λ 6= 0 ∈ GF (2m)
Output : c = e(P ;Q)
1: C(t)← 1
2: x← x2, y ← y2, α← α4, β ← β4
3: (X, Y, Z)← (λx, λy, λ)
4: V ← X,U ← X + Y + m−1
2
Z
5: J ← α(V + Z), K ← βZ, L← αZ
6: for i = 0 : m− 1
7: A(t)← J +K + U + (L+ V )t+ (L+ V + Z)t2
8: C(t)← C(t)2 ∗ A(t)
9: U ← U + V + Z, V ← V + Z, α← α4, β ← β4
10: J ← αV,K ← βZ,L← αZ
11: end for
12: return C(t)← C(t)22m−1
total cost:(11m+58)M+(26m+65)A+(8m+10)S+1I
intermediate variables in step 2 of Algorithm 2.2 is changed into equation 6.8:
v ← X
Z
, u← X
Z
+ Y
Z
+ m−1
2
γ ← α(X
Z
+ 1), β ← β, α← α (6.8)
However, performing GF (2m) division is time consuming. Consider the property of
the ηT pairing algorithm, as presented in equation 6.6, where multiplying an element
over GF (2m) with every element of the Miller variable does not affect the result of
the ηT pairing’s calculation. Here every element in equation 6.8 is multiplied by Z,
where Z is initiated to the random number λ in step 3 and, thus, forms steps 4 and
5 in Algorithm 6.3. Note that the names of the intermediate variables are changed
accordingly.
Step 4 of Algorithm 2.2 is changed into step 7 of Algorithm 6.3 by multiplying
every element of A(t) by Z:
A(t)← α(X
Z
+ 1) + X
Z
+ Y
Z
+ m−1
2
+ β + (α + X
Z
)t+ (α + X
Z
+ 1)t2
← 1
Z
[α(X + Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
J
+X + Y +
m− 1
2
Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
+ βZ︸︷︷︸
K
+( αZ︸︷︷︸
L
+ X︸︷︷︸
V
)t+ ( αZ︸︷︷︸
L
+ X︸︷︷︸
V
+Z)t2
← J +K + U + (L+ V )t+ (L+ V + Z)t2
(6.9)
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Algorithm M A S I
Original ηT 7m+53 24m+65 8m+10 1
Bilinearity 14m+140 48m+123 12m+25 5
Random Miller 11m+58 26m+65 8m+10 1
Projective 11m+58 26m+65 8m+10 1
Tab. 6.1: Cost of ηT pairing and countermeasures
Removing 1
Z
can be seen as multiplying by Z and the effect can be eliminated at the
end of the algorithm by the final exponentiation, as introduced in equation 6.6.
Similar to the randomized Miller variable method, this countermeasure modifies
the intermediate Miller variable, by introducing a random number λ ∈ GF (2m). Ev-
ery intermediate variable that relates to the point Q(x, y) is masked by this random
number in step 3 of Algorithm 6.3. In step 5, both input coordinates α and β of
input point P (α, β) are multiplied by Z, which is equal to λ. Therefore, every inter-
mediate variable in Algorithm 6.3 is protected by the introduced random number λ.
This countermeasure incurs the same cost, (4m+ 5)M and (2m)A, as Algorithm
6.2 for protecting the ηT pairing.
Note that other than homogeneous projective coordinates [31], Jacobian projec-
tive coordinates recommended in [32] uses map (X, Y, Z)↔(Z2x, Z3y, Z) and Lopez-
Dahab projective coordinates proposed in [33] uses map (X, Y, Z)↔(Zx,Z2y, Z).
These two types of projective coordinates also can be applied in this countermeasure.
The countermeasure algorithms and the costs of using such projective coordinates
are listed in Algorithms D.1 and D.2. Except for some differences in operations and
some additional variables that must be stored, the countermeasures using these three
projective coordinates are achieved at almost the same cost. Thus, in the rest of this
work, the algorithm using homogeneous projective coordinate will be picked as a
representative of all projective coordinate countermeasures.
6.3.4 Cost comparison between countermeasures
The costs of the original ηT pairing and the countermeasures are shown in Table 6.1.
As can be seen from the table, the countermeasure using the bilinearity property
almost doubles the calculation cost by performing two original ηT pairings. The
countermeasures randomizing the Miller variables and using projective coordinates
cost the same number of operations. The 11 multiplications in the ‘for’ loop dominate
the calculation time.
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In all of the proposed countermeasures, random variables are introduced . In the
bilinearity countermeasure, there is a random number σ ∈ GF (2m) and a random
point R(xR, yR), where xR and yR ∈ GF (2m). Countermeasures randomizing Miller
variables and using projective coordinates introduced random numbers r and λ ∈
GF (2m), respectively. In this work, these random numbers are pre-stored in the
block RAM. However, it is suggested that designers of cryptosystems use hardware
Random Number Generators (RNG) with strong seeds to generate cryptographically
secure random numbers to protect the implementations [155]. Different types of
embedded RNGs are designed for this purpose [156, 157]. Using dedicated hardware
for random number generation ensures that the random number used in the same
design changes for every calculation. In choosing RNGs, the designer must make
sure that the RNG is secure against existing the attacks [158].
6.4 Security discussion
As discussed in section 6.3, to securely implement the ηT pairing algorithm the three
RULEs must be obeyed. The following sections discuss the security aspects of the
proposed countermeasures, with the successful attacks in mind.
6.4.1 Security of exploiting bilinearity method
The countermeasure using the bilinearity property introduced in Algorithm 6.1 does
not change the pairing operation itself, but masks the initial point and performs an
additional pairing calculation.
In an IBE (or ABE) system, decryptor Bob recieves point KBob (or D
Bob
i ) from
the PKG through a secure channel. By carefully arranging the inputs, the designer
can make sure that only the public point Pr (or Ei) can be tampered with by the
attacker. To apply an SCA attack, the attacker can only manipulate point Pr (or
Ei). Consider Algorithm 6.1 where the multiplications in step 1 mask the input point
Q(x, y) by multiplying the coordinates x and y by the coordinates of the random
point R(xR, yR). These coordinates of point R are not known by the attacker and
their effect cannot be removed. Even if the attacker knows and can tamper with the
information in point Q, the masked point S = (Q + R) is secure because of the use
of the random number σ ∈ GF (2m).
As in previous discussions, firstly consider the case in which point P is secret,
i.e. KBob or D
Bob
i and point Q is public, i.e. Pr or Ei. In this case, by introducing
the random number σ and carefully arranging the inputs of the multipliers, the
138
6.4. Security discussion
attacker cannot know any of the information contained in R and S in step 1 of
Algorithm 6.1. Since the inputs of calculations e(P ;S) and e(P ;R) are secure, this
countermeasure protects the ηT algorithm from CPA attacks. Consider the other
case in which point P , i.e. Pr or Ei, is public and point Q, i.e. KBob or D
Bob
i , is
secret. In this case, the attacker still controls the knowledge, in point P , of the
calculations e(P ;S) and e(P ;R). The CPA attacks proposed in chapter 5 still work.
By applying a CPA attack, the attacker can reveal the information in points S and
R. A point substraction operation Q = S−R can help the attacker reveal the secret
information in point Q.
This means that the designer must ensure that point P in Algorithm 6.1 is secure
against the attacker. For security reasons, the designer must apply KBob or D
Bob
i to
input P of the pairing calculation e(P ;Q) and let public point Pr or Ei enter from
input Q.
6.4.2 Security of randomized Miller variable method
Randomizing the Miller variable and using projective coordinates results in a similar
increase in point operations for both countermeasures. In both instances, the Miller
variable is affected by randomisation and the increase in the algorithm complexity is
the same. Consider the security of randomizing the Miller variable. Firstly, assume
the attacker knows the public point P (α, β). By inputting different values for P
and running the algorithm several times, the attacker controls the values of α and
β of Algorithm 6.2. In step 3 of Algorithm 6.2, the random value r is introduced
into every intermediate variable which will be used in the ‘for’ loop. To ensure that
u, δ, α1, β1 and γ are securely masked, random value r must be applied to the a
input of the DSM at this step. This will prevent the CPA attacks on the DSMs and,
therefore, prevent an attacker from determining the value of any of the variables in
step 5.
Now assume that the point Q(x, y) is the public point that can be manipulated
by the attacker and, therefore, the attacker can manipulate u and v in step 2. The
random value r masks the values u and δ in step 3. In DSM designs, as long as r is
applied to the secure input a of the multiplier, the attacker will never reveal u and v.
As a result, no matter which input is set to be public, this countermeasure is secure
against CPA attacks. The coordinates of the public input will always be masked by
the random value r, which is beyond the control of the attacker.
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6.4.3 Security of using projective coordinates method
The countermeasure described in Algorithm 6.3 uses a similar approach to protect
against CPA attacks. In this countermeasure the pre-stored random value λ is in-
troduced. Assume the attacker knows the public point P (α, β) and tries to reveal
information in point Q(x, y). Intermediate values J , K and L are masked in step 5,
while value V and Z are unknown to the attacker. By carefully arranging the inputs
to the DSMs, an attacker will not be able to reveal any of the intermediate values
J , K and L. Consider K as an example. In the multiplication K ← βZ in step 5
of Algorithm 6.3, Z is applied to the a input of the DSM while β is applied to the
b input of the DSM. In this way, the countermeasure protects information relating
to the secret point Q(x, y) from the attackers. Alternatively, assume the attacker
knows the public point Q(x, y) and, thus, P (α, β) is private. Values x and y are
masked in step 3 of Algorithm 6.3 by the pre-stored random value λ. The attacker
cannot get variables X, Y and Z. Thus, J , K and L are secured in step 5. The
attacker has no chance of revealing information related to the secret point P (α, β)
in this case. In this way, the countermeasure using projective coordinates protects
the ηT algorithm against CPA attacks.
6.4.4 Security operations in common
In both countermeasures using the randomized Miller variable and projective coor-
dinates, no matter how the inputs are assigned, RULE1 is satisfied. However, in
the bilinearity countermeasure in Algorithm 6.1, the designer must be careful. Only
when the public input (KBob in IBE or D
Bob
i in ABE) is set to Q and the private
information (Pr in IBE or Ei in ABE) is set to P can this countermeasure follow
RULE1 and thus, protect the ηT algorithm against CPA attacks.
RULE2 can be satisfied by not inserting registers into the Karatsuba multipliers.
All the three countermeasures proposed above provide different approaches to
mask the weak addition operation in Algorithm 2.2, i.e. RULE3. The bilinearity
method in Algorithm 6.1 adds a point addition operation before the pairing calcula-
tions and masks the public input point Q to an unknown point S and, thus, masks
the input of the weak addition operation in the original ηT algorithm. Both counter-
measures using randomized Miller variable and projective coordinates in Algorithms
6.2 and 6.3 introduced a random variable (r and λ) into the original ηT algorithm.
By multiplying both inputs of the weak addition operation with the random vari-
able, these two countermeasures ensure that the addition operation no longer leaks
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information.
6.5 Bus type top-level architecture implementation result of the
countermeasures
Since no more operations other than addition, squaring, multiplication and division
are needed in the proposed countermeasures, the bus type top-level architecture, as
introduced in chapter 4, can be used to implement the countermeasures. In a bus
type top-level architecture, as shown in Fig. 4.6, for the same field size m, the same
number of multipliers #Mult and the same digit size d, the same design structure can
be reused for the new algorithms. Thus, the area required for the countermeasures
is the same as those of the naively implemented Tate pairing, the area results of
the designs is not listed in this chapter. However, the newly added operations in
the countermeasures require additional calculation time. The time increment of the
countermeasure in different schedules of the Tate pairing designs is shown in Table
E.1, E.2, E.3 and 6.2. For better comparison, the calculation time of the original
design is also given as Algorithm 2.2. Note that, because the method of inserting
registers to improve the Karatsuba multiplier is proven to be insecure, such method
is not applied in the implementations of this chapter.
In Tables E.1, E.2, E.3 and 6.2, Algorithm 6.1 represents the operation time
of the Tate pairing protected by the bilinearity countermeasure. The operation
times for the randomised Miller variable (section 6.3.2) and projective coordinate
(section 6.3.3) countermeasures are represented by Algorithm 6.2 & 6.3 respectively.
Countermeasures in Algorithm 6.2 and Algorithm 6.3 have different motivations and
different names for their intermediate variables, but result in the same cost and
calculation flow. The schedules of the operations are the same and, thus, incur the
same time penalty for each configuration. The column labelled ‘Ratio’ in Tables E.1,
E.2, E.3 and 6.2 shows the ratio of calculation time for the countermeasures to the
original algorithm under the same design parameters.
Since there are 14 multiplications in the ‘for’ loop of Algorithm 6.1 and 11 mul-
tiplications in the ‘for’ loop of Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3, for fastest designs, 14 and 11
multipliers are used to implement the countermeasures, respectively. As in previous
chapters, area, time and A*T product are taken as the parameters to show the per-
formance of the designs. The implementation results are shown in Tables 6.3 and
6.4.
It should be noted, the bus type implementations of Algorithm 6.1 using 11
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Parameters Alg.2.2 Alg. 6.1 Alg. 6.2 & 6.3
#Mult d n
Time Time
Ratio
Time
Ratio
(µs) (µs) (µs)
1× DSM
1 571 10182.6 20451.0 200.8 % 15831.2 155.5 %
2 286 5215.9 10476.0 200.8 % 8057.4 154.5 %
4 143 2723.9 5471.0 200.9 % 4156.9 152.6 %
8 72 1486.6 2986.0 200.9 % 2220.3 149.4 %
16 36 859.2 1726.0 200.9 % 1238.4 144.1 %
32 18 545.5 1096.0 200.9 % 747.4 137.0 %
2× DSM
1 571 6063.2 10832.8 178.7 % 8974.9 148.0 %
2 286 3155.4 5664.2 179.5 % 4626.4 146.6 %
4 143 1696.4 3070.7 181.0 % 2444.5 144.1 %
8 72 972.0 1783.1 183.4 % 1361.2 140.0 %
16 36 604.7 1130.2 186.9 % 811.9 134.3 %
32 18 421.1 803.8 190.9 % 537.3 127.6 %
3× DSM
1 571 4609.2 7947.8 172.4 % 6086.5 132.1 %
2 286 2427.4 4219.5 173.8 % 3179.9 131.0 %
4 143 1332.6 2348.9 176.3 % 1721.5 129.2 %
8 72 789.1 1420.1 180.0 % 997.4 126.4 %
16 36 513.5 949.1 184.8 % 630.3 122.7 %
32 18 375.7 713.6 190.0 % 446.7 118.9 %
4× DSM
1 571 3348.0 6879.9 205.5 % 4910.9 146.7 %
2 286 1817.0 3728.1 205.2 % 2619.5 144.2 %
4 143 1027.1 2102.2 204.7 % 1438.5 140.1 %
8 72 642.1 1309.6 204.0 % 862.5 134.3 %
16 36 446.9 907.7 203.1 % 570.4 127.6 %
32 18 349.3 706.8 202.4 % 424.4 121.5 %
7× DSM
1 571 1829.0 3854.2 210.7 % 3404.4 186.1 %
2 286 1037.8 2174.7 209.5 % 1836.6 177.0 %
4 143 648.2 1347.4 207.9 % 1062.9 164.0 %
8 72 452.3 931.6 206.0 % 674.5 149.1 %
16 36 351.8 718.4 204.2 % 476.0 135.3 %
32 18 302.3 613.3 202.9 % 377.8 125.0 %
Kara. no Reg 5 419.7 843.6 201.0 % 516.9 123.2 %
Tab. 6.2: Calculation time (µs) of proposed countermeasures, m = 571
multipliers of digit size d=32 and Algorithm 6.2 and 6.3 using 14 multipliers of digit
size d=16 and 32, are too complicated and cannot be implemented with the software
tools. Several implementations in the table above exceed the area constraint of the
Virtex-V xc5vlx50 technology [84]. The hardware resources required (in the form of
registers and LUTs) can be calculated, but to implement such designs, a larger FPGA
device must be used. In addition, the operation times of these implementations are
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Parameters Results
m d n Regs LUTs
Freq. Time Area*Time
(MHz) (µs) (LUT*s)
163
1 163 8721 10445 190.2 389.4 4.07
2 82 8720 13053 180.6 184.8 2.41
4 41 8705 13388 195.5 164.9 2.21
8 21 8746 18103 195.5 140.9 2.55
16 14 8843 29681 195.5 132.5 3.93
32 14 9039 44746 185.3 139.8 6.25
233
1 233 12359 15330 183.2 557.5 8.55
2 117 12360 18813 183.2 364.4 6.86
4 59 12373 21378 185.4 264.7 5.66
8 30 12414 28053 185.4 217.0 6.09
16 15 12399 40848 184.5 193.2 7.89
32 14 12595 61360 187.8 188.2 11.55
283
1 283 14977 14121 179.2 767.8 10.84
2 142 14978 18334 179.9 486.6 8.92
4 71 14962 22879 190.1 327.9 7.50
8 36 15002 30969 188.0 265.5 8.22
16 18 14990 50114 181.4 239.9 12.02
32 14 14962 69814 183.9 228.9 15.98
571
1 571 29970 27978 178.1 2465.6 68.98
2 286 29969 35943 178.1 1436.7 51.64
4 143 29940 43420 193.4 847.6 36.80
8 72 29983 51686 193.4 611.5 31.61
16 36 Out of memory
32 18 Out of memory
Tab. 6.3: Performance of the countermeasures applied on ηT algorithm, Algorithm 6.1,
#Mult=14, bus type top-level architecture
estimated values.
Having all multiplications in the ‘for’ loop of the Tate pairing operated in parallel
speeds up the calculation. By using more multipliers, the calculation time of the ‘for’
loop can be reduced even further. However, considering the pipeline schedule of the
DSMs, as illustrated in Fig. 2.11, the bus type architecture can arrange the input
pair of only one DSM in one clock cycle. Thus, to pipeline all 14 (or 11) DSMs in the
‘for’ loop, at least 14 (or 11) clock cycles are required. In this case, even though it
only takes 6 clock cycles to calculate a GF (2163) digit-serial multiplication, or 8 and
9 clock cycles for fields GF (2233) and GF (2283), respectively, the DSM will still have
to wait for 14 clock cycles until the data bus is free from arranging the inputs of the
13 other multiplications. This makes using digit size d=32 on these comparatively
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Parameters Results
m d n Regs LUTs
Freq. Time Area*Time
(MHz) (µs) (LUT*s)
163
1 163 7197 6719 211.1 221.1 1.49
2 82 7196 8490 211.1 151.6 1.29
4 41 7184 10368 211.1 116.4 1.21
8 21 7217 12033 209.7 100.0 1.20
16 11 7293 19800 211.1 90.7 1.80
32 11 7458 33656 211.1 90.7 3.05
233
1 233 10206 9145 210.0 394.9 3.61
2 117 10207 11834 216.4 248.7 2.94
4 59 10217 14295 210.0 186.9 2.67
8 30 10249 17065 210.0 152.2 2.60
16 15 10237 27547 210.8 133.8 3.69
32 11 10402 46281 210.8 129.0 5.97
283
1 283 12371 11868 217.8 527.2 6.26
2 142 12369 15109 217.8 332.3 5.02
4 71 12359 21249 210.4 242.5 5.15
8 36 12392 24642 210.4 192.4 4.74
16 18 12380 37236 210.4 166.6 6.20
32 11 12369 55866 212.8 154.8 8.65
571
1 571 24769 23516 222.9 1776.2 41.77
2 286 24767 29785 222.9 1023.1 30.47
4 143 24756 25071 219.8 654.3 16.40
8 72 24790 41569 219.8 464.1 19.29
16 36 24779 66833 219.8 367.6 24.57
32 18 Out of memory
Tab. 6.4: Performance of the countermeasures applied on ηT algorithm, Algorithm 6.2 &
6.3, #Mult=11, bus type top-level architecture
small fields inefficient.
6.6 Mixed Type Implementation results of the countermeasures
As illustrated in Fig. 4.8 of section 4.3.4, the mixed type top-level architecture can
be applied to speed up the hardware accelerator of the Tate pairing algorithm. In
this section the implementation results of the countermeasures proposed using the
mixed type top-level architecture are presented. As in designing the original ηT
algorithm, the mixed type design of Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3 expands all the addition
and squaring operations in the ‘for loop logic’ block. All these operations require
only one clock cycle. Together with the 7 multiplications which require 8 clock cycles,
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Parameters Results
m Algorithm n Regs LUTs
Freq. Time
Ratio
Area*Time
(MHz) (us) (LUT*s)
163
Alg. 6.1 1 14043 29257 149.1 34.1 254.8 % 1.00
Alg. 6.2 & 6.3 1 11604 20735 148.9 18.2 135.9 % 0.38
233
Alg. 6.1 1 30747 42094 149.6 47.1 256.2 % 1.98
Alg. 6.2 & 6.3 1 16424 30831 148.6 25.3 137.6 % 0.78
283
Alg. 6.1 1 37592 53758 145.5 58.1 251.4 % 3.12
Alg. 6.2 & 6.3 1 20009 39727 140.6 32.1 138.9 % 1.27
571
Alg. 6.1 5 79648 93390 171.9 285.3 221.7 % 26.65
Alg. 6.2 & 6.3 5 44203 64867 171.9 198.9 154.5 % 12.90
Tab. 6.5: Performance of the countermeasures applied on ηT algorithm, mixed type top-
level architecture, no registers inserted
each iteration of the ‘for’ loop in Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3 requires 9 clock cycles. In
the Karatsuba design of Algorithm 6.1, there is only one original ‘for loop logic’
block. The two Tate pairing operations share the same block. A 2:1 multiplexor
array selects the input to the ‘for loop logic’ block. The multiplixor array requires
additional hardware resources, but less than a ‘for loop logic’ block.
Area, time and A*T product are taken as parameters for analysis of the per-
formance of the implementations. The experimental results over Xilinx Virtex-V
xc5vlx50 technology [84] are shown in Table 6.5. Note that, except for the design
of Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3 over GF (2163), all the designs, as listed in Table 6.5, ex-
ceed the area constraint of Xilinx Virtex-V xc5vlx50 technology [84]. Larger FPGA
technology must be chosen to implement these larger designs.
6.7 Analysis of implementation result of the proposed
countermeasures
This section compares the performance of the designs according to the implemen-
tation results in the tables in the previous sections. As in the analysis in section
4.4, because for each m, when the parameters (#Mult and d) change, the trends of
how the implementation results change are similar. Here, implementation results for
proposed countermeasures over GF (2571) are taken as an example.
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Fig. 6.1: Time requirement of the countermeasures, bus type, DSM designs, d=1, 2 and 3,
m=571
6.7.1 Time analysis
Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 show the calculation time of the original ηT algorithm (Algorithm
2.2), the countermeasure in Algorithm 6.1 and the countermeasures in Algorithms
6.2 and 6.3, over GF (2571). Each sub-figure shows the case for different #Mult.
Fig. 6.3 shows the calculation time of the maximum DSM designs of the counter-
measures, i.e. 14×DSM for Algorithm 6.1 and 11×DSM for Algorithms 6.2 and
6.3. The Karatsuba design timing results are also illustrated in Fig. 6.3. As can
be seen from these figures, when #Mult increases or when digit size d increases,
the calculation time of the designs decreases. Optimizing the multiplications speeds
up the countermeasures in the same way as it speeds up the original ηT algorithm.
However, when using the same multiplier schedule, Algorithm 6.1 always requires
more time for the calculation than Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3 due to the time penalty
in the additional operations. In Figs. 6.1 and 6.2, when using the same number of
multipliers, the calculation time required for Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3 is always more
than that for the original ηT algorithm. However, the ‘Max DSM Designs’ sub-figure
of Fig. 6.3 shows that by adding more DSMs into the design and having all the addi-
tional 4 multiplications pipelined with the original 7 multiplications, the calculation
of Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3 can be speeded up to same level as that of the original ηT
algorithm. Algorithm 6.1 doesn’t show this feature because apart from additional
multiplications, when compared to Algorithm 2.2, the additions and squarings in Al-
gorithm 6.1 are doubled. Optimizing the multiplications in Algorithm 6.1 does not
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Fig. 6.2: Time requirement of the countermeasures, bus type, DSM designs, d=4 and 7,
m=571
help reduce the calculation time of the other operations. The ‘Karatsuba Designs’
sub-figure shows the calculation time of designs using Karatsuba multipliers over
field GF (2571). ‘BN’ and ‘MN’ represent bus type design without registers inserted
and mixed type design with registers inserted, respectively. Similar to the maximum
DSM designs, the bus type Karatsuba design results of Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3 and
Algorithm 2.2 are almost the same. However, in mixed type designs over GF (2571),
the ‘for’ loop takes 36 clock cycles for Algorithm 2.2, 72 clock cycles for Algorithm
6.1 and 56 clock cycles for Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. This enlarges the
difference between the calculation time for each algorithm.
6.7.2 Time ratio analysis
Fig. 6.4 and 6.5 show the time increment ratio of the proposed countermeasures
compared to the original ηT of Algorithm 2.2. In Fig. 6.4 it can be clearly seen
that the calculation time ratio for designs implementing Algorithm 6.1 is over 200%
when using 1, 4 and 7 DSMs and Karatsuba multiplier of both types of top-level
architecture. However, when using 2 and 3 DSMs, the designs of Algorithm 6.1
exhibit a time ratio of less time than 200%. This is because the unused DSMs
in these two cases of the original ηT algorithm, as shown in the schedule in Fig.
4.7, are utilized to perform the additional operations in Algorithm 6.1. When digit
size d increases, the proportion of calculation time consumed by the multiplications
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Fig. 6.3: Time requirement of the countermeasures, bus type, maximum DSM designs and
Karatsuba designs, m=571
Fig. 6.4: Time Ratio of the countermea-
sure in Algorithm 6.1, m=571
Fig. 6.5: Time Ratio of the countermea-
sures in Algorithms 6.2 & 6.3,
m=571
decreases. The time ratio does not vary significantly, but shows a trend towards
200%. When the calculation time of the multiplications is reduced to the extreme
case, i.e. in only 1 clock cycle, the ratio should be 200%, as in the case of bus type
Karatsuba designs. As in Fig. 6.4, in the calculation time increment ratio shown
in Fig. 6.5, different numbers of DSMs provide different utilizations of the unused
DSMs in the original ηT algorithm. In bus type designs, increasing the digit size d
of the DSMs makes the time ratio tend to the same level as the bus type Karatsuba
design. In both Figs. 6.4 and 6.5, mixed type Karatsuba designs exhibit higher
time ratios than bus type Karatsuba designs. This is because the ‘for loop logic’
block optimized the calculation time of the additions and squarings to a very short
time and consequently multiplications once again dominate the calculation time and,
thus, dominate the time increment ratio: about 14
7
= 200% for Algorithm 6.1 and
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11
7
= 157% for Algorithms 6.2 and 6.3.
Fig. 6.6: Area requirement of countermeasure implementations across different field size
m, mixed type top-level architecture
As the countermeasure designs using DSMs has the same structure as the original
ηT algorithm, the bus type designs’ area performances are not discussed further here.
Fig. 6.6 shows the area performance of the mixed type designs of the countermea-
sures. As can be seen from the algorithms, the countermeasures require additional
operations to protect the pairing algorithm. To implement the additional multiplica-
tions in the ‘for’ loop, more multiplexors are required. Also, to implement additional
additions and squarings in the ‘for’ loop, more XOR chains are required. These all
make the hardware resources requirement of the countermeasures larger than that of
the original ηT algorithm. When field size m increases from 163 to 283, the Karatsuba
multiplier in the mixed type designs increases proportional to n2 × 3log2 mn . When
m increases from 283 to 571, although the Karatsuba multiplier does not change
significantly, all the addition and squaring components in the designs grow linearly
with m and, thus, the area of the designs still increases.
6.7.3 A*T product analysis
Fig. 6.7 shows the A*T product comparison of bus type and mixed type Karatsuba
designs. Since the bus type designs of the same parameters are of the same area as the
original ηT algorithm, the A*T product of such designs are of the same ratio as their
timing performance as seen in Fig. 6.7. However, the A*T product performances of
the mixed type Karatsuba designs shows a difference. The A*T product of Algorithm
2.2 is smaller than its bus type design. In the countermeasure designs, because of
the additional operations, both the calculation time and the hardware resources
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Fig. 6.7: Area*Time product of the countermeasures, Karatsuba designs, m=571
requirements increased. This makes the A*T product of mixed type Karatsuba
designs larger than that of bus type Karatsuba designs.
6.8 Conclusions
This chapter investigated the FPGA implementation of three countermeasures ap-
plied to the ηT algorithm, to protect it against CPA attacks. All the three coun-
termeasures proposed in this chapter ensure the security of ηT pairing in IBE and
ABE systems. As discussed in section 6.4, the countermeasures Randomizing Miller
variable in Algorithm 6.2 and using projective coordinates in Algorithm 6.3 provide
the security of the ηT pairing algorithm, irrespective of which input is exposed to
the insecure channel. However, the designers using the bilinearity method shown in
Algorithm 6.1 still have to carefully arrange the inputs by connecting the information
from an insecure channel to input Q of the pairing based cryptosystem.
The operations required for the countermeasures, when compared to original ηT
algorithm, were analyzed. The implementation results of these three countermea-
sures for bus type and mixed type architectures were shown. Similar to the imple-
mentation results of the original ηT algorithm, the mixed type architecture shows the
best performance in calculation time. However, the cost of fast calculation speed is
a large hardware resources requirement. Most of the designs of the countermeasures
using the mixed type architecture exceed the area constraint of the proposed FPGA
device in this work (Xilinx Virtex-V xc5vlx50 technology [84]).
The time increments of the countermeasures under different multiplier schedules
were listed. The results show that the bilinearity countermeasure takes 200% of
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the calculation time of the original ηT algorithm when using the same amount of
hardware resources. The time ratio of countermeasures Randomizing Miller variable
and using projective coordinates is about 157%, which is smaller.
This chapter showed the implementation results of the proposed three counter-
measures. Unlike previous works [16, 17, 18, 145], this work presented the cost
overheads of the countermeasures from the hardware designer’s point of view.
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7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Contributions to the Field
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized in this Chapter. In Chapter 3
the basic architecture for operations on elliptic curves over finite field GF (2m) was
introduced. The adder and the bit-parallel squarer are commonly used in Elliptic
curve based cryptosystems. Among the two multipliers introduced, the DSM calcu-
lates a multiplication in n = dm
d
e clock cycles. The original Karatsuba multiplier
calculates a GF (2m) multiplication in only 1 clock cycle. With registers inserted to
improve the critical path performance, the Karatsuba multiplier calculates a GF (2m)
multiplication in 3 clock cycles. For the two structures of divider/inverter, the EEA
divider calculates in a fixed time of 2m+1 clock cycles, the IT inverter reuses the
multiplier and the squarer and the calculation time depends on the multiplier struc-
ture used in the design. These different operation blocks provides the designer with
various ways of configuring the hardware resources in implementing Elliptic curve
based cryptosystems.
Chapter 4 studies the common used top-level structures of the pairing based
cryptosystems. With all the operation blocks introduced in Chapter 3, the designer
is able to build up his own cryptosystem. A bus type top-level architecture for
the ηT algorithm of Tate pairing is implemented and the results are given. In this
architecture a bus connect all the GF (2m) components and memory control units.
This type of structure can be flexible. With more hardware resource connected to
the bus, the system can calculate the algorithm faster. In this work, time, area,
and A*T product (area × time) are used to analyse the efficiency of the hardware
implementations. As was to be expected, for the same architecture, the more area
used, the faster speed achieved. Fore designs over GF (2571), among the designs of
bus type architecture using DSMs, the design with one DSM of digit size d=32 shows
the lowest A*T product, i.e. the best efficiency between area and time. However,
the design using Karatsuba multiplier with registers inserted shows the lowest A*T
product amongst all bus type architecture designs.
7.1. Contributions to the Field
In Chapter 4, the reconfigurable designs of bus type top-level architecture are
introduced. As there are 7 multiplications in the main loop of the proposed ηT al-
gorithm, using different number of multipliers requires different scheduling of the
operations. With different digit sizes of the DSMs, this work presents the implemen-
tation results of the reconfigurable structure. Both DSM and Karatsuba multiplier
are used as the GF (2m) multiplier unit. The implementation results with both area
and timing performance are shown. This work was presented in the 6th International
Symposium on Applied Reconfigurable Computing 2010 (ARC 2010) [159].
The bus type architecture is reconfigurable, but adds in only multipliers to speed
up the multiplications of the ηT pairing algorithms. It does not perform the addition
and squaring operations in the “for” loop efficiently. Thus a mixed type top-level
architecture which speeds up the other operations in the “for” loop is proposed. This
method further compresses the calculation time of the “for” loop by calculating all
addition and squaring operations in the loop in parallel. It results in an excellent
calculation time. Among all the designs over the mixed type architecture design
using Karatsuba multiplier without registers inserted shows the lowest A*T product.
However, a large area is required to implement such method.
Chapter 5 considers the side channel analysis (SCA) attacks which make use of
the side channel information leaked during the operation of target cryptosystem.
A Correlation power analysis attack is applied to the FPGA implemented cryp-
tosystems in this work. The commonly used power consumption models to fit the
hardware implementations, the Hamming Weight model and the Hamming Distance
model, are studied. This work chose the Hamming Distance model because this
model fits the side channel information better.
For the ηT algorithm implementation in this work, the attacks applied are based
upon the assumption that the ηT algorithm is to be used in an IBE or an ABE
system which works allows two parties to communicate through an insecurity chan-
nel. In the insecure channel, it is assumed that an attacker can get access to and
can alter the ciphertext sent between the sender and the intended receiver. This
assumption is a common condition in public key cryptosystem attacks. This chapter
fully analyzes the ηT algorithm in the IBE and ABE schemes and identifies several
possible weaknesses in the addition operation and the multiplication operations of
the ηT algorithm. The detailed steps for attacking each possible weakness are intro-
duced. The power traces collected from the operating hardware and the calculated
correlation results are illustrated. Successful attack results shows that the power
consumption model selected in this work fits well the hardware power consumption.
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As long as the attacker finds a suitable target and build the computable power con-
sumption model, the correlation power analysis attack can work well with the side
channel information collected.
The results of attacks on the pairing implementation with different number of
multipliers are presented. The successful attack shows that increasing the amount
of hardware resource taken does not help the security aspect of the cryptosystem.
Whether with one multiplier or with 7 multipliers in parallel, the side channel attacks
will reveal the private information. This CPA attack against the multipliers in the
ηT algorithm implementation of bus type top level structure was presented in the
7th International Symposium on Applied Reconfigurable Computing in 2011 (ARC
2011) [160].
In Chapter 6, several important weaknesses when implementing the multiplica-
tions in a pairing based cryptosystem are listed from the attacker’s point of view.
The security analysis in this chapter pointed out that by carefully arranging the
multipliers in the ηT pairing algorithm, weaknesses in the GF (2
m) multiplications
can be eliminated. However, additional operations must be applied on the original
algorithm to protect the GF (2m) addition. For this reason, this chapter introduced
three countermeasures which protect the GF (2m) operation in the ηT algorithm from
the CPA attack through mathematically methods. Along with the same top level
architecture introduced in implementing the original ηT algorithm, the implementa-
tion results of the three countermeasures are presented. The additional operations
needed and the additional operation time required for calculating a secure ηT algo-
rithm using the countermeasures are analyzed. Amongst the countermeasures the
bilinearity method requires almost 100% additional calculation time. The other two
countermeasures, randomizing the Miller variable and using projective coordinates,
incur the same cost which is about 150% of the original ηT algorithm, less than that
of the bilinearity method. The implementation results of the designs provide the
designers with different choices.
7.2 Future work
From the design and implementation of the basic operation blocks, to the top level
structure of the whole algorithm, and then to the flaws in the hardware implemented
cryptosystem and how to solve such problems, this thesis presented a full design flow
of how to securely implement an ηT pairing algorithm which is suitable for use in IBE
and ABE cryptosystems. The functional algorithms in the IBE and ABE schemes
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are all introduced in this thesis including the point operations, the hash function,
and the pairing algorithms. One of the directions of the future work is to complete
the peripheral circuits, such as the hash functions, the random number generator and
the wrapper which fits the cryptosystem into suitable number of input and output
ports, and make the pairing based public key schemes an independent circuit.
In the implementation of GF (2m) multiplications, the DSM [126] and Karatsuba
multiplier[77] are condisered. However, a designer may try to mix these two types of
multipliers to take advantage of their properties. There are two ways of combining
them: 1) the d × m multiplication block of the DSM can be composed of several
parallel sub-multiplier blocks of the Karatsuba structure; 2) the n×n sub-multiplier
blocks of the Karatsuba multiplier can use digit-serial or bit-serial structures. How-
ever, as mentioned by Rebeiro [130], the size of the sub-multiplier blocks of the
Karatsuba multiplier should be around 20. Thus the combination of the DSM and
the Karatsuba multiplier doesn’t suit small digit sized multipliers.
The operations in the ηT algorithm are all based on Elliptic curves. In other El-
liptic curve based cryptographies, these operations are widely used as well. The CPA
attack provides a test that shows the potential risks that might exist in other cryp-
tosystems. Further work of the CPA attackers should be focused on other protocols
and algorithms that make use of the Elliptic curve operation blocks. As proved by
this work, the hamming distance model well fits the power consumption of FPGA im-
plementations. Other side channel analysis methods such as fault attacks [161, 162],
timing attacks [14], electro-magnetic ratiation [15] attacks can be applied on Elliptic
curve based cryptosystems. In power analysis attacks, there also are different ap-
proaches such as the template attack [163] and high-order DPA attacks [164]. All
these methods provide effective ways of revealing the weaknesses that exist in these
public key cryptosystems.
This work only investigated performance and the security aspect of FPGA imple-
mented pairing algorithm designed for IBE and ABE schemes. Such cryptosystems
can also be implemented over other hardware such as microprocessors or ASICs,
which are of different structures and show different features in the side channel in-
formation leaked during operation. Different hardware platforms can lead to different
power consumption models to fit the side channel information and may require dif-
ferent methods of generating the hypothetical value of the target data. This can be
another interesting direction of research.
The performances investigated in this work mainly focus on the area and timings
required for each design. Electrical power and energy are two other parameters that
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feature in the performance of an implementation. The power P dissipated in the
implementation is calculated as per P = Re[V · I∗], where V is the supply voltage,
I is the current flow through the circuit, ∗ denotes complex conjugate and Re[]
represents the real part of the product. Energy E consumed by the implementation
is the product of power and time and can be calculated by E = Pavg · T , where T
is the time the circuit is operating and Pavg represent the average power over the
time. A fully charged battery contains only a certain amount of energy. Thus , in
battery powered system, minimising energy usage helps extend the system lifetime.
For this reason, power and energy consumption of the implementations can also be
insteresting to designers.
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APPENDIX

A. SCHEDULE OF “FOR” LOOP OPERATIONS
In each iteration of the “for” loop in steps 3-7 of Algorithm 2.2, the operations can
be divided into three parts: the pre-multiplication operations (“PRE” for short), the
7 multiplications, and the post-multipication operations(“POST” for short). Each
part requires 11A+8S, 7M, and 13A respectively. The operation flow of the “PRE”
and “POST” blocks are listed in Fig. A.1 and A.2. The arrangement of the 7M
using different number of multipliers are illustrated in Fig. A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, and
A.7.
In these figures, the block signs “A”, “S”, and “M” represent the operations of
addition, squaring, and multiplication over GF (2m) respectively. The operands of
each operation are listed on the right hand side of the block signs. The intermediate
variables generated by each operation are denoted as “sum”, “sq”, and “p”. These
variables will be part of the following calculations or the calculations in the next
“for” loop iteration.
The → signs indicate that the results generated by the current operations has a
specific name in Algorithm 2.2. There are two kinds of subscription in the figures:
The numbers without brackets indicates that this variable is part of an element over
GF (24m), i.e. A(t) = a0+a1t+a2t
2 and C(t) = c0+c1t+c2t
2+c3t
3; The number with
brackets indicates the iteration this variable is going to be calculated. For example,
c0(i) was generated in iteration (i− 1), and takes part in the calculation of iteration
(i) (i is the current iteration number); c0(i+1) is generated in the current iteration
and will be an operand in iteration (i+ 1)’s calculation.
AA
A
A
S
S
S
S
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
S
S
S
S
sum1 =
sum3 =
sum2 = sum1 + 
sum4 = sum3 + 1
sq2 = c
sq3 = c
sq4 = c
2
2
2
2
sum5 = sq1 + sq3
sum6 = sq2 + sq4
a
a
a
0
1
2
sq1 = c
sum7 = sq4 + sum6
sum8 = sum7 + sq3
sum9 = sum7 + sum5
sum10 = sum3 + sum4
sum11 = sq3 + sum6
sq5 = α
α
β
β
sq6 = 
sq7 = 
sq8 = 
2
4
2
4
0(i)
1(i)
2(i)
3(i)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
α
β
(i+1)
(i+1)
Time (clks) for PRE operations
u +
γ
α
(i) β(i)
(i)
(i) + v(i)
Fig. A.1: Schedule of “PRE”
block operations
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
sum12 = p2 + p3
sum13 = sum12 +sum5 
sum14 = p2 + p4
sum15 = p5 + sum14
sum16 = p6 + sum15
sum17 = sq4 + sum5
sum18 = sum16 + sum17
sum19 = p7 + sum15
sum20 = sum19 + sq3
sum21 = p4 + p7
sum22 = sum21 +sum6 
sum23 = v   + 1
sum24 = u   + sum23
c
c
c
c
0(i+1)
1(i+1)
2(i+1)
3(i+1)
RAM update operations
FSM operations
v
u
(i+1)
(i+1)
Time (clks) for POST operations
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
42
47
(i)
(i)
Fig. A.2: Schedule of “POST”
block operations
160
MM
M
M
M
M
M
(i) (i)αp1 = v   * 
p5 = sum9 * sum10
p7 = sum10 * sum11
p2 = sum5 * sum2
p3 = sum7 * sum4 
p4 = sum8 * sum2
p6 = sq4 * sum4
38
n+40
2n+42
3n+44
4n+46
5n+48
6n+50
7n+52
PRE
0
POST
7n+99
Time (clks) for # Mult = 1
Fig. A.3: Schedule of the 7 multi-
plications, #Mult=1
M M
M M
M M
M M
POST
38
PRE
0
Time (clks) for # Mult = 2
p3 = sum7 * sum4 p4 = sum8 * sum2
p2 = sum5 * sum2
p5 = sum9 * sum10 p6 = sq4 * sum4
p7 = sum10 * sum11
n+41
2n+44
3n+47
4n+49
4n+96
p1 = v   * α(i) (i)
Fig. A.4: Schedule of the 7 multiplications,
#Mult=2
POST
MMM
M M M
M M M
38
PRE
0
Time (clks) for # Mult = 3
3n+48
3n+95
p3 = sum7 * sum4 
p4 = sum8 * sum2 p5 = sum9 * sum10
p2 = sum5 * sum2
p6 = sq4 * sum4
p7 = sum10 * sum11
n+42
2n+46
αp1 = v   * (i) (i)
Fig. A.5: Schedule of the 7 multiplications,
#Mult=3
MMM
M M
M
M M
POST
38
PRE
0
Time (clks) for # Mult = 4
n+43
2n+47
p3 = sum7 * sum4 p4 = sum8 * sum2
p2 = sum5 * sum2
p5 = sum9 * sum10 p6 = sq4 * sum4
p7 = sum10 * sum11
2n+94
p1 = v   * α(i) (i)
Fig. A.6: Schedule of the 7 multiplications,
#Mult=4
M MM M M M M
POST
38
PRE
0
Time (clks) for # Mult = 7
n+46
p4 = sum8 * sum2 p6 = sq4 * sum4p5 = sum9 * sum10
p3 = sum7 * sum4 p2 = sum5 * sum2
p7 = sum10 * sum11
n+93
p1 = v   * α(i) (i)
Fig. A.7: Schedule of the 7 multiplications,
#Mult=7
161
B. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS OF TATE PAIRING
Parameters Results
#Mult d n Regs LUTs
Freq. Time A*T
(MHz) (µs) (LUT*s)
1× DSM
1 163 2202 2296 248.6 845.3 1.94
2 82 2202 2457 248.6 456.3 1.12
4 41 2201 2625 248.6 259.4 0.68
8 21 2204 2809 248.6 163.3 0.46
16 11 2211 3478 248.6 115.3 0.40
32 6 2231 4733 248.6 91.3 0.43
2× DSM
1 163 2701 2641 243.6 520.7 1.38
2 82 2703 2982 243.6 293.6 0.88
4 41 2700 3304 243.6 178.7 0.59
8 21 2706 3676 243.6 122.6 0.45
16 11 2719 5030 243.6 94.6 0.48
32 6 2753 7516 243.6 80.6 0.61
3× DSM
1 163 3194 3471 225.1 438.3 1.52
2 82 3194 3948 225.1 254.8 1.01
4 41 3190 4453 225.1 161.9 0.72
8 21 3199 5431 225.1 116.5 0.63
16 11 3220 7848 225.1 93.9 0.74
32 6 3273 10952 226.7 82.0 0.90
4× DSM
1 163 3694 4959 217.8 329.5 1.63
2 82 3695 5596 217.8 201.2 1.13
4 41 3689 5948 212.6 139.6 0.83
8 21 3710 7573 217.8 104.5 0.79
16 11 3729 10890 217.8 88.7 0.97
32 6 3796 14077 220.1 79.9 1.13
7× DSM
1 163 5196 6587 214.8 207.4 1.37
2 82 5196 7715 214.8 140.2 1.08
4 41 5187 8907 214.8 106.3 0.95
8 21 5208 11250 214.8 89.7 1.01
16 11 5257 17163 214.8 81.4 1.40
32 7 5366 22400 209.9 79.9 1.79
Kara. no Reg 1 1865 8938 158.8 105.3 0.94
Kara. with Reg 3 5088 8864 244.8 78.1 0.69
Tab. B.1: Implementation results of Tate pairing, bus type, Xilinx Virtex-V, m=163
163
Parameters Results
#Mult d n Regs LUTs
Freq. Time A*T
(MHz) (µs) (LUT*s)
1× DSM
1 233 3102 3200 241.4 1717.0 5.49
2 117 3102 3434 241.4 907.8 3.12
4 59 3103 3668 241.4 503.2 1.85
8 30 3106 3912 241.4 300.8 1.18
16 15 3104 5305 241.4 196.2 1.04
32 8 3129 6693 243.9 145.9 0.98
2× DSM
1 233 3347 3157 301.3 818.1 2.58
2 117 3813 4141 233.0 578.4 2.40
4 59 3815 4608 233.0 338.7 1.56
8 30 3823 5543 233.0 218.9 1.21
16 15 3818 7868 233.0 156.9 1.23
32 8 3857 10436 233.0 127.9 1.34
3× DSM
1 233 4524 4090 222.7 852.6 3.49
2 117 4524 4791 222.7 477.5 2.29
4 59 4528 5494 222.7 290.0 1.59
8 30 4537 6892 222.7 196.3 1.35
16 15 4533 10378 222.7 147.8 1.53
32 8 4586 14283 228.0 122.2 1.75
4× DSM
1 233 4535 6738 219.8 614.7 4.14
2 117 5235 7903 219.8 358.7 2.84
4 59 5240 8832 219.8 230.8 2.04
8 30 5252 10681 219.8 166.8 1.78
16 15 5247 15302 219.8 133.7 2.05
32 8 5313 19783 216.2 120.2 2.38
7× DSM
1 233 7365 9757 217.8 366.8 3.58
2 117 7367 11404 217.8 234.7 2.68
4 59 7372 10013 207.2 177.3 1.78
8 30 7393 16347 217.8 135.7 2.22
16 15 7385 24491 217.8 118.6 2.90
32 8 7494 33654 223.3 107.9 3.63
Kara. no Reg 1 2634 14420 159.0 149.6 2.16
Kara. with Reg 3 7301 14478 254.8 106.6 1.54
Tab. B.2: Implementation results of Tate pairing, bus type, Xilinx Virtex-V, m=233
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Parameters Results
#Mult d n Regs LUTs
Freq. Time A*T
(MHz) (µs) (LUT*s)
1× DSM
1 283 3756 3860 226.6 2658.5 10.26
2 142 3755 4137 226.6 1392.9 5.76
4 71 3755 4431 226.6 755.6 3.35
8 36 3757 4993 241.4 414.4 2.07
16 18 3756 6419 226.6 279.9 1.80
32 9 3765 8145 229.6 196.5 1.60
2× DSM
1 283 4618 4446 221.8 1604.8 7.13
2 142 4619 5276 221.8 865.4 4.57
4 71 4615 5590 221.8 493.1 2.76
8 36 4622 6988 221.8 309.6 2.16
16 18 4620 9569 221.8 215.2 2.06
32 9 4627 12523 227.3 164.0 2.05
3× DSM
1 283 5481 5893 225.4 1211.2 7.14
2 142 5480 6724 225.4 667.0 4.49
4 71 5477 7603 225.4 393.0 2.99
8 36 5485 9374 225.4 257.9 2.42
16 18 5482 12737 225.4 188.4 2.40
32 9 5487 17584 229.2 151.1 2.66
4× DSM
1 283 6342 7902 210.9 912.1 7.21
2 142 6341 9571 215.6 509.6 4.88
4 71 6337 10743 215.6 317.0 3.41
8 36 6350 12976 215.6 222.0 2.88
16 18 6345 17587 215.6 173.2 3.05
32 9 6348 21882 217.1 147.7 3.23
7× DSM
1 283 8925 11231 212.1 524.0 5.88
2 142 8925 12764 217.6 317.7 4.05
4 71 8919 15261 212.1 226.1 3.45
8 36 8939 19218 212.1 177.0 3.40
16 18 8932 29199 212.1 151.7 4.43
32 9 8929 36312 209.2 141.0 5.12
Kara. no Reg 1 3188 14420 153.7 187.6 2.71
Kara. with Reg 3 8859 14478 240.9 136.6 1.98
Tab. B.3: Implementation results of Tate pairing, bus type, Xilinx Virtex-V, m=283
165
C. FEATURES OF VIRTEX FAMILIES
Family Virtex-2 Virtex-4 Virtex-5 Virtex-6
LUTs per Slice 2 2 4 4
LUTs type 4-in,1-out 4-in,1-out 6-in,1-out
6-in,1-out or
5-in,2-out
Max Freq. 200 MHz 450 MHz 550 MHz 600 MHz
Tab. C.1: Area and Speed Features of Virtex Families 2, 4, 5 and 6 [84, 82, 83, 85]
D. COUNTERMEASURES ALGORITHMS USING PROJECTIVE
COORDINATES
Algorithm D.1 Using Jacobian projective coordinates
Input : P (α, β), Q(x, y)
Random Number : λ 6= 0 ∈ GF (2m)
Output : c = e(P ;Q)
1: C(t)← 1
2: x← x2, y ← y2, α← α4, β ← β4
3: (X, Y, Z)← (λ3x, λ2y, λ)
4: Z ← Z6
5: V ← X,U ← X + Y + m−1
2
Z
6: J ← α(V + Z), K ← βZ, L← αZ
7: for i = 0 : m− 1
8: A(t)← J +K + U + (L+ V )t+ (L+ V + Z)t2
9: C(t)← C(t)2 ∗ A(t)
10: U ← U + V + Z, V ← V + Z, α← α4, β ← β4
11: J ← αV,K ← βZ,L← αZ
12: end for
13: return C(t)← C(t)22m−1
total cost:(11m+59)M+(26m+65)A+(8m+12)S+1I
Algorithm D.2 Using Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates
Input : P (α, β), Q(x, y)
Random Number : λ 6= 0 ∈ GF (2m)
Output : c = e(P ;Q)
1: C(t)← 1
2: x← x2, y ← y2, α← α4, β ← β4
3: (X, Y, Z)← (λ2x, λy, λ)
4: Z ← Z2
5: V ← X,U ← X + Y + m−1
2
Z
6: J ← α(V + Z), K ← βZ, L← αZ
7: for i = 0 : m− 1
8: A(t)← J +K + U + (L+ V )t+ (L+ V + Z)t2
9: C(t)← C(t)2 ∗ A(t)
10: U ← U + V + Z, V ← V + Z, α← α4, β ← β4
11: J ← αV,K ← βZ,L← αZ
12: end for
13: return C(t)← C(t)22m−1
total cost:(11m+58)M+(26m+65)A+(8m+11)S+1I
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Parameters Alg.2.2 Alg. 6.1 Alg. 6.2 & 6.3
#Mult d n
Time Time
Ratio
Time
Ratio
(µs) (µs) (µs)
1× DSM
1 163 845.3 1713.5 202.7 % 1282.7 151.7 %
2 82 456.3 924.4 202.6 % 679.6 148.9 %
4 41 259.4 524.9 202.4 % 374.3 144.3 %
8 21 163.3 330.1 202.1 % 225.4 138.0 %
16 11 115.3 232.6 201.8 % 150.9 130.9 %
32 6 91.3 183.9 201.5 % 113.7 124.6 %
2× DSM
1 163 520.7 970.5 186.4 % 748.9 143.8 %
2 82 293.6 551.9 187.9 % 411.8 140.2 %
4 41 178.7 340.0 190.3 % 241.1 134.9 %
8 21 122.6 236.6 193.0 % 157.9 128.7 %
16 11 94.6 184.9 195.5 % 116.2 122.9 %
32 6 80.6 159.1 197.5 % 95.4 118.5 %
3× DSM
1 163 438.3 806.9 184.1 % 567.2 129.4 %
2 82 254.8 474.8 186.4 % 323.2 126.9 %
4 41 161.9 306.7 189.5 % 199.7 123.4 %
8 21 116.5 224.7 192.8 % 139.5 119.7 %
16 11 93.9 183.7 195.6 % 109.4 116.5 %
32 6 82.6 163.2 197.6 % 94.3 114.2 %
4× DSM
1 163 329.5 710.5 215.6 % 462.7 140.4 %
2 82 201.2 428.6 213.1 % 271.9 135.2 %
4 41 139.6 292.9 209.9 % 179.7 128.7 %
8 21 104.5 216.3 206.9 % 128.3 122.7 %
16 11 88.7 181.5 204.6 % 104.7 118.0 %
32 6 80.8 164.1 203.1 % 92.9 115.0 %
7× DSM
1 163 207.4 470.0 226.7 % 342.5 165.2 %
2 82 140.2 308.6 220.1 % 212.0 151.2 %
4 41 106.3 226.9 213.6 % 145.9 137.3 %
8 21 89.7 187.1 208.6 % 113.7 126.8 %
16 11 81.4 167.1 205.4 % 97.6 119.9 %
32 7 78.1 159.2 203.9 % 91.2 116.8 %
Kara. no Reg 1 105.3 211.7 201.1 % 105.3 113.7 %
Tab. E.1: Calculation time (µs) of proposed countermeasures, m = 163
170
Parameters Alg.2.2 Alg. 6.1 Alg. 6.2 & 6.3
#Mult d n
Time Time
Ratio
Time
Ratio
(µs) (µs) (µs)
1× DSM
1 233 1717.0 3467.6 202.0 % 2631.0 153.2 %
2 117 907.8 1832.9 201.9 % 1371.6 151.1 %
4 59 503.2 1015.5 201.8 % 741.8 147.4 %
8 30 300.8 606.8 201.7 % 427.0 141.9 %
16 15 196.2 395.4 201.5 % 264.1 134.6 %
32 8 147.4 296.8 201.4 % 188.1 127.6 %
2× DSM
1 233 818.1 1500.0 183.4 % 1190.1 145.5 %
2 117 578.4 1068.9 184.8 % 825.0 142.6 %
4 59 338.7 633.5 187.0 % 468.0 138.2 %
8 30 218.9 415.9 190.0 % 289.5 132.3 %
16 15 156.9 303.3 193.3 % 197.2 125.7 %
32 8 127.9 250.7 196.0 % 154.1 120.5 %
3× DSM
1 233 852.6 1531.4 179.6 % 1112.1 130.4 %
2 117 477.5 868.3 181.8 % 613.1 128.4 %
4 59 290.0 536.7 185.1 % 363.6 125.4 %
8 30 196.3 371.0 189.0 % 238.8 121.7 %
16 15 147.8 285.2 193.0 % 174.3 117.9 %
32 8 125.1 245.2 196.0 % 144.2 115.2 %
4× DSM
1 233 614.7 1302.4 211.9 % 877.6 142.8 %
2 117 358.7 754.6 210.4 % 496.1 138.3 %
4 59 230.8 480.7 208.3 % 305.3 132.3 %
8 30 166.8 343.8 206.1 % 209.9 125.9 %
16 15 133.7 272.9 204.2 % 160.5 120.1 %
32 8 118.2 239.9 202.9 % 137.5 116.3 %
7× DSM
1 233 366.8 811.6 221.3 % 632.1 172.3 %
2 117 234.7 509.1 216.9 % 373.3 159.0 %
4 59 177.3 376.1 212.1 % 256.3 144.6 %
8 30 135.7 282.2 208.0 % 179.2 132.1 %
16 15 118.6 243.1 205.0 % 145.7 122.9 %
32 8 110.6 224.8 203.3 % 130.1 117.6 %
Kara. no Reg 1 149.6 300.8 201.0 % 149.6 113.8 %
Tab. E.2: Calculation time (µs) of proposed countermeasures, m = 233
171
Parameters Alg.2.2 Alg. 6.1 Alg. 6.2 & 6.3
#Mult d n
Time Time
Ratio
Time
Ratio
(µs) (µs) (µs)
1× DSM
1 283 2658.5 5360.7 201.6 % 4091.1 153.9 %
2 142 1392.9 2808.3 201.6 % 2117.9 152.1 %
4 71 755.6 1523.0 201.6 % 1124.4 148.8 %
8 36 414.4 834.9 201.5 % 595.7 143.8 %
16 18 279.9 563.6 201.4 % 382.7 136.7 %
32 9 199.1 400.7 201.3 % 256.8 129.0 %
2× DSM
1 283 1604.8 2921.1 182.0 % 2346.1 146.2 %
2 142 865.4 1586.7 183.3 % 1243.8 143.7 %
4 71 493.1 914.8 185.5 % 688.7 139.7 %
8 36 309.6 583.6 188.5 % 415.1 134.1 %
16 18 215.2 413.2 192.0 % 274.4 127.5 %
32 9 168.0 328.1 195.2 % 204.0 121.4 %
3× DSM
1 283 1211.2 2151.2 177.6 % 1585.4 130.9 %
2 142 667.0 1198.5 179.7 % 861.0 129.1 %
4 71 393.0 718.8 182.9 % 496.3 126.3 %
8 36 257.9 482.3 187.0 % 316.5 122.7 %
16 18 188.4 360.6 191.4 % 224.0 118.9 %
32 9 153.7 299.8 195.1 % 177.7 115.7 %
4× DSM
1 283 912.1 1916.7 210.1 % 1312.0 143.8 %
2 142 509.6 1065.3 209.0 % 712.5 139.8 %
4 71 317.0 657.6 207.5 % 425.0 134.1 %
8 36 222.0 456.6 205.7 % 283.3 127.6 %
16 18 173.2 353.2 204.0 % 210.4 121.5 %
32 9 148.7 301.6 202.7 % 173.9 116.9 %
7× DSM
1 283 524.0 1145.3 218.6 % 921.6 175.9 %
2 142 317.7 683.5 215.2 % 518.6 163.3 %
4 71 226.1 477.6 211.2 % 335.9 148.5 %
8 36 177.0 367.4 207.6 % 239.2 135.2 %
16 18 151.7 310.7 204.8 % 189.5 124.9 %
32 9 139.0 282.3 203.1 % 164.6 118.4 %
Kara. no Reg 1 187.6 377.2 201.0 % 187.6 113.8 %
Tab. E.3: Calculation time (µs) of proposed countermeasures, m = 283
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